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## **Offcase**

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#### Interpretation –

#### Restriction means prohibition of action – it’s distinct from supervision/oversight

Jean Schiedler-Brown 12, Attorney, Jean Schiedler-Brown & Associates, Appellant Brief of Randall Kinchloe v. States Dept of Health, Washington, The Court of Appeals of the State of Washington, Division 1, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A01/686429%20Appellant%20Randall%20Kincheloe%27s.pdf

3. The ordinary definition of the term "restrictions" also does not include the reporting and monitoring or supervising terms and conditions that are included in the 2001 Stipulation. ¶ Black's Law Dictionary, 'fifth edition,(1979) defines "restriction" as; ¶ A limitation often imposed in a deed or lease respecting the use to which the property may be put. The term "restrict' is also cross referenced with the term "restrain." Restrain is defined as; To limit, confine, abridge, narrow down, restrict, obstruct, impede, hinder, stay, destroy. To prohibit from action; to put compulsion on; to restrict; to hold or press back. To keep in check; to hold back from acting, proceeding, or advancing, either by physical or moral force, or by interposing obstacle, to repress or suppress, to curb. ¶ In contrast, the terms "supervise" and "supervisor" are defined as; To have general oversight over, to superintend or to inspect. See Supervisor. A surveyor or overseer. . . In a broad sense, one having authority over others, to superintend and direct. The term "supervisor" means an individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but required the use of independent judgment. ¶ Comparing the above definitions, it is clear that the definition of "restriction" is very different from the definition of "supervision"-very few of the same words are used to explain or define the different terms. In his 2001 stipulation, Mr. Kincheloe essentially agreed to some supervision conditions, but he did not agree to restrict his license.

#### War power is the power to conduct war successfully

HIRABAYASHI v. UNITED STATES - SUPREME COURT - June 21, 1943, Decided, 320 U.S. 81; 63 S. Ct. 1375; 87 L. Ed. 1774; 1943 U.S. LEXIS 1109

The war power of the national government is "the power to wage war successfully." See Charles Evans Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, 42 A. B. A. Rep. 232, 238.It extends to every matter and activity so related to war as substantially to affect its conduct and progress. The power is not restricted to the winning of victories in the field and the repulse of enemy forces. It embraces every phase of the national defense, including the protection of war materials and the members of the armed forces from injury and from the dangers which attend the rise, prosecution and progress of war. Prize Cases, supra; Miller v. United States, 11 Wall. 268, 303-14; Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall. 493, 506-07; Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366; McKinley v. United States, 249 U.S. 397; United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 622-23. HN4Go to this Headnote in the case.Since the Constitution commits to the Executive and to Congress the exercise of the war power in all the vicissitudes and conditions of warfare, it has necessarily given them wide scope for the exercise of judgment and discretion in determining the nature and extent of the threatened injury or danger and in the selection of the means for resisting it. Ex parte Quirin, supra, 28-29; cf. Prize Cases, supra, 670; Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19, 29. Where, as they did here, the conditions call for the exercise of judgment and discretion and for the choice of means by those branches of the Government on which the Constitution has placed the responsibility of war-making, it is not for any court to sit in review of the wisdom of their action or substitute its judgment for theirs.

#### Authority is the power to act

COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE, EASTERN SECTION - October 31, 1925, Decided, RACY CREAM COMPANY v. MARY BELLE WALDEN., 1 Tenn. App. 653; 1925 Tenn. App. LEXIS 85

While the circumstances in and of themselves do not necessarily show that the driver was the agent, employee or servant of the owner at the time of the accident, and if so that he was engaged in the master's business when the injury was effected, yet good reasons are shown justifying the purposes of the Legislature, if such justification was necessary, as to why these two essential facts should be presumed. The driver fled immediately after the accident, so that his name or identity was not known, and the difficulty of proving the same is therefore manifest, together with the necessity of indulging some such presumption, or else justice will be defeated in an ever increasing number of similar incidents. On the other hand, if in any case the presumption should be ill founded, it would be an easy matter to furnish facts to controvert [\*\*33] it, which are, or would be, more easily within the knowledge of the defendants, or at least much less difficult for them to establish, and thus the ends of justice be subserved. Besides, as it appears from the facts of this case, the proposition has attractions of original merit. When evidence has been furnished as to the negligent injury by one driving the defendants' truck, presumably from the name Racy Cream Company on the truck, engaged in the sale, distribution or transportation of cream or its products, and at a time of day, nine o'clock in the forenoon, in a city where such business might reasonably be pursued, and where just such an outfit so manned might reasonably have been employed, with a woman almost dead in the street from having been wantonly mowed down by its rapid and illegal operation, it furnishes a combination of facts and circumstances from which, it could be more reasonably inferred that the driver was the owner's servant rather than a thief, and that he was engaged in the owners business rather than his own, or that of someone else in which the truck was borrowed or hired. At least these first conceptions are less involved and more direct than the latter, and [\*\*34] are the most natural and legitimate to which the mind first gravitates, and why not indulge them? These first-hand legitimate inferences call for explanation rather than to be combatted by other circumstances neither ordinary nor proximate. It is not a case of draft without reason, but a case of the accusing finger pointing naturally sought to a conclusion which the Legislature in the act just mentioned sought to mature as a prima-facie case. Has the body of the act in the use of the terms employed sufficiently effectuated the purposes expressed in the title? Considered without reference to the amendment, we think it has. It is conceded that while under our constitution [\*669] the body of an act cannot be broader than the restrictions of the title, it may be less pretentious, and thus fall short of the purpose expressed; and in this case authority for the prima-facie case claimed to justify any personal judgment against the defendants must be found in the use of the word "authority," as the other words ("knowledge and consent") used express nothing more than the permissive authority necessary to effect a lien against the machine, if the negligence consists in willful violation [\*\*35] of the statute. It is true that in a certain sense the word "authority" has a meaning synonimous with the other terms, "knowledge and consent," but used as it is in the act, and in connection with the other terms mentioned, it may have another meaning implying direction or supervision, signifying control of subordinate agency. As expressed in 6th. Volume of C. J., page 864, with reference to the term "authority," in defining same it is said: "In another sense power delegated by a principal to his agent or attorney. . . . Power to act, whether originally or delegated. Control over. Jurisdiction. The word is generally used to express a derivative power."

#### The plan creates a supervisory, ex post review – that’s not a limitation on action

#### Vote Neg

#### Predictable limits – There are 1000s of steps Congress could ask the president to take – minimum page requirements, specific military officials to notify, filling out the right report – and 1000s of different aspects of a mission they could review – Impossible for the neg to keep up with all the boxes they could have the President or Congress check

#### Ground – “Presidential flexibility bad” is core negative ground – ex post review leaves every presidential power on the table – aff can claim a perception advantage without touching core questions of presidential power

### Warfighting 1NC

#### Obama’s Syria maneuver has maximized presidential war powers because it’s on his terms

Posner 9/3, Law Prof at University of Chicago

(Eric, Obama Is Only Making His War Powers Mightier, www.slate.com/articles/news\_and\_politics/view\_from\_chicago/2013/09/obama\_going\_to\_congress\_on\_syria\_he\_s\_actually\_strengthening\_the\_war\_powers.html)

President Obama’s surprise announcement that he will ask Congress for approval of a military attack on Syria is being hailed as a vindication of the rule of law and a revival of the central role of Congress in war-making, even by critics. But all of this is wrong. Far from breaking new legal ground, President Obama has reaffirmed the primacy of the executive in matters of war and peace. The war powers of the presidency remain as mighty as ever. It would have been different if the president had announced that only Congress can authorize the use of military force, as dictated by the Constitution, which gives Congress alone the power to declare war. That would have been worthy of notice, a reversal of the ascendance of executive power over Congress. But the president said no such thing. He said: “I believe I have the authority to carry out this military action without specific congressional authorization.” Secretary of State John Kerry confirmed that the president “has the right to do that”—launch a military strike—“no matter what Congress does.” Thus, the president believes that the law gives him the option to seek a congressional yes or to act on his own. He does not believe that he is bound to do the first. He has merely stated the law as countless other presidents and their lawyers have described it before him. The president’s announcement should be understood as a political move, not a legal one. His motive is both self-serving and easy to understand, and it has been all but acknowledged by the administration. If Congress now approves the war, it must share blame with the president if what happens next in Syria goes badly. If Congress rejects the war, it must share blame with the president if Bashar al-Assad gases more Syrian children. The big problem for Obama arises if Congress says no and he decides he must go ahead anyway, and then the war goes badly. He won’t have broken the law as he understands it, but he will look bad. He would be the first president ever to ask Congress for the power to make war and then to go to war after Congress said no. (In the past, presidents who expected dissent did not ask Congress for permission.) People who celebrate the president for humbly begging Congress for approval also apparently don’t realize that his understanding of the law—that it gives him the option to go to Congress—maximizes executive power vis-à-vis Congress. If the president were required to act alone, without Congress, then he would have to take the blame for failing to use force when he should and using force when he shouldn’t. If he were required to obtain congressional authorization, then Congress would be able to block him. But if he can have it either way, he can force Congress to share responsibility when he wants to and avoid it when he knows that it will stand in his way.

#### **Statutory restriction of Presidential War Powers makes warfighting impossible**

Yoo 12 – prof of law @ UC Berkeley

(John, War Powers Belong to the President, ABA Journal February 2012 Issue, http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/war\_powers\_belong\_to\_the\_president) <we do not endorse the ableist language used in this card, but have left it in to preserve the author’s intent. we apologize for the author’s inappropriate use of the word “paralyze”>

The framers realized the obvious. Foreign affairs are unpredictable and involve the highest of stakes, making them unsuitable to regulation by pre-existing legislation. Instead, they can demand swift, decisive action—sometimes under pressured or even emergency circumstances—that is best carried out by a branch of government that does not suffer from multiple vetoes or is delayed by disagreements. Congress is too large and unwieldy to take the swift and decisive action required in wartime. Our framers replaced the Articles of Confederation, which had failed in the management of foreign relations because they had no single executive, with the Constitution’s single president for precisely this reason. Even when it has access to the same intelligence as the executive branch, Congress’ loose, decentralized structure would paralyze American policy while foreign threats grow. Congress has no political incentive to mount and see through its own wartime policy. Members of Congress, who are interested in keeping their seats at the next election, do not want to take stands on controversial issues where the future is uncertain. They will avoid like the plague any vote that will anger large segments of the electorate. They prefer that the president take the political risks and be held accountable for failure. Congress’ track record when it has opposed presidential leadership has not been a happy one. Perhaps the most telling example was the Senate’s rejection of the Treaty of Versailles at the end of World War I. Congress’ isolationist urge kept the United States out of Europe at a time when democracies fell and fascism grew in their place. Even as Europe and Asia plunged into war, Congress passed the Neutrality Acts designed to keep the United States out of the conflict. President Franklin Roosevelt violated those laws to help the Allies and draw the nation into war against the Axis. While pro-Congress critics worry about a president’s foreign adventurism, the real threat to our national security may come from inaction and isolationism. Many point to the Vietnam War as an example of the faults of the “imperial presidency.” Vietnam, however, could not have continued without the consistent support of Congress in raising a large military and paying for hostilities. And Vietnam ushered in a period of congressional dominance that witnessed American setbacks in the Cold War and the passage of the ineffectual War Powers Resolution. Congress passed the resolution in 1973 over President Richard Nixon’s veto, and no president, Republican or Democrat, George W. Bush or Obama, has ever accepted the constitutionality of its 60-day limit on the use of troops abroad. No federal court has ever upheld the resolution. Even Congress has never enforced it. Despite the record of practice and the Constitution’s institutional design, critics nevertheless argue for a radical remaking of the American way of war. They typically base their claim on Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution, which gives Congress the power to “declare war.” But these observers read the 18th century constitutional text through a modern lens by interpreting “declare war” to mean “start war.” When the Constitution was written, however, a declaration of war served diplomatic notice about a change in legal relations between nations. It had little to do with launching hostilities. In the century before the Constitution, for example, Great Britain—where the framers got the idea of the declare-war power—fought numerous major conflicts but declared war only once beforehand. Our Constitution sets out specific procedures for passing laws, appointing officers and making treaties. There are none for waging war because the framers expected the president and Congress to struggle over war through the national political process. In fact, other parts of the Constitution, properly read, support this reading. Article I, Section 10, for example, declares that the states shall not “engage” in war “without the consent of Congress” unless “actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.” This provision creates exactly the limits desired by anti-war critics, complete with an exception for self-defense. If the framers had wanted to require congressional permission before the president could wage war, they simply could have repeated this provision and applied it to the executive. Presidents, of course, do not have complete freedom to take the nation to war. Congress has ample powers to control presidential policy, if it wants to. Only Congress can raise the military, which gives it the power to block, delay or modify war plans. Before 1945, for example, the United States had such a small peacetime military that presidents who started a war would have to go hat in hand to Congress to build an army to fight it. Since World War II, it has been Congress that has authorized and funded our large standing military, one primarily designed to conduct offensive, not defensive, operations (as we learned all too tragically on 9/11) and to swiftly project power worldwide. If Congress wanted to discourage presidential initiative in war, it could build a smaller, less offensive-minded military. Congress’ check on the presidency lies not just in the long-term raising of the military. It can also block any immediate armed conflict through the power of the purse. If Congress feels it has been misled in authorizing war, or it disagrees with the president’s decisions, all it need do is cut off funds, either all at once or gradually. It can reduce the size of the military, shrink or eliminate units, or freeze supplies. Using the power of the purse does not even require affirmative congressional action. Congress can just sit on its hands and refuse to pass a law funding the latest presidential adventure, and the war will end quickly. Even the Kosovo war, which lasted little more than two months and involved no ground troops, required special funding legislation. The framers expected Congress’ power of the purse to serve as the primary check on presidential war. During the 1788 Virginia ratifying convention, Patrick Henry attacked the Constitution for failing to limit executive militarism. James Madison responded: “The sword is in the hands of the British king; the purse is in the hands of the Parliament. It is so in America, as far as any analogy can exist.” Congress ended America’s involvement in Vietnam by cutting off all funds for the war. Our Constitution has succeeded because it favors swift presidential action in war, later checked by Congress’ funding power. If a president continues to wage war without congressional authorization, as in Libya, Kosovo or Korea, it is only because Congress has chosen not to exercise its easy check. We should not confuse a desire to escape political responsibility for a defect in the Constitution. A radical change in the system for making war might appease critics of presidential power. But it could also seriously threaten American national security. In order to forestall another 9/11 attack, or to take advantage of a window of opportunity to strike terrorists or rogue nations, the executive branch needs flexibility. It is not hard to think of situations where congressional consent cannot be obtained in time to act. Time for congressional deliberation, which leads only to passivity and isolation and not smarter decisions, will come at the price of speed and secrecy. The Constitution creates a presidency that can respond forcefully to prevent serious threats to our national security. Presidents can take the initiative and Congress can use its funding power to check them. Instead of demanding a legalistic process to begin war, the framers left war to politics. As we confront the new challenges of terrorism, rogue nations and WMD proliferation, now is not the time to introduce sweeping, untested changes in the way we make war.

#### The plan spills over to broader Congressional decisionmaking

Paul 2008 - Senior Social Scientist; Professor, Pardee RAND Graduate School Pittsburgh Office Education Ph.D., M.A., and B.A. in sociology, University of California, Los Angeles (September, Christopher, “US Presidential War Powers: Legacy Chains in Military Intervention Decisionmaking\* ,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 45, No. 5 (Sep., 2008), pp. 665-679)

Legacy Chains

Finegold & Skocpol (1995: 222) describe policy legacies: Past and present policies are connected in at least three different ways. First, past policies give rise to analogies that affect how public officials think about contemporary policy issues. Second, past policies suggest lessons that help us to understand the processes by which contemporary policies are formulated and implemented and by which the conse quences of contemporary policies will be determined. Third, past policies impose limi tations that reduce the range of policy choices available as responses to contemporary problems. All three of the ways in which they connect past policy to present policy can be viewed as changes in the institutional context in which policy is made. These legacies are institutionalized in two different ways: first, through changes in formal rules or procedures, and second, in the 'taken for granteds', 'schemas', and accepted wisdom of policy makers and ordinary citizens alike (Sewell, 1992: 1-29). While a policy or event can leave multiple legacies, it often leaves a single major legacy. For example, the War Powers Resolution for mally changed the relationship between the president and the congress with regard to war-making and the deployment of troops. Subsequent military interventions were influenced by this change and have, in turn, left their own legacy (legal scholars might call it precedent) as a link in that chain. Legacy chains can be modified, trans formed, or reinforced as they step through each 'link' in the chain. As another example, US involvement in Vietnam left a legacy in the sphere of press/military relations which affected the intervention in Grenada in 1983 (the press was completely excluded for the first 48 hours of the operation). The press legacy chain begun in Vietnam also affected the Panama invasion of 1989 (a press pool was activated, in country, but excluded from the action), but the legacy had been trans formed slightly by the Grenada invasion (the press pool system itself grew out of complaint regarding press exclusion in Grenada) (Paul & Kim, 2004). Because of the different ways in which policy legacies are institutionalized, some legacies have unintended institutional conse quences. The War Powers Resolution was intended to curtail presidential war-making powers and return some authority to the con gress. In practice, the joint resolution failed to force presidents to include congressional participation in their intervention decision making, but it had the unintended conse quence of forcing them to change the way they planned interventions to comply with the letter of the law (see the extended ex ample presented later in the article).1

#### **Judicial restriction of Presidential War Powers makes warfighting impossible**

Knott 13, Professor of National Security Affairs at the United States Naval War College

(8/22, Stephen F., War by Lawyer, www.libertylawsite.org/2013/08/22/war-by-lawyer/)

It is important to keep this in mind in light of the recent National Security Agency surveillance “scandal” which has led to calls for increased judicial oversight of the nation’s intelligence community. These calls, unfortunately, are not coming solely from the usual liberal suspects, but from conservatives who proclaim their devotion to the Constitution. This is an unfortunate turn of events, for if legislating from the bench is inappropriate in the domestic arena, it is completely unwarranted, and altogether dangerous, in the national security arena. This newfound appreciation for judicial activism from normally sober-minded conservatives can be seen in Senator Rand Paul’s (R-KY) and Representative Justin Amash’s (R-MI) proposal that class action lawsuits be filed against the National Security Agency in order to alter its practices. Paul recently announced that he would challenge “this [NSA surveillance] at the Supreme Court level. I’m going to be asking all the Internet providers and all of the phone companies, ask your customers to join me in a class-action lawsuit. If we get 10 million Americans saying ‘We don’t want our phone records looked at,’ then somebody will wake up and say things will change in Washington.” A program authorized by Congress, managed by the executive, and sanctioned by the FISA court will now be challenged by a class action lawsuit, mimicking the traditional liberal tactic of going to court when you cannot prevail in the political process. Additionally, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), a longtime critic of the American intelligence community, has sponsored legislation with Senator Mike Lee (R-Utah) to “increase judicial review” of terrorist related surveillance requests. The FISA Accountability and Privacy Protection Act of 2013 would, as its sponsors put it, add more “meaningful judicial review” of requests by the government to intercept suspected terrorist communications. On top of this, President Obama has proposed that a “special advocate” be appointed to serve as an adversary to the government in FISA court proceedings. In other words, government officials will have to joust in front of a judge with a lawyer concerned about the civil rights of a suspected Al Qaeda sympathizer living in the United States. While it is not surprising that President Obama and Patrick Leahy would adopt these positions, it is surprising to see prominent Republicans, including potential 2016 GOP nominees, jumping on Pat Leahy’s bandwagon. Terrorist attacks directed from abroad are acts of war against the United States, requiring a response by the nation’s armed forces under the direction of the commander-in-chief. Unity in the executive is critical to the conduct of war, as Alexander Hamilton noted in The Federalist, and war by committee, especially a committee of lawyers, brings to armed conflict the very qualities that are the antithesis of Publius’s “decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch.” The American military, with the assistance of the American intelligence community, fulfill the constitutional mandate to provide for the common defense. The nation’s defense establishment is not the Internal Revenue Service or the Department of Health and Human Services; if one dislikes the social welfare policies of the Obama administration or disagrees with President Obama for whatever reason, that is all well and good, but true conservatives should reject the principle that judicial review is applicable to the conduct of national defense. The founders understood that the decision to use force, the most important decision any government can make, were non-judicial in nature and were to be made by the elected representatives of the people. Nonetheless, for those weaned during an era when “privacy” was elevated to the be-all and end-all of the American experiment, the war power and related national security powers granted by the Constitution to the elected branches are trumped by modern notions of a limitless “right to privacy.” The civil liberties violations of the War on Terror are considered so egregious as to require the intervention of an appointed judiciary lacking any Constitutional mandate, and lacking the wherewithal, including information and staff, to handle sensitive national security matters. This is judicial activism at its worst and further evidence that the “political questions doctrine,” the idea of deferring to the elected branches of government on matters falling under their constitutional purview, is, for all practical purposes, dead (See the case of Totten vs. U.S., 1875, for an example of judicial deference to the elected branches on intelligence matters. This deference persisted until the late 20th century). Simply put, according to the Constitution and to almost 220 years of tradition, Congress and the President are constitutionally empowered, among other things, to set the rules regarding the measures deemed necessary to gather intelligence and conduct a war. One of the latest demands from advocates of increased judicial oversight is for a “targeted killing court.” In a similar vein, Senator Marco Rubio has called for the creation of a “Red Team” review of any executive targeting of American citizens, which would include a 15 day review process – “decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch” be damned. A 15 day review process of targeting decisions would horrify Alexander Hamilton and all the framers of the Constitution. No doubt our 16th President would be horrified as well – imagine Abraham Lincoln applying for targeting permits on American citizens suspected of assisting the Confederacy. (“Today, we begin a 15 day review of case #633,721, that of Beauregard Birdwell of Paducah, Kentucky.”) War by lawyer might in the not too distant future include these types of targeting decisions, followed by endless appeals to unelected judges. All of this is a prescription for defeat. We are, sadly, almost at this point, for a new conception about war and national security has taken root in our increasingly legalistic society. We saw this during the Bush years when the Supreme Court for the first time in its history instructed the executive and legislative branches on the appropriate manner of treating captured enemy combatants. The Courts are now micromanaging the treatment of detainees at Guantanamo, to the point of reviewing standards for groin searches of captured Al Qaeda members. True conservatives understand the pitfalls of this legalism, especially of the ill-defined international variety. Conservatives should be especially alert to the dangers arising from elevating international law over the national interest as the standard by which to measure American conduct. The legalistic approach to the war on terror now being endorsed by prominent conservatives would cede presidential authority to executive branch lawyers and to their brethren in the judiciary who are playing a role they were never intended to play. Michael Scheuer, the former head of the CIA’s unit charged with tracking down Osama bin Laden, observed that “at the end of the day, the U.S. intelligence community is palsied by lawyers, and everything still depends on whether the lawyers approve it or not.” This is as far removed from conducting war, as Hamilton described it, with decision and dispatch, and with the “exercise of power by a single hand,” as one can get. War conducted by the courts is not only unconstitutional, it is, to borrow a phrase from author Philip K. Howard, part of the ongoing drift toward the death of common sense.

#### Executive control of warmaking is key to avoiding nuclear war and terrorism

Li 2009 - J.D. candidate, Georgetown University Law Center, 2009; B.A., political science and history, Yale University (Zheyao, “War Powers for the Fourth Generation: Constitutional Interpretation in the Age of Asymmetric Warfare,” 7 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 373 2009 WAR POWERS IN THE FOURTH GENERATION OF WARFARE)

A. The Emergence of Non-State Actors

Even as the quantity of nation-states in the world has increased dramatically since the end of World War II, the institution of the nation-state has been in decline over the past few decades. Much of this decline is the direct result of the waning of major interstate war, which primarily resulted from the introduction of nuclear weapons.122 The proliferation of nuclear weapons, and their immense capacity for absolute destruction, has ensured that conventional wars remain limited in scope and duration. Hence, "both the size of the armed forces and the quantity of weapons at their disposal has declined quite sharply" since 1945.123 At the same time, concurrent with the decline of the nation-state in the second half of the twentieth century, non-state actors have increasingly been willing and able to use force to advance their causes. In contrast to nation-states, who adhere to the Clausewitzian distinction between the ends of policy and the means of war to achieve those ends, non-state actors do not necessarily fight as a mere means of advancing any coherent policy. Rather, they see their fight as a life-and-death struggle, wherein the ordinary terminology of war as an instrument of policy breaks down because of this blending of means and ends.124 It is the existential nature of this struggle and the disappearance of the Clausewitzian distinction between war and policy that has given rise to a new generation of warfare. The concept of fourth-generational warfare was first articulated in an influential article in the Marine Corps Gazette in 1989, which has proven highly prescient. In describing what they saw as the modem trend toward a new phase of warfighting, the authors argued that: In broad terms, fourth generation warfare seems likely to be widely dispersed and largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between "civilian" and "military" may disappear. Actions will occur concurrently throughout all participants' depth, including their society as a cultural, not just a physical, entity. Major military facilities, such as airfields, fixed communications sites, and large headquarters will become rarities because of their vulnerability; the same may be true of civilian equivalents, such as seats of government, power plants, and industrial sites (including knowledge as well as manufacturing industries). 125 It is precisely this blurring of peace and war and the demise of traditionally definable battlefields that provides the impetus for the formulation of a new. theory of war powers. As evidenced by Part M, supra, the constitutional allocation of war powers, and the Framers' commitment of the war power to two co-equal branches, was not designed to cope with the current international system, one that is characterized by the persistent machinations of international terrorist organizations, the rise of multilateral alliances, the emergence of rogue states, and the potentially wide proliferation of easily deployable weapons of mass destruction, nuclear and otherwise. B. The Framers' World vs. Today's World The Framers crafted the Constitution, and the people ratified it, in a time when everyone understood that the state controlled both the raising of armies and their use. Today, however, the threat of terrorism is bringing an end to the era of the nation-state's legal monopoly on violence, and the kind of war that existed before-based on a clear division between government, armed forces, and the people-is on the decline. 126 As states are caught between their decreasing ability to fight each other due to the existence of nuclear weapons and the increasing threat from non-state actors, it is clear that the Westphalian system of nation-states that informed the Framers' allocation of war powers is no longer the order of the day. 127 As seen in Part III, supra, the rise of the modem nation-state occurred as a result of its military effectiveness and ability to defend its citizens. If nation-states such as the United States are unable to adapt to the changing circumstances of fourth-generational warfare-that is, if they are unable to adequately defend against low-intensity conflict conducted by non-state actors-"then clearly [the modern state] does not have a future in front of it.' 128 The challenge in formulating a new theory of war powers for fourthgenerational warfare that remains legally justifiable lies in the difficulty of adapting to changed circumstances while remaining faithful to the constitutional text and the original meaning. 29 To that end, it is crucial to remember that the Framers crafted the Constitution in the context of the Westphalian system of nation-states. The three centuries following the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 witnessed an international system characterized by wars, which, "through the efforts of governments, assumed a more regular, interconnected character."' 130 That period saw the rise of an independent military class and the stabilization of military institutions. Consequently, "warfare became more regular, better organized, and more attuned to the purpose of war-that is, to its political objective."' 1 3' That era is now over. Today, the stability of the long-existing Westphalian international order has been greatly eroded in recent years with the advent of international terrorist organizations, which care nothing for the traditional norms of the laws of war. This new global environment exposes the limitations inherent in the interpretational methods of originalism and textualism and necessitates the adoption of a new method of constitutional interpretation. While one must always be aware of the text of the Constitution and the original understanding of that text, that very awareness identifies the extent to which fourth-generational warfare epitomizes a phenomenon unforeseen by the Framers, a problem the constitutional resolution of which must rely on the good judgment of the present generation. 13 Now, to adapt the constitutional warmarking scheme to the new international order characterized by fourth-generational warfare, one must understand the threat it is being adapted to confront. C. The Jihadist Threat The erosion of the Westphalian and Clausewitzian model of warfare and the blurring of the distinction between the means of warfare and the ends of policy, which is one characteristic of fourth-generational warfare, apply to al-Qaeda and other adherents of jihadist ideology who view the United States as an enemy. An excellent analysis of jihadist ideology and its implications for the rest of the world are presented by Professor Mary Habeck. 133 Professor Habeck identifies the centrality of the Qur'an, specifically a particular reading of the Qur'an and hadith (traditions about the life of Muhammad), to the jihadist terrorists. 134 The jihadis believe that the scope of the Qur'an is universal, and "that their interpretation of Islam is also intended for the entire world, which must be brought to recognize this fact peacefully if possible and through violence if not."' 135 Along these lines, the jihadis view the United States and her allies as among the greatest enemies of Islam: they believe "that every element of modern Western liberalism is flawed, wrong, and evil" because the basis of liberalism is secularism. 136 The jihadis emphasize the superiority of Islam to all other religions, and they believe that "God does not want differing belief systems to coexist."' 37 For this reason, jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda "recognize that the West will not submit without a fight and believe in fact that the Christians, Jews, and liberals have united against Islam in a war that will end in the complete destruction of the unbelievers.' 138 Thus, the adherents of this jihadist ideology, be it al-Qaeda or other groups, will continue to target the United States until she is destroyed. Their ideology demands it. 139 To effectively combat terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, it is necessary to understand not only how they think, but also how they operate. Al-Qaeda is a transnational organization capable of simultaneously managing multiple operations all over the world."14 It is both centralized and decentralized: al-Qaeda is centralized in the sense that Osama bin Laden is the unquestioned leader, but it is decentralized in that its operations are carried out locally, by distinct cells."4 AI-Qaeda benefits immensely from this arrangement because it can exercise direct control over high-probability operations, while maintaining a distance from low-probability attacks, only taking the credit for those that succeed. The local terrorist cells benefit by gaining access to al-Qaeda's "worldwide network of assets, people, and expertise."' 42 Post-September 11 events have highlighted al-Qaeda's resilience. Even as the United States and her allies fought back, inflicting heavy casualties on al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and destroying dozens of cells worldwide, "al-Qaeda's networked nature allowed it to absorb the damage and remain a threat." 14 3 This is a far cry from earlier generations of warfare, where the decimation of the enemy's military forces would generally bring an end to the conflict. D. The Need for Rapid Reaction and Expanded Presidential War Power By now it should be clear just how different this conflict against the extremist terrorists is from the type of warfare that occupied the minds of the Framers at the time of the Founding. Rather than maintaining the geographical and political isolation desired by the Framers for the new country, today's United States is an international power targeted by individuals and groups that will not rest until seeing her demise. The Global War on Terrorism is not truly a war within the Framers' eighteenth-century conception of the term, and the normal constitutional provisions regulating the division of war powers between Congress and the President do not apply. Instead, this "war" is a struggle for survival and dominance against forces that threaten to destroy the United States and her allies, and the fourth-generational nature of the conflict, highlighted by an indiscernible distinction between wartime and peacetime, necessitates an evolution of America's traditional constitutional warmaking scheme. As first illustrated by the military strategist Colonel John Boyd, constitutional decision-making in the realm of war powers in the fourth generation should consider the implications of the OODA Loop: Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act. 44 In the era of fourth-generational warfare, quick reactions, proceeding through the OODA Loop rapidly, and disrupting the enemy's OODA loop are the keys to victory. "In order to win," Colonel Boyd suggested, "we should operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than our adversaries." 145 In the words of Professor Creveld, "[b]oth organizationally and in terms of the equipment at their disposal, the armed forces of the world will have to adjust themselves to this situation by changing their doctrine, doing away with much of their heavy equipment and becoming more like police."1 46 Unfortunately, the existing constitutional understanding, which diffuses war power between two branches of government, necessarily (by the Framers' design) slows down decision- making. In circumstances where war is undesirable (which is, admittedly, most of the time, especially against other nation-states), the deliberativeness of the existing decision-making process is a positive attribute. In America's current situation, however, in the midst of the conflict with al-Qaeda and other international terrorist organizations, the existing process of constitutional decision-making in warfare may prove a fatal hindrance to achieving the initiative necessary for victory. As a slow-acting, deliberative body, Congress does not have the ability to adequately deal with fast-emerging situations in fourth-generational warfare. Thus, in order to combat transnational threats such as al-Qaeda, the executive branch must have the ability to operate by taking offensive military action even without congressional authorization, because only the executive branch is capable of the swift decision-making and action necessary to prevail in fourth-generational conflicts against fourthgenerational opponents.

### 1nc

**Obama will prevail in the debt ceiling battle by maintaining a focused message and strong political image**

**Dovere and Epstein, 10/1** (EDWARD-ISAAC DOVERE and REID J. EPSTEIN, 10/1/2013, “Government shutdown: President Obama holds the line,” <http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/government-shutdown-president-obama-holds-the-line-97646.html?hp=f3>)

President Barack **Obama started September in an agonizing, extended display of how little sway he had in Congress. He ended the month with a display of resolve and strength that could redefine his presidency.**

**All it took was a government shutdown.**

This was less a White House strategy than simply staying in the corner the House GOP had painted them into — to the White House’s surprise, **Obama was forced to do what he so rarely has as president: he said no, and he didn’t stop saying no**.

For two weeks ahead of Monday night’s deadline, Obama and aides rebuffed the efforts to kill Obamacare with the kind of firm, narrow sales pitch they struggled with in three years of trying to convince people the law should exist in the first place. There was no litany of doomsday scenarios that didn’t quite come true, like in the run-up to the fiscal cliff and the sequester. No leaked plans or musings in front of the cameras about Democratic priorities he might sacrifice to score a deal.

After five years of what’s often seen as Obama’s desperation to negotiate — to the fury of his liberal base and the frustration of party leaders who argue that he negotiates against himself. Even his signature health care law came with significant compromises in Congress.

Instead, **over and over and over again, Obama delivered the simple line: Republicans want to repeal a law that was passed and upheld by the Supreme Court** — to give people health insurance — or they’ll do something that everyone outside the GOP caucus meetings, including Wall Street bankers, seems to agree would be a ridiculous risk.

“If we lock these Americans out of affordable health care for one more year,” Obama said Monday afternoon as he listed examples of people who would enjoy better treatment under Obamacare, “if we sacrifice the health care of millions of Americans — then they’ll fund the government for a couple more months. Does anybody truly believe that we won’t have this fight again in a couple more months? Even at Christmas?”

The president and his advisers weren’t expecting this level of Republican melee, a White House official said. Only during Sen. Ted Cruz’s (R-Texas) 21-hour floor speech last week did the realization roll through the West Wing that they wouldn’t be negotiating because they couldn’t figure out anymore whom to negotiate with. And even then, they didn’t believe the shutdown was really going to happen until Saturday night, when the House voted again to strip Obamacare funding.

This wasn’t a credible position, Obama said again Monday afternoon, but rather, bowing to “extraneous and controversial demands” which are “all to save face after making some impossible promises to the extreme right wing of their political party.”

Obama and aides have said repeatedly that they’re not thinking about the shutdown in terms of political gain, but the situation’s is taking shape for them. Congress’s approval on dealing with the shutdown was at 10 percent even before the shutters started coming down on Monday according to a new CNN/ORC poll, with 69 percent of people saying the House Republicans are acting like “spoiled children.”

**“The Republicans are making themselves so radioactive that the president and Democrats can win this debate in the court of public opinion” by waiting them out, said** Jim **Manley, a Democratic strategist** and former aide to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid who has previously been critical of Obama’s tactics.

Democratic pollster Stan Greenberg said the Obama White House learned from the 2011 debt ceiling standoff, when it demoralized fellow Democrats, deflated Obama’s approval ratings and got nothing substantive from the negotiations.

“They didn’t gain anything from that approach,” Greenberg said. “I think that there’s a lot they learned from what happened the last time they ran up against the debt ceiling.”

While the Republicans have been at war with each other, the White House has proceeded calmly — a breakthrough phone call with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani Friday that showed him getting things done (with the conveniently implied juxtaposition that Tehran is easier to negotiate with than the GOP conference), his regular golf game Saturday and a cordial meeting Monday with his old sparring partner Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

White House press secretary Jay Carney said Monday that the shutdown wasn’t really affecting much of anything.

“It’s busy, but it’s always busy here,” **Carney said**. “It’s busy for most of you covering this White House, any White House. **We’re very much focused on making sure that the implementation of the Affordable Care Act continues.”**

Obama called all four congressional leaders Monday evening — including Boehner, whose staff spent Friday needling reporters to point out that the president hadn’t called for a week. According to both the White House and Boehner’s office, the call was an exchange of well-worn talking points, and changed nothing.

Manley advised Obama to make sure people continue to see Boehner and the House Republicans as the problem and not rush into any more negotiations until public outrage forces them to bend.

“He may want to do a little outreach, but not until the House drives the country over the cliff,” Manley said Monday, before the shutdown. “Once the House has driven the country over the cliff and failed to fund the government, then it might be time to make a move.”

The White House believes Obama will take less than half the blame for a shutdown – with the rest heaped on congressional Republicans.

The divide is clear in a Gallup poll also out Monday: over 70 percent of self-identifying Republicans and Democrats each say their guys are the ones acting responsibly, while just 9 percent for both say the other side is.

**If Obama is able to turn public opinion against Republicans, the GOP won’t be able to turn the blame back on Obama**, Greenberg said. “Things only get worse once things begin to move in a particular direction,” he said. “They don’t suddenly start going the other way as people rethink this.”

**Losing authority would embolden the GOP on the debt ceiling fight and undermine the economy**

**Seeking Alpha, 9/10** (“Syria Could Upend Debt Ceiling Fight,” 9/10/2013, <http://seekingalpha.com/article/1684082-syria-could-upend-debt-ceiling-fight>)

Unless President Obama can totally change a reluctant public's perception of another Middle-Eastern conflict, it seems unlikely that he can get 218 votes in the House, though he can probably still squeak out 60 votes in the Senate. This **defeat would be totally unprecedented as a President has never lost a military authorization vote** in American history. To forbid the Commander-in-Chief of his primary power renders him all but impotent. At this point, a rebuff from the House is a 67%-75% probability.

I reach this probability by looking within the whip count. I assume the 164 declared "no" votes will stay in the "no" column. To get to 218, Obama needs to win over 193 of the 244 undecided, a gargantuan task. Within the "no" column, there are 137 Republicans. Under a best case scenario, Boehner could corral 50 "yes" votes, which would require Obama to pick up 168 of the 200 Democrats, 84%. Many of these Democrats rode to power because of their opposition to Iraq, which makes it difficult for them to support military conflict. The only way to generate near unanimity among the undecided Democrats is if they choose to support the President (recognizing the political ramifications of a defeat) despite personal misgivings. The idea that all undecided Democrats can be convinced of this argument is relatively slim, especially as there are few votes to lose. In the best case scenario, the House could reach 223-225 votes, barely enough to get it through. Under the worst case, there are only 150 votes. Given the lopsided nature of the breakdown, the chance of House passage is about one in four.

While a failure in the House would put action against Syria in limbo, I have felt that the market has overstated the impact of a strike there, which would be limited in nature. Rather, **investors should focus on the profound ripple through the power structure in Washington, which would greatly impact impending battles over spending and the debt ceiling**.

Currently, the government loses spending authority on September 30 while it hits the debt ceiling by the middle of October. Markets have generally felt that Washington will once again strike a last-minute deal and avert total catastrophe. Failure in the Syrian vote could change this. **For the Republicans to beat Obama on a President's strength (foreign military action), they will likely be emboldened that they can beat him on domestic spending issues.**

Until now, consensus has been that the two sides would compromise to fund the government at sequester levels while passing a $1 trillion stand-alone debt ceiling increase. However, the right wing of Boehner's caucus has been pushing for more, including another $1 trillion in spending cuts, defunding of Obamacare, and a one year delay of the individual mandate. **Already, Conservative PACs** have begun airing advertisements, **urging a debt ceiling fight over Obamacare. With the President rendered hapless on Syria, they will become even more vocal about their hardline resolution, setting us up for a showdown that will rival 2011's debt ceiling fight.**

I currently believe the two sides will pass a short-term continuing resolution to keep the government open, and then the GOP will wage a massive fight over the debt ceiling. While Obama will be weakened, he will be unwilling to undermine his major achievement, his healthcare law. In all likelihood, both sides will dig in their respective trenches, unwilling to strike a deal, essentially in a game of chicken. If the House blocks Syrian action, it will take America as close to a default as it did in 2011. Based on the market action then, we can expect massive volatility in the final days of the showdown with the Dow falling 500 points in one session in 2011.

As markets panicked over the potential for a U.S. default, we saw a massive risk-off trade, moving from equities into Treasuries. I think there is a significant chance we see something similar this late September into October. **The Syrian vote has major implications on the power of Obama and the far-right when it comes to their willingness to fight over the debt ceiling. If the Syrian resolution fails, the debt ceiling fight will be even worse, which will send equities lower by upwards of 10%. Investors must be prepared for this "black swan" event.**

Looking back to August 2011, stocks that performed the best were dividend paying, less-cyclical companies like Verizon (VZ), Wal-Mart (WMT), Coca-Cola (KO) and McDonald's (MCD) while high beta names like Netflix (NFLX) and Boeing (BA) were crushed. Investors also flocked into treasuries despite default risk while dumping lower quality bonds as spreads widened. The flight to safety helped treasuries despite U.S. government issues. I think we are likely to see a similar move this time.

Assuming there is a Syrian "no" vote, I would begin to roll back my long exposure in the stock market and reallocate funds into treasuries as I believe yields could drop back towards 2.50%. Within the stock market, I think the less-cyclical names should outperform, making utilities and consumer staples more attractive. For more tactical traders, I would consider buying puts against the S&P 500 and look toward shorting higher-beta and defense stocks like Boeing and Lockheed Martin (LMT). I also think lower quality bonds would suffer as spreads widen, making funds like JNK vulnerable. Conversely, gold (GLD) should benefit from the fear trade.

I would also like to address the potential that Congress does not vote down the Syrian resolution. First, news has broken that **Russia has proposed Syria turn over its chemical stockpile. If Syria were to agree** (Syria said it was willing to consider), **the U.S. would not have to strike, canceling the congressional vote.** The proposal can be found here. I strongly believe this is a delaying tactic rather than a serious effort. In 2005, Libya began to turn over chemical weapons; it has yet to complete the hand-off. Removing and destroying chemical weapons is an exceptionally challenging and dangerous task that would take years, not weeks, making this deal seem unrealistic, especially because a cease-fire would be required around all chemical facilities. The idea that a cease-fire could be maintained for months, essentially allowing Assad to stay in office, is hard to take seriously. I believe this is a delaying tactic, and Congress will have to vote within the next two weeks.

The final possibility is that Democrats back their President and barely ram the Syria resolution through. I think the extreme risk of a full-blown debt stand-off to dissipate. However, Boehner has promised a strong fight over the debt limit that the market has largely ignored. I do believe the fight would still be worse than the market anticipates but not outright disastrous. As such, I would not initiate short positions, but I would trim some longs and move into less cyclical stocks as the risk would still be the debt ceiling fight leading to some drama not no drama.

Remember, **in politics everything is connected. Syria is not a stand-alone issue. Its resolution will impact the power structure in Washington. A failed vote in Congress is likely to make the debt ceiling fight even worse, spooking markets, and threatening default on U.S. obligations unless another last minute deal can be struck.**

**Entertaining GOP negotiating demands will drag the process out and trigger economic collapse**

**Lobello, 8/27** --- business editor at TheWeek.com (Carmel, 8/27/2013, “How the looming debt ceiling fight could screw up the U.S. economy; Yup, this is happening — again,” <http://theweek.com/article/index/248775/how-the-looming-debt-ceiling-fight-could-screw-up-the-us-economy)>)

Ready for more debt-ceiling drama?

The Treasury Department said Monday it would hit its borrowing limit in mid-October, which means that Congress will need to raise its $16.7 trillion debt ceiling to pay the nation's bills.

The sooner-than-expected deadline comes at an inconvenient moment, because Congress is already facing a budget deadline for the stopgap "continuing resolution" that finances the federal government, which is set to run out September 30. Failure to come to an agreement would trigger a government shutdown.

Having two big deadlines fall two weeks apart could be a recipe for disaster. Republicans, led by Speaker John **Boehner** (R-Ohio), **have been musing about the possibility of using the debt ceiling, instead of a government shutdown, as leverage to delay the implementation of ObamaCare**.

But as Ezra Klein put it in The Washington Post, "Trading a government shutdown for a debt-ceiling breach is like trading the flu for septic shock":

**Anything Republicans might fear about a government shutdown is far more terrifying amidst a debt-ceiling breach. The former is an inconvenience. The latter is a global financial crisis.** It’s the difference between what happened in 1995, when the government did shutdown, and what happened in 2008, when global markets realized a bedrock investment they thought was safe (housing in that case, U.S. treasuries in this one) was full of risk. [The Washington Post]

Indeed, **a debt ceiling debate in 2011 that went on to the last possible minute had real economic consequences, leading Standard & Poor's to downgrade the United States' credit rating. The move "left a clear and deep dent in US economic and market data," said** Matt **Phillips at Quartz**.

Investors pulled huge amounts of cash from the stock market, and consumer confidence was hurt as well. When the same problem cropped up again in May 2012, because Congress failed to reach a long-term deal, Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers in Bloomberg explained how confidence plummeted the first time around:

[Confidence] went into freefall as the political stalemate worsened through July. Over the entire episode, confidence declined more than it did following the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. in 2008. After July 31, when the deal to break the impasse was announced, consumer confidence stabilized and began a long, slow climb that brought it back to its starting point almost a year later. [Bloomberg]

This morning, Wolfers had this to say:

Treasury Secretary Jack Lew visited CNBC Tuesday morning to reiterate President Obama's promise not to go down he same road. **"The president has made it clear: We're not going to negotiate over the debt limit,"** Lew said.

He also explained why in a letter to Boehner Monday morning. "Protecting the full faith and credit of the United States is the responsibility of Congress, because only Congress can extend the nation's borrowing authority," he wrote. "Failure to meet that responsibility would cause irreparable harm to the American economy."

**This will destroy the U.S. and global economy and collapse trade**

**Davidson, 9/10** (Adam - co-founder of NPR’s “Planet Money” 9/10/2013, “Our Debt to Society,” <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/magazine/our-debt-to-society.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0)>)

This is the definition of a deficit, and it illustrates why the government needs to borrow money almost every day to pay its bills. Of course, all that daily borrowing adds up, and we are rapidly approaching what is called the X-Date — the day, somewhere in the next six weeks, when the government, by law, cannot borrow another penny. **Congress** has imposed a strict limit on how much debt the federal government can accumulate, but **for nearly 90 years**, it **has raised the ceiling well before it was reached**. But **since a large number of Tea Party**-aligned **Republicans entered the House** of Representatives, in 2011, **raising that debt ceiling has become a matter of fierce debate**. This summer, House **Republicans have promised**, in Speaker John Boehner’s words, **“a whale of a fight” before they raise the debt ceiling — if they even raise it at all.**

**If the debt ceiling isn’t lifted** again this fall, **some serious financial decisions will have to be made**. Perhaps the government can skimp on its foreign aid or furlough all of NASA, but eventually the big-ticket items, like Social Security and Medicare, will have to be cut. At some point, **the government won’t be able to pay interest on its bonds and will enter what’s known as sovereign default, the ultimate national financial disaster** achieved by countries like Zimbabwe, Ecuador and Argentina (and now Greece). In the case of the United States, though, **it won’t be an isolated national crisis**. If the American government can’t stand behind the dollar, the world’s benchmark currency, **then the global financial system will very likely enter a new era in which there is much less trade and much less economic growth. It would be**, by most accounts, **the largest self-imposed financial disaster in history**.

Nearly everyone involved predicts that someone will blink before this disaster occurs. Yet a small number of House Republicans (one political analyst told me it’s no more than 20) appear willing to see what happens if the debt ceiling isn’t raised — at least for a bit. This could be used as leverage to force Democrats to drastically cut government spending and eliminate President Obama’s signature health-care-reform plan. In fact, Representative Tom Price, a Georgia Republican, told me that the whole problem could be avoided if the president agreed to drastically cut spending and lower taxes. Still, it is hard to put this act of game theory into historic context. Plenty of countries — and some cities, like Detroit — have defaulted on their financial obligations, but only because their governments ran out of money to pay their bills. **No wealthy country has ever voluntarily decided — in the middle of an economic recovery, no less — to default**. And there’s certainly no record of that happening to the country that controls the global reserve currency.

Like many, I assumed a self-imposed U.S. debt crisis might unfold like most involuntary ones. **If the debt ceiling isn’t raised by X-Day, I figured, the world’s investors would begin to see America as an unstable investment and rush to sell their Treasury bonds. The U.S. government, desperate to hold on to investment, would then raise interest rates far higher**, hurtling up rates on credit cards, student loans, mortgages and corporate borrowing — **which would effectively put a clamp on all trade and spending. The U.S. economy would collapse far worse than anything we’ve seen in the past several years**.

Instead, Robert **Auwaerter, head of bond investing for Vanguard, the world’s largest mutual-fund company, told me that the collapse might be more insidious**. “You know what happens when the market gets upset?” he said. “There’s a flight to quality. Investors buy Treasury bonds. It’s a bit perverse.” In other words, **if the U.S. comes within shouting distance of a default (which Auwaerter is confident won’t happen), the world’s investors — absent a safer alternative, given the recent fates of the euro and the yen — might actually buy even more Treasury bonds. Indeed, interest rates would fall and the bond markets would soar.**

**While this possibility might not sound so bad, it’s really far more damaging than the apocalyptic one I imagined.** Rather than resulting in a sudden crisis, failure to raise the debt ceiling would lead to a slow bleed. Scott Mather, head of the global portfolio at Pimco, the world’s largest private bond fund, explained that while governments and institutions might go on a U.S.-bond buying frenzy in the wake of a debt-ceiling panic, they would eventually recognize that the U.S. government was not going through an odd, temporary bit of insanity. They would eventually conclude that it had become permanently less reliable. **Mather imagines institutional investors and governments turning to a basket of currencies, putting their savings in a mix of U.S., European, Canadian, Australian and Japanese bonds. Over the course of decades, the U.S. would lose its unique role in the global economy.**

**The U.S. benefits enormously from its status as global reserve currency and safe haven**. Our interest and mortgage rates are lower; companies are able to borrow money to finance their new products more cheaply. As a result, there is much more economic activity and more wealth in America than there would be otherwise. If **that status erodes, the U.S. economy’s peaks will be lower and recessions deeper**; future generations will have fewer job opportunities and suffer more when the economy falters. And, Mather points out, **no other country would benefit from America’s diminished status**. When you make the base risk-free asset more risky, the entire global economy becomes riskier and costlier.

**The impact is global nuclear war**

**Freidberg & Schonfeld, 8** --- \*Professor of Politics and IR at Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School, AND \*\*senior editor of Commentary and a visiting scholar at the Witherspoon Institute in Princeton (10/21/2008, Aaron and Gabriel, “The Dangers of a Diminished America”, Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html?mod=googlenews\_wsj)

**With the global financial system in serious trouble, is America's geostrategic dominance likely to diminish?** If so, what would that mean?

One immediate implication of the crisis that began on Wall Street and spread across the world is that **the primary instruments of U.S. foreign policy will be crimped**. The next president will face an entirely new and adverse fiscal position. Estimates of this year's federal budget deficit already show that it has jumped $237 billion from last year, to $407 billion. With families and businesses hurting, there will be calls for various and expensive domestic relief programs.

In the face of this onrushing river of red ink, both Barack Obama and John McCain have been reluctant to lay out what portions of their programmatic wish list they might defer or delete. Only Joe Biden has suggested a possible reduction -- foreign aid. This would be one of the few popular cuts, but in budgetary terms it is a mere grain of sand. Still, Sen. Biden's comment hints at where **we may be headed: toward a major reduction in America's world role, and perhaps even a new era of financially-induced isolationism.**

**Pressures to cut defense spending, and to dodge the cost of waging two wars, already intense before this crisis, are likely to mount.** Despite the success of the surge, the war in Iraq remains deeply unpopular. Precipitous withdrawal -- attractive to a sizable swath of the electorate before the financial implosion -- might well become even more popular with annual war bills running in the hundreds of billions.

Protectionist sentiments are sure to grow stronger as jobs disappear in the coming slowdown. Even before our current woes, calls to save jobs by restricting imports had begun to gather support among many Democrats and some Republicans. **In a prolonged recession, gale-force winds of protectionism will blow.**

Then **there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy**, among other things, **made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven.** Will this be possible in the future?

Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. **Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern.**

**If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk.**

**In** such a scenario there are shades of **the** 19**30s**, **when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability.**

**The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder** than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity.

**None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures**.

As for our democratic friends, the present crisis comes when many European nations are struggling to deal with decades of anemic growth, sclerotic governance and an impending demographic crisis. Despite its past dynamism, Japan faces similar challenges. India is still in the early stages of its emergence as a world economic and geopolitical power.

What does this all mean? **There is no substitute for America on the world stage**. The choice we have before us is between the potentially disastrous effects of disengagement and the stiff price tag of continued American leadership.

### CP 1NC

#### The executive branch of the United States federal government should issue an executive order that

#### publishes clear guidelines for targeting to be carried out by nonpoliticians and make assassination truly a last resort,

#### stipulatees that an outside court review the evidence before placing Americans on a kill list

#### releasees the legal briefs upon which the targeted killing was based

#### The executive should also sign directive that consolidates lead executive authority for planning and conducting nonbattlefield targeted killings under the Department of Defense.

#### Obama himself decides drone targeting --- publishing guidelines creates transparency

[--- Court should only review if Americans are placed on a kill list]

NYT, 12 (Editorial, 5/30/2012, “Too Much Power for a President,” <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/31/opinion/too-much-power-for-a-president.html?_r=0)>)

It has been clear for years that the Obama administration believes the shadow war on terrorism gives it the power to choose targets for assassination, including Americans, without any oversight. On Tuesday, The New York Times revealed who was actually making the final decision on the biggest killings and drone strikes: President Obama himself. And that is very troubling.

Mr. Obama has demonstrated that he can be thoughtful and farsighted, but, like all occupants of the Oval Office, he is a politician, subject to the pressures of re-election. No one in that position should be able to unilaterally order the killing of American citizens or foreigners located far from a battlefield — depriving Americans of their due-process rights — without the consent of someone outside his political inner circle.

How can the world know whether the targets chosen by this president or his successors are truly dangerous terrorists and not just people with the wrong associations? (It is clear, for instance, that many of those rounded up after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks weren’t terrorists.) How can the world know whether this president or a successor truly pursued all methods short of assassination, or instead — to avoid a political charge of weakness — built up a tough-sounding list of kills?

It is too easy to say that this is a natural power of a commander in chief. The United States cannot be in a perpetual war on terror that allows lethal force against anyone, anywhere, for any perceived threat. That power is too great, and too easily abused, as those who lived through the George W. Bush administration will remember.

Mr. Obama, who campaigned against some of those abuses in 2008, should remember. But the Times article, written by Jo Becker and Scott Shane, depicts him as personally choosing every target, approving every major drone strike in Yemen and Somalia and the riskiest ones in Pakistan, assisted only by his own aides and a group of national security operatives. Mr. Obama relies primarily on his counterterrorism adviser, John Brennan.

To his credit, Mr. Obama believes he should take moral responsibility for these decisions, and he has read the just-war theories of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas.

The Times article points out, however, that the Defense Department is currently killing suspects in Yemen without knowing their names, using criteria that have never been made public. The administration is counting all military-age males killed by drone fire as combatants without knowing that for certain, assuming they are up to no good if they are in the area. That has allowed Mr. Brennan to claim an extraordinarily low civilian death rate that smells more of expediency than morality.

In a recent speech, Mr. Brennan said the administration chooses only those who pose a real threat, not simply because they are members of Al Qaeda, and prefers to capture suspects alive. Those assurances are hardly binding, and even under Mr. Obama, scores of suspects have been killed but only one taken into American custody. The precedents now being set will be carried on by successors who may have far lower standards. Without written guidelines, they can be freely reinterpreted.

A unilateral campaign of death is untenable. To provide real assurance, President Obama should publish clear guidelines for targeting to be carried out by nonpoliticians, making assassination truly a last resort, and allow an outside court to review the evidence before placing Americans on a kill list. And it should release the legal briefs upon which the targeted killing was based.

#### Obama directive to consolidate authority in the DOD will create transparency

Zenko, 13 --- Douglas Dillon Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations

(April, Transferring CIA Drone Strikes to the Pentagon, [www.cfr.org/drones/transferring-cia-drone-strikes-pentagon/p30434](http://www.cfr.org/drones/transferring-cia-drone-strikes-pentagon/p30434))

The main obstacle to acknowledging the scope, legality, and oversight of U.S. targeted killings beyond traditional or "hot" battlefields is the division of lead executive authority between the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)—a subunit of the Department of Defense (DOD) Special Operations Command—and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In particular, the U.S. government cannot legally acknowledge covert actions undertaken by the CIA. The failure to answer the growing demands for transparency increases the risk that U.S. drone strikes will be curtailed or eliminated due to mounting domestic or international pressure. To take a meaningful first step toward greater transparency, President Barack Obama should sign a directive that consolidates lead executive authority for planning and conducting nonbattlefield targeted killings under DOD.

### **K 1NC**

asking how the executive should be allowed to conduct war masks the fundamental question of whether war should be allowed at all – ensures a military mentality

* Accepting that war is inevitable even without realizing it is problematic

**Cady 10 (Duane L., prof of phil @ hamline university, From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum, pp. 22-23)**

The widespread, unquestioning acceptance of warism and the corresponding reluctance to consider pacifism as a legitimate option make it difficult to propose a genuine consideration of pacifist alternatives. Warism may be held implicitly or explicitly. Held in its implicit form, it does not occur to the warist to challenge the view that war is morally justified; war is taken to be natural and normal. No other way of understanding large-scale human conflict even comes to mind. In this sense warism is like racism, sexism, and homophobia: a prejudicial bias built into conceptions and judgments without the awareness of those assuming it. In its explicit form, warism is openly accepted, articulated, and deliberately chosen as a value judgment on nations in conflict. War may be defended as essential for justice, needed for national security, as “the only thing the enemy understands,” and so on. In both forms warism misguides judgments and institutions by reinforcing the necessity and **inevitability** of war and **precluding alternatives**. Whether held implicitly or explicitly, warism obstructs questioning the conceptual framework of the culture. If we assume (without realizing it) that war itself is morally justifiable, our moral considerations of war will be focused on whether a **particular war** is justified or whether **particular acts within a given war** are morally acceptable. These are important concerns, but addressing them does **not** get at the fundamental issue raised by the pacifist: the morality of war **as such**. In Just and Unjust Wars Michael Walzer explains that “war is always judged twice, first with reference to the **reasons** states have for fighting, secondly with reference to the **means** they adopt.”8 The pacifist suggestion is that there is a third judgment of war that must be made prior to the other two: might war, by its very nature, be morally wrong? This issue is considered by Walzer only as an afterthought in an appendix, where it is dismissed as naïve. Perhaps Walzer should not be faulted for this omission, since he defines his task as describing the conventional morality of war and, as has been argued above, conventional morality does take warism for granted. To this extent Walzer is correct. And this is just the point: our warist conceptual frameworks— our warist normative lenses— **blind us to the root question**. The concern of pacifists is to expose the hidden warist bias and not merely describe cultural values. Pacifists seek to examine cultural values and recommend what they ought to be. This is why the pacifist insists on judging war **in itself**, a judgment **more fundamental** than the more **limited assessments** of the morality of a given war or the morality of **specific acts** within a particular war.

That causes extinction and structural violence

* Another impact: freeing ourselves from war = more resources for peace

**Lawrence 9** (Grant, “Military Industrial "War" Consciousness Responsible for Economic and Social Collapse,” OEN—OpEdNews, March 27)

As a presidential candidate, [Barack Obama](http://obama.senate.gov/) called [Afghanistan](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_in_Afghanistan_%282001%E2%80%93present%29) ''the war we must win.'' He was absolutely right. Now it is time to win it... Senators [John McCain](http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0564587/) and Joseph Lieberman [calling](http://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/inbox/story/960269.html) for an expanded war in Afghanistan "How true it is that war can destroy everything of value." Pope Benedict XVI [decrying](http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iuue8kE-e0lYZVFpt4RlbX4M_IEw) the suffering of Africa Where troops have been quartered, brambles and thorns spring up. In the track of great armies there must follow lean years. Lao Tzu on [War](http://www.sacred-texts.com/tao/salt/salt09.htm) As Americans we are raised on the utility of war to conquer **every problem.** We have a drug problem so we wage war on it. We have a cancer problem so we wage war on it. We have a crime problem so we wage war on it. Poverty cannot be dealt with but it has to be warred against. Terror is another problem that must be warred against. In the [United States](http://maps.google.com/maps?ll=38.8833333333,-77.0166666667&spn=10.0,10.0&q=38.8833333333,-77.0166666667%20%28United%20States%29&t=h), solutions can only be found in terms of wars. In a society that functions to support a massive military industrial war machine and empire, it is important that the **terms** promoted support the **conditioning of** its **citizens**. We are conditioned to see war as the solution to major social ills and major political disagreements. That way when we see so much of our resources devoted to war then we don't question the utility of it. The term "war" excites mind and body and creates a fear mentality that looks at life in terms of attack. In war, there has to be an attack and a must win attitude to carry us to victory. But is this war mentality working for us? In an age when nearly half of our tax money goes to support the war machine and a good deal of the rest is going to support the elite that control the war machine, we can see that our present war mentality is not working. Our values have been so perverted by our war mentality that we see sex as sinful but killing as entertainment. Our society is **dripping violence**. The violence is fed by poverty, social injustice, the break down of family and community that also arises from economic injustice, and by the managed media. **The cycle of violence** that exists in our society **exists because it is useful to those that control society.** It is easier to sell the war machine when your population is conditioned to violence. Our military industrial consciousness may not be working for nearly all of the life of the planet but it does work for the very few that are the master manipulators of our values and our consciousness. Rupert Murdoch, the media monopoly man that runs the "Fair and Balanced" [Fox Network](http://www.fox.com/), Sky Television, and [News Corp](http://www.newscorp.com/) just to name a few, [had](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rupert_Murdoch) all of his 175 newspapers editorialize in favor of the [Iraq war](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_War). Murdoch snickers when [he says](http://www.newscorpse.com/ncWP/?p=341) "we tried" to manipulate public opinion." The Iraq war was a good war to Murdoch [because,](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2004/07/b122948.html) "The death toll, certainly of Americans there, by the terms of any previous war are quite minute." But, to the media manipulators, the phony politicos, the military industrial elite, a million dead Iraqis are not to be considered. War is big business and it is supported by a **war consciousness that allows it to prosper.** That is why more war in Afghanistan, the war on Palestinians, and the other wars around the planet in which the [military industrial complex](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military-industrial_complex) builds massive wealth and power will continue. The military industrial war mentality is not only killing, maiming, and destroying but it is also contributing to the present social and economic collapse. As mentioned previously, the massive wealth transfer that occurs when the American people give half of their money to support death and destruction is money that could have gone to support a just society. It is no accident that after years of war and preparing for war, our society is crumbling. Science and technological resources along with economic and natural resources have been squandered in the never-ending pursuit of enemies. All of that energy **could** have been utilized for the good of humanity, ¶ instead of maintaining the power positions of the very few super wealthy. So the suffering that we give is ultimately the suffering we get. Humans want to believe that they can escape the consciousness that they live in. But that consciousness determines **what we experience** and **how we live.** As long as we choose to live in "War" in **our minds** then we will continue to get "War" in **our lives**. When humanity chooses to wage peace on the world then there will be a flowering of life. But until then we will be forced to live the life our present war consciousness is creating.

#### The alternative must begin in our minds – we need to free ourselves of the presumption towards war and advocate for peace and social justice to stop the flow of militarism that threatens existence

Demenchonok 9 – Worked as a senior researcher at the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, and is currently a Professor of Foreign Languages and Philosophy at Fort Valley State University in Georgia, listed in 2000 Outstanding Scholars of the 21st Century and is a recipient of the Twenty-First Century Award for Achievement in Philosophy from the International Biographical Centre --Edward, Philosophy After Hiroshima: From Power Politics to the Ethics of Nonviolence and Co-Responsibility, February, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Volume 68, Issue 1, Pages 9-49

Where, then, does the future lie? Unilateralism, hegemonic political anarchy, mass immiseration, ecocide, and global violence—a Hobbesian bellum omnium contra omnes? Or international cooperation, social justice, and genuine collective—political and human—security? Down which path lies cowering, fragile hope?¶ Humanistic thinkers approach these problems from the perspective of their concern about the situation of individuals and the long-range interests of humanity. They examine in depth the root causes of these problems, warning about the consequences of escalation and, at the same time, indicating the prospect of their possible solutions through nonviolent means and a growing global consciousness. Today's world is in desperate need of realistic alternatives to violent conflict. Nonviolent action—properly planned and executed—is a powerful and effective force for political and social change. The ideas of peace and nonviolence, as expressed by Immanuel Kant, Leo Tolstoy, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and many contemporary philosophers—supported by peace and civil rights movements—counter the paralyzing fear with hope and offer a realistic alternative: a rational approach to the solutions to the problems, encouraging people to be the masters of their own destiny.¶ Fortunately, the memory of the tragedies of war and the growing realization of this new existential situation of humanity has awakened the global conscience and generated protest movements demanding necessary changes. During the four decades of the Cold War, which polarized the world, power politics was challenged by the common perspective of humanity, of the supreme value of human life, and the ethics of peace. Thus, in Europe, which suffered from both world wars and totalitarianism, spiritual-intellectual efforts to find solutions to these problems generated ideas of "new thinking," aiming for peace, freedom, and democracy. Today, philosophers, intellectuals, progressive political leaders, and peace-movement activists continue to promote a peaceful alternative. In the asymmetry of power, despite being frustrated by war-prone politics, peaceful projects emerge each time, like a phoenix arising from the ashes, as the only viable alternative for the survival of humanity. The new thinking in philosophy affirms the supreme value of human and nonhuman life, freedom, justice, and the future of human civilization. It asserts that the transcendental task of the survival of humankind and the rest of the biotic community must have an unquestionable primacy in comparison to particular interests of nations, social classes, and so forth. In applying these principles to the nuclear age, it considers a just and lasting peace as a categorical imperative for the survival of humankind, and thus proposes a world free from nuclear weapons and from war and organized violence.44 In tune with the Charter of the United Nations, it calls for the democratization of international relations and for dialogue and cooperation in order to secure peace, human rights, and solutions to global problems. It further calls for the transition toward a cosmopolitan order.¶ The escalating global problems are symptoms of what might be termed a contemporary civilizational disease, developed over the course of centuries, in which techno-economic progress is achieved at the cost of depersonalization and dehumanization. Therefore, the possibility of an effective "treatment" today depends on whether or not humankind will be able to regain its humanity, thus establishing new relations of the individual with himself or herself, with others, and with nature. Hence the need for a new philosophy of humanity and an ethics of nonviolence and planetary co-responsibility to help us make sense not only of our past historical events, but also of the extent, quality, and urgency of our present choices.

## Case Stuff

### Norms

#### Drones are inevitably unpopular

Jacobstein 2013 - co-chair of AI and Robotics at Singularity University, located inside NASA Research Park (September, Neil, “Drones: A 360 Degree View” World Policy Journal 2013 30: 14, <http://wpj.sagepub.com/content/30/3/14.full?etoc>)

Third, the United States and its allies should expect that the use of military drones will be unpopular, even when used under the most legitimate, limited, transparent, and ethical circumstances. Policies about the use of these drones need to clearly distinguish military drones from what will be the vast majority of unmanned aircraft systems that will also be used for more anodyne purposes even in the areas targeted for military operations.

#### Long timeframe for norm setting – their author

Zenko 2013 (Micah Zenko is the Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department's Office of Policy Planning, Council Special Report No. 65, January 2013, “U.S. Drone Strike Policies”, i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Drones\_CSR65.pdf‎)

Much like policies governing the use of nuclear weapons, offensive cyber capabilities, and space, developing rules and frameworks for innovative weapons systems, much less reaching a consensus within the U.S. government, is a long and arduous process. In its second term, the Obama administration has a narrow policy window of opportunity to pursue reforms of the targeted killings program. The Obama administration can proactively shape U.S. and international use of armed drones in nonbattlefield settings through transparency, self-restraint, and engagement, or it can continue with its current policies and risk the consequences. To better secure the ability to conduct drone strikes, and potentially influence how others will use armed drones in the future, the United States should undertake the following specific policy recommendations.

#### Hostile states won’t follow norms and there’s no enforcement mechanism – they just constrain US flexibility

Lerner 2013 - Vice President for Government Relations at the Center for Security Policy (March 25, Ben, “Judging ‘Drones’ From Afar” <http://spectator.org/archives/2013/03/25/judging-drones-from-afar/1>)

Whatever the potential motivations for trying to codify international rules for using UAVs, such a move would be ill advised. While in theory, every nation that signs onto a treaty governing UAVs will be bound by its requirements, it is unlikely to play out this way in practice. It strains credulity to assume that China, Russia, Iran, and other non-democratic actors will not selectively apply (at best) such rules to themselves while using them as a cudgel with which to bash their rivals and score political points. The United States and its democratic allies, meanwhile, are more likely to adhere to the commitments for which they signed up. The net result: we are boxed in as far as our own self-defense, while other nations with less regard for the rule of law go use their UAVs to take out whomever, whenever, contorting said “rules” as they see fit. One need only look at China’s manipulation of the Law of the Sea Treaty to justify its vast territorial claims at the expense of its neighbors to see how this often plays out. And who would enforce the treaty’s rules — a third party tribunal? Would it be an apparatus of the United Nations, the same U.N. that assures us that it is not coming after the United States or its allies specifically, even as its investigation takes on as its “immediate focus” UAV operations recently conducted by those countries? The United States already conducts warfare under the norms of centuries of practice of customary international law in areas such as military necessity and proportionality, as well as the norms to which we committed ourselves when we became party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the United Nations Charter. These same rules can adequately cover the use of UAVs in the international context. But if the United States were to create or agree to a separate international regime for UAVs, we would subject ourselves to new, politicized “rules” that would needlessly hold back countries that already use UAVs responsibly, while empowering those that do not. America is in the midst of an important conversation about UAVs. President Obama should state unambiguously that we will not invite others to dictate its outcome.

#### Long timeframe on drone prolif – no one wants to invest in the near term

Zenko 2013 (Micah Zenko is the Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department's Office of Policy Planning, Council Special Report No. 65, January 2013, “U.S. Drone Strike Policies”, i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Drones\_CSR65.pdf‎)

Based on current trends, it is unlikely that most states will have, within ten years, the complete system architecture required to carry out distant drone strikes that would be harmful to U.S. national interests. However, those candidates able to obtain this technology will most likely be states with the financial resources to purchase or the industrial base to manufacture tactical short-range armed drones with limited firepower that lack the precision of U.S. laser-guided munitions; the intelligence collection and military command-and-control capabilities needed to deploy drones via line-of-sight communications; and crossborder adversaries who currently face attacks or the threat of attacks by manned aircraft, such as Israel into Lebanon, Egypt, or Syria; Russia into Georgia or Azerbaijan; Turkey into Iraq; and Saudi Arabia into Yemen. When compared to distant U.S. drone strikes, these contingencies do not require system-wide infrastructure and host-state support. Given the costs to conduct manned-aircraft strikes with minimal threat to pilots, it is questionable whether states will undertake the significant investment required for armed drones in the near term.

#### No impact to global drone prolif and it’s impossible to solve

Alejandro Sueldo 12, J.D. candidate and Dean’s Fellow at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law and a PhD candidate at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London of the University of London, 4/11/12, “The coming drone arms race,” <http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=70B6B991-ECA7-4E5F-BE80-FD8F8A1B5E90>

Of particular concern are the legal and policy challenges posed if other states imitate the U.S. targeted killing program. For Washington is setting a precedent whereby states can send drones, often over sovereign borders, to kill foreigners or their own citizens, who are deemed threats.

Other states may also follow Washington’s example and develop their own criteria to define imminent threats and use drones to counter them.

Washington will find it increasingly difficult to protest other nations’ targeted killing programs — particularly when the United States has helped define this lethal practice. U.S. opposition will prove especially difficult when other states justify targeted killings as a matter of domestic affairs.

Should enough states follow the U.S. example, the practice of preemptively targeting and killing suspected threats may develop into customary international law.

Such a norm, however, which requires consistent state practice arising out of a sense of legal obligation, now looks unlikely. While targeted killing policies are arguably executed by states citing a legal obligation to protect themselves from imminent threats, widespread state practice is still uncommon.

But international law does not forbid drones. And given the lack of an international regime to control drones, state and non-state actors are free to determine their future use.

This lack of international consensus about how to control drones stems from a serious contradiction in incentives. Though drones pose grave challenges, they also offer states lethal and non-lethal capabilities that are of great appeal. Because the potential for drone technology is virtually limitless, states are now unwilling to control how drones evolve.

#### U.S. drone use doesn’t set a precedent, restraint doesn’t solve it, and norms don’t apply to drones at all in the first place

Amitai Etzioni 13, professor of international relations at George Washington University, March/April 2013, “The Great Drone Debate,” Military Review, <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20130430_art004.pdf>

Other critics contend that by the United States using drones, it leads other countries into making and using them. For example, Medea Benjamin, the cofounder of the anti-war activist group CODEPINK and author of a book about drones argues that, “The proliferation of drones should evoke reﬂection on the precedent that the United States is setting by killing anyone it wants, anywhere it wants, on the basis of secret information. Other nations and non-state entities are watching—and are bound to start acting in a similar fashion.”60 Indeed scores of countries are now manufacturing or purchasing drones. There can be little doubt that the fact that drones have served the United States well has helped to popularize them. However, it does not follow that United States should not have employed drones in the hope that such a show of restraint would deter others. First of all, this would have meant that either the United States would have had to allow terrorists in hardto-reach places, say North Waziristan, to either roam and rest freely—or it would have had to use bombs that would have caused much greater collateral damage.

Further, the record shows that even when the United States did not develop a particular weapon, others did. Thus, China has taken the lead in the development of anti-ship missiles and seemingly cyber weapons as well. One must keep in mind that the international environment is a hostile one. Countries—and especially non-state actors— most of the time do not play by some set of self constraining rules. Rather, they tend to employ whatever weapons they can obtain that will further their interests. The United States correctly does not assume that it can rely on some non-existent implicit gentleman’s agreements that call for the avoidance of new military technology by nation X or terrorist group Y—if the United States refrains from employing that technology.

I am not arguing that there are no natural norms that restrain behavior. There are certainly some that exist, particularly in situations where all parties beneﬁt from the norms (e.g., the granting of diplomatic immunity) or where particularly horrifying weapons are involved (e.g., weapons of mass destruction). However drones are but one step—following bombers and missiles—in the development of distant battleﬁeld technologies. (Robotic soldiers—or future ﬁghting machines— are next in line). In such circumstances, the role of norms is much more limited.

#### China won’t use drones to resolve territorial disputes – fears backlash and creating a precedent

**Erickson and Strange 13** [Andrew Erickson, associate professor at the Naval War College and Associate in Research at Harvard University's Fairbank Centre, and Austin Strange, researcher at the Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute and graduate student at Zhejiang University, 5-29-13 China has drones. Now how will it use them? Foreign Affairs, McClatchy-Tribune, 29 May 2013, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/China-has-drones-Now-how-will-it-use-them-30207095.html, da 8-3-13]

Drones, able to dispatch death remotely, without human eyes on their targets or a pilot's life at stake, make people uncomfortable - even when they belong to democratic governments that presumably have some limits on using them for ill. (On May 23, in a major speech, US President Barack Obama laid out what some of those limits are.) An even more alarming prospect is that unmanned aircraft will be acquired and deployed by authoritarian regimes, with fewer checks on their use of lethal force.¶ Those worried about exactly that tend to point their fingers at China. In March, after details emerged that China had considered taking out a drug trafficker in Myanmar with a drone strike, a CNN blog post warned, "Today, it's Myanmar. Tomorrow, it could very well be some other place in Asia or beyond." Around the same time, a National Journal article entitled "When the Whole World Has Drones" teased out some of the consequences of Beijing's drone programme, asking, "What happens if China arms one of its remote-piloted planes and strikes Philippine or Indian trawlers in the South China Sea?"¶ Indeed, the time to fret about when China and other authoritarian countries will acquire drones is over: they have them. The question now is when and how they will use them. But as with its other, less exotic military capabilities, Beijing has cleared only a technological hurdle - and its behaviour will continue to be constrained by politics.¶ China has been developing a drone capacity for over half a century, starting with its reverse engineering of Soviet Lavochkin La-17C target drones that it had received from Moscow in the late 1950s. Today, Beijing's opacity makes it difficult to gauge the exact scale of the programme, but according to Ian Easton, an analyst at the Project 2049 Institute, an American think-tank devoted to Asia-Pacific security matters, by 2011 China's air force alone had over 280 combat drones. In other words, its fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles is already bigger and more sophisticated than all but the United States'; in this relatively new field Beijing is less of a newcomer and more of a fast follower. And the force will only become more effective: the Lijian ("sharp sword" in Chinese), a combat drone in the final stages of development, will make China one of the very few states that have or are building a stealth drone capacity.¶ This impressive arsenal may tempt China to pull the trigger. The fact that a Chinese official acknowledged that Beijing had considered using drones to eliminate the Myanmar drug trafficker, Naw Kham, makes clear that it would not be out of the question for China to launch a drone strike in a security operation against a non-state actor. Meanwhile, as China's territorial disputes with its neighbours have escalated, there is a chance that Beijing would introduce unmanned aircraft, especially since India, the Philippines and Vietnam distantly trail China in drone funding and capacity, and would find it difficult to compete. Beijing is already using drones to photograph the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands it disputes with Japan, as the retired Chinese major-general Peng Guangqian revealed earlier this year, and to keep an eye on movements near the North Korean border.¶ Beijing, however, is unlikely to use its drones lightly. It already faces tremendous criticism from much of the international community for its perceived brazenness in continental and maritime sovereignty disputes. With its leaders attempting to allay notions that China's rise poses a threat to the region, injecting drones conspicuously into these disputes would prove counterproductive. China also fears setting a precedent for the use of drones in East Asian hotspots that the United States could eventually exploit. For now, Beijing is showing that it understands these risks, and to date it has limited its use of drones in these areas to surveillance, according to recent public statements from China's Defence Ministry.

**Mil to mil coop solves South China Sea war**

**Bloomberg 9/30**, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-30/china-u-s-military-ties-grow-as-countries-eye-each-other-at-sea.html>

Next year, **Chinese ships will join the Rim of** the **Pacific exercise** **for the first time**. During a visit to the Pentagon last month, **Foreign Minister** Wang Yi **described military ties as a “bright spot” in the** U.S.-China **relationship**.

Wang’s words and **China’s participation reflect** a **changed attitude as the world’s** two **biggest militaries boost contacts despite competing for influence** in the Asia-Pacific, home to shipping lanes and resource reserves. The closer ties will be tested as China grows more assertive in a region dotted with nations that would call for U.S. help if attacked.

“The **competition** and conflicts between China and the U.S. **will** still **be there, but it will prevent them from escalating to an unmanageable level**,” Yan Xuetong, dean of the Institute of Modern International Relations at [Tsinghua University](http://topics.bloomberg.com/tsinghua-university/) in Beijing, said by phone. “It is preventable diplomacy rather than positive cooperation.”

U.S.-China ties will be on display at next week’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum leaders meeting in Bali. China’s territorial disputes in the [South China Sea](http://topics.bloomberg.com/south-china-sea/) may be discussed, along with changing U.S. and Chinese roles in the region.

**Zhang and Shi never say nuclear war**

**No war from heg decline – international liberal order**

**Ikenberry, 11** – (May/June issue of Foreign Affairs, G. John, PhD, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, “The Future of the Liberal World Order,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/

articles/67730/g-john-ikenberry/the-future-of-the-liberal-world-order?page=show DH)

For all these reasons, many observers have concluded that world politics is experiencing not just a changing of the guard but also a transition in the ideas and principles that underlie the global order. The journalist Gideon Rachman, for example, says that a cluster of liberal internationalist ideas -- such as faith in democratization, confidence in free markets, and the acceptability of U.S. military power -- are all being called into question. According to this worldview, the future of international order will be shaped above all by China, which will use its growing power and wealth to push world politics in an illiberal direction. Pointing out that China and other non-Western states have weathered the recent financial crisis better than their Western counterparts, pessimists argue that an authoritarian capitalist alternative to Western neoliberal ideas has already emerged. According to the scholar Stefan Halper, emerging-market states "are learning to combine market economics with traditional autocratic or semiautocratic politics in a process that signals an intellectual rejection of the Western economic model." Today's international order is not really American or Western--even if it initially appeared that way. But this panicked narrative misses a deeper reality: although the United States' position in the global system is changing, the liberal international order is alive and well. The struggle over international order todayis not about fundamental principles. China and other emerging great powers do not want to contest the basic rules and principles of the liberal international order; they wish to gain more authority and leadership within it. Indeed, today's power transition represents not the defeat of the liberal order but its ultimate ascendance. Brazil, China, and India have all become more prosperous and capable by operating inside the existing international order -- benefiting from its rules, practices, and institutions, including the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the newly organized G-20. Their economic success and growing influence are tied to the liberal internationalist organization of world politics, and they have deep interests in preserving that system. In the meantime, alternatives to an open and rule-based order have yet to crystallize. Even though the last decade has brought remarkable upheavals in the global system -- the emergence of new powers, bitter disputes among Western allies over the United States' unipolar ambitions, and a global financial crisis and recession -- the liberal international order has no competitors. On the contrary, the rise of non-Western powers and the growth of economic and security interdependence are creating new constituencies for it. To be sure, as wealth and power become less concentrated in the United States' hands, the country will be less able to shape world politics. But the underlying foundations of the liberal international order will survive and thrive.Indeed, now may be the best time for the United States and its democratic partners to update the liberal order for a new era, ensuring that it continues to provide the benefits of security and prosperity that it has provided since the middle of the twentieth century.

### Accountability

**Instability inev – Iraq**

**Democracy Digest – 12/23/11, Iraq may be litmus for fate of Arab democracy, http://www.demdigest.net/blog/2011/12/iraq-may-be-litmus-for-fate-of-arab-democracy/**

**Is a year of hope brought on by the Arab Awakening about to end on a sour note?** “We have a remarkable new model in the Arab world,” says Salman Shaikh of the Brookings Institute in Doha. “People from different ends of the political spectrums of civil society, including secularist liberals, are forming coalitions with Islamists. That is something that continues to gain some strength, especially as we see Islamists come to the fore.” But **Iraq’s sectarian upsurge and authoritarian shift is feeding anxiety that the country could face a new civil war** and become a battleground for conflicting regional powers. “Iraq is deeply worrying,” **Shaikh says**. “It’s **the politics of the country** that **could break it apart**. In fact, some of us do have real concerns that **we could end up with another civil war with regional players again playing a role** in that.” Some observers suggest that **US troops’ departure from Iraq has allowed** Prime Minister Nouri **Al-Maliki to revert to innate sectarian and authoritarian impulses**, **and to move closer to his fellow Shia counterparts in Iran.** “With the Americans removed from the equation, of course Maliki feels stronger,” says Laith Kubba (above), Middle East program director at the National Endowment for Democracy. With Iranian power growing as US influence declines, the Iraqiya bloc’s Ayad Allawi and other Sunni interests “feel totally exposed,” he says. But Maliki’s political instincts are less important than the state of Iraq’s political institutions. “The real problem is not an authoritarian president or prime minister, but the weak state and weak institutions,” says Kubba. The Iraqi military is the one institution that may be able to stand between al-Qaeda and the Shia militias, says Toby Dodge, an international relations scholar at the London School of Economics. “The Iraqi military have the capacity to hold things together in a rough and ready way if they get the political backing from Maliki downwards,” he argues. “But **we have the recognizable dynamic of paranoid politicians who may be tempted to use state institutions to strike back in a sectarian way – and that is a short road to civil war.”** Iraq’s current tensions may carry broader lessons for the region, demonstrating the fragility of democratic institutions and the dangers inherent in cultivating democracy on terrain contested by sectarian forces. “The US hoped to leave at least a stable political process in which internal conflicts could be resolved via the ballot box,” says Kubba. “It is questionable whether this was done,” with the possible exception of Kurdistan. “There are two Iraqs today, not one. In Kurdistan, everything is different: security, management, economics,” he suggests. Iraq is demonstrating the resilience of entrenched illiberal forces and ideologies that are fuelling the backlash against the democratic and liberal energies unleashed over the past year. “Some of the older narratives are and will reassert themselves in the region whether in Bahrain or Iraq now. We will see, particularly around the Gulf, Lebanon, the Sunni-Shi’ite schism arise again,” Brookings analyst Shaikh believes. Iraq, like Syria, is becoming a site of struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the NED’s Kubba contends. “The regional balance of power will change with the fall of Assad,” which will also impact Lebanon and Iraq, he says. “But nobody knows how Iran will respond.”

**Impact’s empirically denied**

**Drum ‘7**

**(Kevin-, Political Blogger @ the Washington Monthly, Sept. 9, Washington Monthly, “The Chaos Hawks”, http://www.**

**washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2007\_09/012029.php )**

Having admitted, however, that the odds of a military success in Iraq are almost impossibly long, Chaos **Hawks** nonetheless **insist** that the U.S. military needs to stay in Iraq for the foreseeable future. Why? Because if we leave **the** entire **Middle East will become a bloodbath**. Sunni and Shiite will engage in mutual genocide, oil fields will go up in flames, fundamentalist parties will take over, and al-Qaeda will have a safe haven bigger than the entire continent of Europe.

Needless to say, **this is nonsense**. **Israel has fought war after war in the Middle East. Result: no regional conflagration. Iran and Iraq fought one of the bloodiest wars of the second half the 20th century. Result: no regional conflagration**. **The Soviets fought in Afghanistan and then withdrew. No regional conflagration**. The **U.S. fought the Gulf War and then left. No regional conflagration. Algeria fought an internal civil war for a decade. No regional conflagration.** So where does this bogeyman come from? Hard to say. Probably a deep-seated unwillingness to confront the fact that the United States can't really influence a course of events we originally set in motion. But Iraq is already fighting a civil war, and that civil war will continue whether we stay or go. If we go it will likely become more intense, but also shorter lived. The eventual result, however, will almost certainly be the same: a de facto independent Kurdistan in the north and a Shiite theocracy in the south. **The rest of the Middle East will**, as usual, **watch events unfold without doing much of anything about them**, and will accept the inevitable results. The U.S., for its part, will remain in the north to protect Kurdistan, in the east in Afghanistan, in the west in the Mediterranean, and in the south in its bases in the Gulf. We'll hardly be absent from the region.

#### Nuclear deterrence is stable between India and Pakistan

**Ganguly, poli sci prof- Indiana, 08 (Sumit, Nuclear Stability in South Asia, Intl Security Vol 33, No 2, Fall)**

The Robustness of Nuclear Deterrence As the outcomes of the 1999 and 2001–02 crises show, nuclear deterrence is robust in South Asia. Both crises were contained at levels considerably short of full-scale war. That said, as Paul Kapur has argued, Pakistan's acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability may well have emboldened its leadership, secure in the belief that India had no good options to respond. India, in turn, has been grappling with an effort to forge a new military doctrine and strategy to enable it to respond to Pakistani needling while containing the possibilities of conflict escalation, especially to the nuclear level.78 Whether Indian military planners [End Page 65] can fashion such a calibrated strategy to cope with Pakistani probes remains an open question. This article's analysis of the 1999 and 2001–02 crises does suggest, however, that nuclear deterrence in South Asia is far from parlous, contrary to what the critics have suggested. Three specific forms of evidence can be adduced to argue the case for the strength of nuclear deterrence. First, there is a serious problem of conflation in the arguments of both Hoyt and Kapur. Undeniably, Pakistan's willingness to provoke India has increased commensurate with its steady acquisition of a nuclear arsenal. This period from the late 1980s to the late 1990s, however, also coincided with two parallel developments that equipped Pakistan with the motives, opportunities, and means to meddle in India's internal affairs—particularly in Jammu and Kashmir. The most important change that occurred was the end of the conflict with the Soviet Union, which freed up military resources for use in a new jihad in Kashmir. This jihad, in turn, was made possible by the emergence of an indigenous uprising within the state as a result of Indian political malfeasance.79 Once the jihadis were organized, trained, armed, and unleashed, it is far from clear whether Pakistan could control the behavior and actions of every resulting jihadist organization.80 Consequently, although the number of attacks on India did multiply during the 1990s, it is difficult to establish a firm causal connection between the growth of Pakistani boldness and its gradual acquisition of a full-fledged nuclear weapons capability. Second, India did respond with considerable force once its military planners realized the full scope and extent of the intrusions across the Line of Control. Despite the vigor of this response, India did exhibit restraint. For example, Indian pilots were under strict instructions not to cross the Line of Control in pursuit of their bombing objectives.81 They adhered to these guidelines even though they left them more vulnerable to Pakistani ground fire.82 The Indian military exercised such restraint to avoid provoking Pakistani fears of a wider attack into Pakistan-controlled Kashmir and then into Pakistan itself. Indian restraint was also evident at another level. During the last war in [End Page 66] Kashmir in 1965, within a week of its onset, the Indian Army horizontally escalated with an attack into Pakistani Punjab. In fact, in the Punjab, Indian forces successfully breached the international border and reached the outskirts of the regional capital, Lahore. The Indian military resorted to this strategy under conditions that were not especially propitious for the country. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime minister, had died in late 1964. His successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, was a relatively unknown politician of uncertain stature and standing, and the Indian military was still recovering from the trauma of the 1962 border war with the People's Republic of China.83 Finally, because of its role in the Cold War, the Pakistani military was armed with more sophisticated, U.S.-supplied weaponry, including the F-86 Sabre and the F-104 Starfighter aircraft. India, on the other hand, had few supersonic aircraft in its inventory, barring a small number of Soviet-supplied MiG-21s and the indigenously built HF-24.84 Furthermore, the Indian military remained concerned that China might open a second front along the Himalayan border. Such concerns were not entirely chimerical, because a Sino-Pakistani entente was under way. Despite these limitations, the Indian political leadership responded to Pakistani aggression with vigor and granted the Indian military the necessary authority to expand the scope of the war. In marked contrast to the politico-military context of 1965, in 1999 India had a self-confident (if belligerent) political leadership and a substantially more powerful military apparatus. Moreover, the country had overcome most of its Nehruvian inhibitions about the use of force to resolve disputes.85 Furthermore, unlike in 1965, India had at least two reserve strike corps in the Punjab in a state of military readiness and poised to attack across the border if given the political nod.86 Despite these significant differences and advantages, the Indian political leadership chose to scrupulously limit the scope of the conflict to the Kargil region. As K. Subrahmanyam, a prominent Indian defense analyst and political commentator, wrote in 1993: [End Page 67] The awareness on both sides of a nuclear capability that can enable either country to assemble nuclear weapons at short notice induces mutual caution. This caution is already evident on the part of India. In 1965, when Pakistan carried out its "Operation Gibraltar" and sent in infiltrators, India sent its army across the cease-fire line to destroy the assembly points of the infiltrators. That escalated into a full-scale war. In 1990, when Pakistan once again carried out a massive infiltration of terrorists trained in Pakistan, India tried to deal with the problem on Indian territory and did not send its army into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.87 Subrahmanyam's argument takes on additional significance in light of the overt acquisition of nuclear weapons by both India and Pakistan. Third, Sagan's assertion about the dominance of the Pakistani military in determining Pakistan's security policies is unquestionably accurate. With the possible exception of the Kargil conflict, however, it is far from clear that the Pakistani military has been the primary force in planning for and precipitating aggressive war against India. The first Kashmir war, without a doubt, had the explicit approval of Pakistan's civilian authorities.88 Similarly, there is ample evidence that the highly ambitious foreign minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, goaded President Ayub Khan to undertake the 1965 war.89 Finally, once again Bhutto, as much as the Pakistani military dictator Yahya Khan, was complicit in provoking a war with India in 1971, following the outbreak of a civil war in East Pakistan.90

#### Wouldn’t cause extinction

**Copley News Service, 02 (Bruce Lieberman, “Fallout from nuclear war in South Asia seen as unlikely to reach U.S.”, http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2002/020610-indopak1.htm)**

The horror of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan could decimate South Asia's largest cities, killing up to 12 million people and bringing misery to countless others. But a war, if limited to those two nations and the nuclear arsenals they are thought to possess, poses little danger of radioactive fallout reaching North America, physicists and atmospheric scientists say. There are fundamental reasons. First, India and Pakistan are believed armed with less potent weapons, probably no larger than the equivalent of 15,000 tons of TNT, about the same size as the bombs the United States dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. In contrast, the typical nuclear weapon in the U.S. stockpile today is 10 to 20 times more powerful than the weapons held by India and Pakistan, according to GlobalSecurity.org. Second, the two countries are thought to have no more than 200 warheads between them - not enough, scientists believe, to endanger populations far beyond South Asia. More than 31,000 nuclear weapons, by contrast, are maintained by eight known nuclear powers, and 95 percent are in the United States and Russia, according to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, which monitors nuclear proliferation. Third, the approaching summer in the Northern Hemisphere will mean an absence of fast-moving winter storms that could carry nuclear fallout quickly across the globe. Further, South Asia's monsoon season, which begins this month and extends into October, could wash nuclear fallout back to Earth, confining the worst environmental damage to that part of the world. "Of course, there will be some radiation reaching globally, but the amounts will be small compared to the levels that would produce health effects," said Charles Shapiro, a physicist at San Francisco State University, who co-authored a 1985 study on the environmental effects of nuclear war. Irradiated particles blasted into the atmosphere from a nuclear war between India and Pakistan, carried aloft by the jet stream, would eventually reach every part of the globe and rain back down to Earth as fallout, scientists say. Atmospheric studies conducted by scientists at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography in La Jolla, Calif., have found that particulate from pollution in South Asia can reach the West Coast of the United States in as few as six days. However, those studies focused on the migration of haze in South Asia that covers thousands of square kilometers - a much greater area than that affected by a nuclear explosion, said V. Ramanathan, an atmospheric scientist at Scripps. "It's very risky to extrapolate" data from the pollution study, he said. Ramanathan's study found that particulates larger than 10 microns in diameter fell to Earth before reaching North America, so it's unclear how much radioactive fallout might reach the West Coast, or how dispersed it would be, he said. "I think East Asia has more to worry about, as well as Europe," Ramanathan said. Larry Riddle, a climatologist at Scripps, said the levels of radiation reaching the United States probably would not be any higher than background radiation. Humans are exposed every day to radiation from space, from deep in the Earth, and from man-made sources such as medical X-rays and other consumer products. "Essentially, it would have no effect," Riddle said.

#### **Drones aren’t a recruitment tool – Al Qaeda uses money to recruit and anti-drone propaganda is elitist hype.**

Axe 13

(David Axe, quoting Christopher Swift, fellow at the University of Virginia’s Center for National Security Law,“Expert: No Drone Backlash in Yemen”, http://christopher-swift.com/th\_gallery/expert-no-drone-backlash-in-yemen)

Lethal strikes by armed drones are America’s best and less obtrusive method of killing Islamic militants and dismantling their terror networks while minimizing civilian casualties. Or they’re a misguided and counter-productive attempt at sterilizing the dirty work of counter-terrorism — one that serves as a rallying cry for terrorist recruiters and ends up creating more militants than it eliminates.¶ Those are the opposing views in one of the most urgent debates in military, policy and humanitarian circles today. Now a new, ground-level investigation by a daring American researcher adds a fresh wrinkle to the controversy. Chris Swift, a fellow at the University of Virginia’s Center for National Security Law, spent a week in late May interviewing around 40 tribal leaders in southern Yemen, one of the major drone battlegrounds.¶ What he found might disappoint activists and embolden counter-terrorism officials. “Nobody in my cohort [of interview subjects] drew a causal link between drones on one hand and [militant] recruiting on other,” Swift says.¶ Tweets, blog posts and news reporting from Yemen seem to contradict Swift’s conclusion. Drone strikes in Yemen have gone up, way up, from around 10 in 2011 to some two dozen so far this year. No fewer than 329 people have died in the Yemen drone campaign, at least 58 of whom were innocent civilians, according to a count by the British Bureau of Investigative Journalism.¶ But some Yemenis believe the civilian body count is much higher. “For every headline you read regarding ‘militants’ killed by drones in #Yemen, think of the civilians killed that are not reported,” NGO consultant Atiaf Al Wazir Tweeted.¶ Another Yemeni Twitter user drew the link between the drone war’s innocent victims in a Tweet directed at top U.S. counterterrorism adviser John Brennan. “Brennan do you hear us?!!! We say #NoDrones #NoDrones #NoDrones. You are killing innocent people and creating more enemies in #Yemen.”¶ Reporters have run with the claim that drone strikes breed terrorists. “Drones have replaced Guantánamo as the recruiting tool of choice for militants,” Jo Becker and Scott Shane wrote in The New York Times.¶ “Across the vast, rugged terrain of southern Yemen, an escalating campaign of U.S. drone strikes is stirring increasing sympathy for Al Qaeda-linked militants and driving tribesmen to join a network linked to terrorist plots against the United States,” The Washington Post‘s Sudarsan Raghavan reported.¶ But the narrative embraced by Yemeni Tweeters the Times and the Post originated in, and is sustained by, a comparatively wealthy, educated and English-speaking community based in Yemen’s capital city Sana’a, Swift explains. He calls them the “Gucci jean-wearing crowd.” But cosmopolitan Sana’a isn’t breeding many terrorists, and popular opinions in the city don’t necessarily reflect the reality in Yemen’s embattled south.¶ To get to the sources that really mattered, Swift sensed he had to “get out of the Sana’a political elite,” he says. He teamed up with an experienced fixer — a combined guide, translator and protector — and slipped into heavily-armed Aden in Yemen’s south in the back of pickup trucks. “I always expected that my next checkpoint was going to be my last,” Swift says.¶ Swift survived some close calls and brought back what is arguably the freshest and most relevant data on militant recruiting in southern Yemen. He has since written articles for Foreign Affairs and the Sentinel counterterrorism journal. In southern Yemen “nobody really gets excited about drones,” he explains. He says his sources were “overwhelming saying that Al Qaeda is recruiting through economic inducement.” In other words, for the most part the terror group pays people to join.¶ Which isn’t to say Yemen’s militants don’t fear the American killer robots. In fact, they’re “terrified of drones,” Swift says. “They make a big deal of surviving drones in their propaganda videos.”¶ The militants’ fear of drones perhaps underscores the robots’ effectiveness. It does not argue for widespread resentment among everyday people in southern Yemen that compels them to join the terrorists’ ranks. At least, that’s what Swift believes.

#### Yemeni government is on board – who cares about the public

Mazzetti and Landler, August 2013 - Pulitzer Prize for reporting on the intensifying violence in Pakistan and Afghanistan and Washington's response. (August 2, Mark and Mark, “Despite Administration Promises, Few Signs of Change in Drone Wars ” <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/03/us/politics/drone-war-rages-on-even-as-administration-talks-about-ending-it.html?pagewanted=print>)

But because the drone program remains classified, administration officials are loath to discuss it in any detail, even when it is at the center of policy discussions, as it was during Mr. Obama’s meeting in the Oval Office on Thursday with President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi of Yemen. After their meeting, Mr. Obama and Mr. Hadi heaped praise on each other for cooperating on counterterrorism, though neither described the nature of that cooperation. Mr. Obama credited the setbacks of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or A.Q.A.P., the terrorist network’s affiliate in Yemen, not to the drone strikes, but to reforms of the Yemeni military that Mr. Hadi undertook after he took office in February 2012. And Mr. Hadi twice stressed that Yemen was acting in its own interests in working with the United States to root out Al Qaeda, since the group’s terrorist attacks had badly damaged Yemen’s economy. “Yemen’s development basically came to a halt whereby there is no tourism, and the oil companies, the oil-exploring companies, had to leave the country as a result of the presence of Al Qaeda,” Mr. Hadi said. Asked specifically about the recent increase in drone strikes in Yemen, the White House spokesman, Jay Carney, said: “I can tell you that we do cooperate with Yemen in our counterterrorism efforts. And it is an important relationship, an important connection, given what we know about A.Q.A.P. and the danger it represents to the United States and our allies.”

#### No impact to Pakistani public opinion

Khory 2013 – professor at Mount Holyoke (March 27, Kavita, “The Worrying Future of Drone Strikes” <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/media/worrying-future-drone-strikes>)

QA: What has been the Pakistani government’s response to these drone strikes, and does it publicly or privately support the drone strikes? KK: The precise role of Pakistan’s government and military in the drone strikes remains unclear. For the most part, the government denies any operational knowledge of the attacks. Government officials have challenged the legality of drone strikes in Pakistan, which have risen significantly under the Obama administration, and complain that these strikes are carried out without their consent. Yet, as we learned from documents released by WikiLeaks in 2010, senior Pakistani officials tacitly approved drone strikes while publicly condemning them. Pakistanis have shared intelligence with American counterparts, and until 2011 the CIA carried out drone missions from an airbase in Pakistan. QA: Is the Pakistani government under pressure from within Pakistan to end drone strikes on its soil? KK: Despite growing anger and protests against drone strikes, public opinion is not likely to influence policy in any meaningful way. Drone strikes are a sticking point in current United States-Pakistan relations, but policy toward them is shaped by a variety of factors. For example, the Pakistani government’s support for drone strikes declined significantly after the killing of Osama bin Laden and the deaths of 24 Pakistani soldiers in a botched NATO airstrike. The government’s ambiguous posture and contradictory policy on drones is frustrating for many Pakistanis, but few are calling for a radical restructuring of Pakistan-U.S. relations.

#### Alternatives are less popular than drone strikes – public opinion is misstated

Byman 2013 - professor at Georgetown University's Security Studies Program (July, Daniel, “professor at Georgetown University's Security Studies Program” <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-drones-obama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorism-byman>)

Such concerns are valid, but the level of local anger over drones is often lower than commonly portrayed. Many surveys of public opinion related to drones are conducted by anti-drone organizations, which results in biased samples. Other surveys exclude those who are unaware of the drone program and thus overstate the importance of those who are angered by it. In addition, many Pakistanis do not realize that the drones often target the very militants who are wreaking havoc on their country. And for most Pakistanis and Yemenis, the most important problems they struggle with are corruption, weak representative institutions, and poor economic growth; the drone program is only a small part of their overall anger, most of which is directed toward their own governments. A poll conducted in 2007, well before the drone campaign had expanded to its current scope, found that only 15 percent of Pakistanis had a favorable opinion of the United States. It is hard to imagine that alternatives to drone strikes, such as seal team raids or cruise missile strikes, would make the United States more popular.

### Solvency

#### Ex post review doesn’t grant legitimacy

Vladek 2013 - professor of law and the associate dean for scholarship at American University Washington College of Law (February 10, Steve, “Why a “Drone Court” Won’t Work–But (Nominal) Damages Might…” <http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/02/why-a-drone-court-wont-work/>)

Perhaps counterintuitively, I also believe that after-the-fact judicial review wouldn’t raise anywhere near the same prudential concerns as those noted above. Leaving aside how much less pressure judges would be under in such cases, it’s also generally true that damages regimes don’t have nearly the same validating effect on government action that ex ante approval does. Otherwise, one would expect to have seen a dramatic upsurge in lethal actions by law enforcement officers after each judicial decision refusing to impose individual liability arising out of a prior use of deadly force. So far as I know, no such evidence exists. Of course, damages actions aren’t a perfect solution here. It’s obvious, but should be said anyway, that in a case in which the government does act unlawfully, no amount of damages will make the victim (or his heirs) whole. It’s also inevitable that, like much of the Guantánamo litigation, most of these suits would be resolved under extraordinary secrecy, and so there would be far less public accountability for targeted killings than, ideally, we might want. That said, there are two enormous upsides to damages actions that, in my mind, make them worth it–even if they are deeply, fundamentally flawed:

#### Damages cause constraint in drone operations

Vladek 2013 - professor of law and the associate dean for scholarship at American University Washington College of Law (February 10, Steve, “Why a “Drone Court” Won’t Work–But (Nominal) Damages Might…” <http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/02/why-a-drone-court-wont-work/>)

First, if nothing else, the specter of damages, even nominal damages, should have a deterrent effect on future government officers, such that, if a targeted killing operation ever was carried out in a way that violated the relevant legal rules, there would be liability–and, as importantly, precedent–such that the next government official in a similar context might think twice, and might make sure that he’s that much more convinced that the individual in question is who the government claims, and that there’s no alternative to the use of lethal force.

#### Ex post reviews hurt flexibility – Britain proves

NYT 2013 (January 30, “Drone Strike Prompts Suit, Raising Fears for U.S. Allies” <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/31/world/drone-strike-lawsuit-raises-concerns-on-intelligence-sharing.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print>)

But in light of Mr. Khan’s lawsuit and the potential for others, operatives across the British intelligence agencies are concerned that if they share information, they could be “punished by the judiciary for something the executive ordered them to do,” said the person with knowledge of internal discussions. “They are willing to go the last mile, but they don’t want to go to prison for it,” the person said. “If the sword of Damocles is hanging over our intelligence officers, they can’t do their job.”

## 2NC

## Accountability

### 2NC No Impact

#### Wouldn’t cause extinction

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### **2NC Recruitment**

#### Yemeni government is on board – who cares about the public

Mazzetti and Landler, August 2013 - Pulitzer Prize for reporting on the intensifying violence in Pakistan and Afghanistan and Washington's response. (August 2, Mark and Mark, “Despite Administration Promises, Few Signs of Change in Drone Wars ” <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/03/us/politics/drone-war-rages-on-even-as-administration-talks-about-ending-it.html?pagewanted=print>)

But because the drone program remains classified, administration officials are loath to discuss it in any detail, even when it is at the center of policy discussions, as it was during Mr. Obama’s meeting in the Oval Office on Thursday with President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi of Yemen. After their meeting, Mr. Obama and Mr. Hadi heaped praise on each other for cooperating on counterterrorism, though neither described the nature of that cooperation. Mr. Obama credited the setbacks of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or A.Q.A.P., the terrorist network’s affiliate in Yemen, not to the drone strikes, but to reforms of the Yemeni military that Mr. Hadi undertook after he took office in February 2012. And Mr. Hadi twice stressed that Yemen was acting in its own interests in working with the United States to root out Al Qaeda, since the group’s terrorist attacks had badly damaged Yemen’s economy. “Yemen’s development basically came to a halt whereby there is no tourism, and the oil companies, the oil-exploring companies, had to leave the country as a result of the presence of Al Qaeda,” Mr. Hadi said. Asked specifically about the recent increase in drone strikes in Yemen, the White House spokesman, Jay Carney, said: “I can tell you that we do cooperate with Yemen in our counterterrorism efforts. And it is an important relationship, an important connection, given what we know about A.Q.A.P. and the danger it represents to the United States and our allies.”

#### Alternatives are less popular than drone strikes – public opinion is misstated

Byman 2013 - professor at Georgetown University's Security Studies Program (July, Daniel, “professor at Georgetown University's Security Studies Program” <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-drones-obama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorism-byman>)

Such concerns are valid, but the level of local anger over drones is often lower than commonly portrayed. Many surveys of public opinion related to drones are conducted by anti-drone organizations, which results in biased samples. Other surveys exclude those who are unaware of the drone program and thus overstate the importance of those who are angered by it. In addition, many Pakistanis do not realize that the drones often target the very militants who are wreaking havoc on their country. And for most Pakistanis and Yemenis, the most important problems they struggle with are corruption, weak representative institutions, and poor economic growth; the drone program is only a small part of their overall anger, most of which is directed toward their own governments. A poll conducted in 2007, well before the drone campaign had expanded to its current scope, found that only 15 percent of Pakistanis had a favorable opinion of the United States. It is hard to imagine that alternatives to drone strikes, such as seal team raids or cruise missile strikes, would make the United States more popular.

### **AT: Pakistan Impact**

#### Drones work in Pakistan – systematic data analysis proves

Johnston and Sarbahi 2013 – RAND corporation and Stanford (July 14, Patrick B. and Anoop K., “The Impact of US Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan and Afghanista” <http://patrickjohnston.info/materials/drones.pdf>)

A systematic analysis of the data reveals that drone strikes have succeeded in curbing deadly terrorist attacks in Pakistan. Speci cally, the key ndings of our study show that drone strikes are associated with substantial reductions in terrorist violence along four key dimensions. First, drone strikes are generally associated with a reduction in the rate of terrorist attacks. Second, drone strikes are also associated with a reduction in the number of people killed as a result of terrorist attacks. Third, drone strikes tend to be linked to decreases in the use of particularly lethal and intimidating tactics, including suicide and IED attacks. Fourth, the study nds that this reduction in terrorism is not the result of militants leaving unsafe areas and conducting attacks elsewhere in the region; on the contrary, there is some evidence to suggest that drone strikes have a small violence-reducing e ect in areas near those struck by drones. Taken together, these ndings strongly suggest that despite drone strikes' unpopularity, o cial claims that drones have aided U.S. counterterrorism e orts in Pakistan appear to be credible and should not be dismissed out of hand.

#### The aff makes the Pakistan army effective - key to solve

Dawn ‘9 (Dawn Editorial, “Drone attacks”, <http://archives.dawn.com/archives/145308>, May 8, 2009)

Republican Congressman Ronald Earnest Paul`s query to the House regarding the legitimacy of US drone-bombing in Fata comes not a moment too soon. The matter is of pivotal significance in the Pakistani forces` efforts to contain the terrorism emanating from the area, and is a divisive factor in the debate over how the issue must be tackled. The justification offered earlier was that Pakistan appeared helpless against the rising tide of militancy and terrorism. But now the army has launched renewed offensives in the militant-infested areas and reports suggest that gains are being achieved. Meanwhile, public opinion is turning against the militants, with many in the citizenry now demanding that no stone be left unturned in bringing them to book. In this situation, the continuing US drone incursions are robbing our security forces of some of their moral legitimacy and are, in fact, undermining the war effort. For one thing, as Mr Paul pointed out, the drone incursions violate the rights of a sovereign country. Given that the US is not at war with Pakistan — and, in fact, the two countries are partners in what was earlier referred to as the `war on terror` — the US cannot claim legitimacy in unilaterally launching offensives against militants whom the Pakistan military has already engaged in serious combat. The repeated US violations of the country`s territorial integrity subvert our government`s efforts to make this `Pakistan`s war` and lend currency to the extremists` claim that Pakistan is merely a pawn in what is, essentially, America`s war. Secondly, the US bombings have resulted in a large number of civilian casualties which, in the public`s mind, outweigh by far any success against the militants. America`s actions stand in danger of being viewed as wanton foreign aggression against innocent populations. And the drone strikes are contributing to the increasing number of refugees fleeing the area. Meanwhile, the Pakistan Army and other security forces continue to suffer heavy casualties in the battles underway on our western borders.

#### The military in Pakistan isn’t credible – drones don’t hurt the government

Foust 2012 - fellow at the American Security Project (September 26, Joshua, “Targeted Killing, Pro and Con: What to Make of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan” <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/09/targeted-killing-pro-and-con-what-to-make-of-us-drone-strikes-in-pakistan/262862/>)

It is not a simple one to answer. Looking at how residents in the FATA have behaved in other violent campaigns is instructive. In early 2009, the Pakistani Army announced its campaign to "clear" the Swat Valley, north of Islamabad, of terrorist groups that had been systematically murdering elders and tribal policemen and destroying hundreds of schools and other government buildings. As the campaign proceeded, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees said more than 300,000 people fled the fighting. By the end of the campaign, more than 1 million people got displaced by the army-Taliban fighting in Swat, which left the region completely devastated. There have been no reported mass movements of people fleeing the drones in the last four years. The mere threat of a Pakistani army offensive into Waziristan, however, prompts thousands to flee in terror. There are several possible explanations: for example, people in heavily affected drone areas might be terrified to leave their houses. But there is a simpler explanation: Perhaps drones are not as scary as opponents claim. A February investigation by the Associated Press -- which, unlike the Living Under Drones study, interviewed Pakistanis inside the FATA -- reported that civilian casualties from drones are far lower than Pakistan civil society figures, journalists, and party officials assert publicly. This calls into question the wisdom of relying on such interested parties to build a picture of the utility and morality of targeted killings in Pakistan. Furthermore, the Community Appraisal and Motivation Programme (CAMP), a Pakistan-based research group, consistently finds in its surveys within the FATA that the most pressing security fear among residents is bomb blasts by terror groups, followed closely by the Pakistani military. When asked open-ended questions about their greatest fears, very few ever mention drones. That's not to say people love drones. Many constituencies in the rest of the country are strongly opposed to the drone campaign. But both terror groups and the Pakistani military kill far more innocent civilians and leave far more physical devastation in their wake -- what is the "least bad" course for policymakers? In the short run, there aren't better choices than drones. The targets of drone strikes in Pakistan sponsor insurgents in the region that kill U.S. soldiers and destabilize the Pakistani state (that is why Pakistani officials demand greater control over targeting). They cannot simply be left alone to continue such violent attacks. And given the Pakistani government's reluctance either to grant the FATA the political inclusion necessary for normal governance or to establish an effective police force (right now it has neither), there is no writ of the state to impose order and establish the rule of law. Drones represent the choice with the smallest set of drawbacks and adverse consequences. Reports like Living Under Drones highlight the need for both more transparency from the US and Pakistani governments, and for drawing attention to the social backlash against their use in Pakistan. But they do not definitively build a case against drones in general. Without a better alternative, drones are here to stay.

## Norms

### General

#### No impact to global drone use – easily deterred

Singh 12 (Joseph Singh is a researcher at the Center for a New American Security. “Betting Against a Drone Arms Race,” http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/)

Bold predictions of a coming drones arms race are all the rage since the uptake in their deployment under the Obama Administration. Noel Sharkey, for example, argues in an August 3 op-ed for the Guardian that rapidly developing drone technology — coupled with minimal military risk — portends an era in which states will become increasingly aggressive in their use of drones. As drones develop the ability to fly completely autonomously, Sharkey predicts a proliferation of their use that will set dangerous precedents, seemingly inviting hostile nations to use drones against one another. Yet, the narrow applications of current drone technology coupled with what we know about state behavior in the international system lend no credence to these ominous warnings. Indeed, critics seem overly-focused on the domestic implications of drone use. In a June piece for the Financial Times, Michael Ignatieff writes that “virtual technologies make it easier for democracies to wage war because they eliminate the risk of blood sacrifice that once forced democratic peoples to be prudent.” Significant public support for the Obama Administration’s increasing deployment of drones would also seem to legitimate this claim. Yet, there remain equally serious diplomatic and political costs that emanate from beyond a fickle electorate, which will prevent the likes of the increased drone aggression predicted by both Ignatieff and Sharkey. Most recently, the serious diplomatic scuffle instigated by Syria’s downing a Turkish reconnaissance plane in June illustrated the very serious risks of operating any aircraft in foreign territory. States launching drones must still weigh the diplomatic and political costs of their actions, which make the calculation surrounding their use no fundamentally different to any other aerial engagement. This recent bout also illustrated a salient point regarding drone technology: most states maintain at least minimal air defenses that can quickly detect and take down drones, as the U.S. discovered when it employed drones at the onset of the Iraq invasion, while Saddam Hussein’s surface-to-air missiles were still active. What the U.S. also learned, however, was that drones constitute an effective military tool in an extremely narrow strategic context. They are well-suited either in direct support of a broader military campaign, or to conduct targeted killing operations against a technologically unsophisticated enemy. In a nutshell, then, the very contexts in which we have seen drones deployed. Northern Pakistan, along with a few other regions in the world, remain conducive to drone usage given a lack of air defenses, poor media coverage, and difficulties in accessing the region. Non-state actors, on the other hand, have even more reasons to steer clear of drones: – First, they are wildly expensive. At $15 million, the average weaponized drone is less costly than an F-16 fighter jet, yet much pricier than the significantly cheaper, yet equally damaging options terrorist groups could pursue. – Those alternatives would also be relatively more difficult to trace back to an organization than an unmanned aerial vehicle, with all the technical and logistical planning its operation would pose. – Weaponized drones are not easily deployable. Most require runways in order to be launched, which means that any non-state actor would likely require state sponsorship to operate a drone. Such sponsorship is unlikely given the political and diplomatic consequences the sponsoring state would certainly face. – Finally, drones require an extensive team of on-the-ground experts to ensure their successful operation. According to the U.S. Air Force, 168 individuals are needed to operate a Predator drone, including a pilot, maintenance personnel and surveillance analysts. In short, the doomsday drone scenario Ignatieff and Sharkey predict results from an excessive focus on rapidly-evolving military technology. Instead, we must return to what we know about state behavior in an anarchistic international order. Nations will confront the same principles of deterrence, for example, when deciding to launch a targeted killing operation regardless of whether they conduct it through a drone or a covert amphibious assault team. Drones may make waging war more domestically palatable, but they don’t change the very serious risks of retaliation for an attacking state. Any state otherwise deterred from using force abroad will not significantly increase its power projection on account of acquiring drones. What’s more, the very states whose use of drones could threaten U.S. security – countries like China – are not democratic, which means that the possible political ramifications of the low risk of casualties resulting from drone use are irrelevant. For all their military benefits, putting drones into play requires an ability to meet the political and security risks associated with their use. Despite these realities, there remain a host of defensible arguments one could employ to discredit the Obama drone strategy. The legal justification for targeted killings in areas not internationally recognized as war zones is uncertain at best. Further, the short-term gains yielded by targeted killing operations in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, while debilitating to Al Qaeda leadership in the short-term, may serve to destroy already tenacious bilateral relations in the region and radicalize local populations. Yet, the past decade’s experience with drones bears no evidence of impending instability in the global strategic landscape. Conflict may not be any less likely in the era of drones, but the nature of 21st Century warfare remains fundamentally unaltered despite their arrival in large numbers.

#### US norms mean nothing

**Anderson 11** [Kenneth, 10/9/2011, “What Kind of Drones Arms Race Is Coming?” http://opiniojuris.org/2011/10/09/what-kind-of-drones-arms-race-is-coming/]

By asserting that “we’re” creating it, this is a claim that there is an arms race among states over military drones, and that it is a consequence of the US creating the technology and deploying it — and then, beyond the technology, changing the normative legal and moral rules in the international community about using it across borders. In effect, the combination of those two, technological and normative, forces other countries in strategic competition with the US to follow suit. It sounds like it must be true. But is it? There are a number of reasons to doubt that moves by other countries are an arms race in the sense that the US “created” it or could have stopped it, or that something different would have happened had the US not pursued the technology or not used it in the ways it has against non-state terrorist actors. Here are a couple of quick reasons why I don’t find this thesis very persuasive, and what I think the real “arms race” surrounding drones will be. Unmanned aerial vehicles have clearly got a big push from the US military in the way of research, development, and deployment. But the reality today is that the technology will transform civil aviation, in many of the same ways and for the same reasons that another robotic technology, driverless cars (which Google is busily plying up and down the streets of San Francisco, but which started as a DARPA project), will eventually have an important place in ordinary ground transport. UAVs will eventually move into many roles in ordinary aviation, because it is cheaper, relatively safer, more reliable — and it will eventually include cargo planes, crop dusting, border patrol, forest fire patrols, and many other tasks. There is a reason for this — the avionics involved are simply not so complicated as to be beyond the abilities of many, many states. Military applications will carry drones many different directions, from next-generation unmanned fighter aircraft able to operate against other craft at much higher G stresses to tiny surveillance drones. But the flying-around technology for aircraft that are generally sizes flown today is not that difficult, and any substantial state that feels like developing them will be able to do so. But the point is that this was happening anyway, and the technology was already available. The US might have been first, but it hasn’t sparked an arms race in any sense that absent the US push, no one would have done this. That’s just a fantasy reading of where the technology in general aviation was already going; Zenko’s ‘original sin’ attribution of this to the US opening Pandora’s box is not a credible understanding of the development and applications of the technology. Had the US not moved on this, the result would have been a US playing catch-up to someone else. For that matter, the off-the-shelf technology for small, hobbyist UAVs is simple enough and available enough that terrorists will eventually try to do their own amateur version, putting some kind of bomb on it. Moving on from the avionics, weaponizing the craft is also not difficult. The US stuck an anti-tank missile on a Predator; this is also not rocket science. Many states can build drones, many states can operate them, and crudely weaponizing them is also not rocket science. The US didn’t spark an arms race; this would occur to any state with a drone. To the extent that there is real development here, it lies in the development of specialized weapons that enable vastly more discriminating targeting. The details are sketchy, but there are indications from DangerRoom and other observers (including some comments from military officials off the record) that US military budgets include amounts for much smaller missiles designed not as anti-tank weapons, but to penetrate and kill persons inside a car without blowing it to bits, for example. This is genuinely harder to do — but still not all that difficult for a major state, whether leading NATO states, China, Russia, or India. The question is whether it would be a bad thing to have states competing to come up with weapons technologies that are … more discriminating.

#### Drones will only ever be used in highly permissive environments that lack air defense

Michael W. Lewis 12, Associate Professor of Law at Ohio Northern University Pettit College of Law, Spring 2012, “ARTICLE: SYMPOSIUM: THE 2009 AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE MANUAL: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS: Drones and the Boundaries of the Battlefield,” Texas International Law Journal, p. lexis

Like any weapons system drones have significant limitations in what they can achieve. Drones are extremely vulnerable to any type of sophisticated air defense system. They are slow. Even the jet-powered Avenger recently purchased by the Air Force only has a top speed of around 460 miles per hour, n20 meaning that it cannot escape from any manned fighter aircraft, not even the outmoded 1970s-era fighters that are still used by a number of nations. n21 Not only are drones unable to escape manned fighter aircraft, they also cannot hope to successfully fight them. Their air-to-air weapons systems are not as sophisticated as those of manned fighter aircraft, n22 and in the dynamic environment of an air-to-air engagement, the drone operator could not hope to match the situational awareness n23 of the pilot of manned fighter aircraft. As a result, the outcome of any air-to-air engagement between drones and manned fighters is a foregone conclusion. Further, drones are not only vulnerable to manned fighter aircraft, they are also vulnerable to jamming. Remotely piloted aircraft are dependent upon a continuous signal from their operators to keep them flying, and this signal is vulnerable to disruption and jamming. n24 If drones were [\*299] perceived to be a serious threat to an advanced military, a serious investment in signal jamming or disruption technology could severely degrade drone operations if it did not defeat them entirely. n25

These twin vulnerabilities to manned aircraft and signal disruption could be mitigated with massive expenditures on drone development and signal delivery and encryption technology, n26 but these vulnerabilities could never be completely eliminated. Meanwhile, one of the principal advantages that drones provide - their low cost compared with manned aircraft n27 - would be swallowed up by any attempt to make these aircraft survivable against a sophisticated air defense system. As a result, drones will be limited, for the foreseeable future, n28 to use in "permissive" environments in which air defense systems are primitive n29 or non-existent. While it is possible to find (or create) such a permissive environment in an inter-state conflict, n30 permissive environments that will allow for drone use will most often be found in counterinsurgency or counterterrorism operations.

#### Zero chance that U.S. self-restraint causes any other country to give up their plans for drones

Max Boot 11, the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, 10/9/11, “We Cannot Afford to Stop Drone Strikes,” Commentary Magazine, <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2011/10/09/drone-arms-race/>

The New York Times engages in some scare-mongering today about a drone ams race. Scott Shane notes correctly other nations such as China are building their own drones and in the future U.S. forces could be attacked by them–our forces will not have a monopoly on their use forever. Fair enough, but he goes further, suggesting our current use of drones to target terrorists will backfire:

If China, for instance, sends killer drones into Kazakhstan to hunt minority Uighur Muslims it accuses of plotting terrorism, what will the United States say? What if India uses remotely controlled craft to hit terrorism suspects in Kashmir, or Russia sends drones after militants in the Caucasus? American officials who protest will likely find their own example thrown back at them.

“The problem is that we’re creating an international norm” — asserting the right to strike preemptively against those we suspect of planning attacks, argues Dennis M. Gormley, a senior research fellow at the University of Pittsburgh and author of Missile Contagion, who has called for tougher export controls on American drone technology. “The copycatting is what I worry about most.”

This is a familiar trope of liberal critics who are always claiming we should forego “X” weapons system or capability, otherwise our enemies will adopt it too. We have heard this with regard to ballistic missile defense, ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, land mines, exploding bullets, and other fearsome weapons. Some have even suggested the U.S. should abjure the first use of nuclear weapons–and cut down our own arsenal–to encourage similar restraint from Iran.

The argument falls apart rather quickly because it is founded on a false premise: that other nations will follow our example. In point of fact, Iran is hell-bent on getting nuclear weapons no matter what we do; China is hell-bent on getting drones; and so forth. Whether and under what circumstances they will use those weapons remains an open question–but there is little reason to think self-restraint on our part will be matched by equal self-restraint on theirs. Is Pakistan avoiding nuking India because we haven’t used nuclear weapons since 1945? Hardly. The reason is that India has a powerful nuclear deterrent to use against Pakistan. If there is one lesson of history it is a strong deterrent is a better upholder of peace than is unilateral disarmament–which is what the New York Times implicitly suggests.

Imagine if we did refrain from drone strikes against al-Qaeda–what would be the consequence? If we were to stop the strikes, would China really decide to take a softer line on Uighurs or Russia on Chechen separatists? That seems unlikely given the viciousness those states already employ in their battles against ethnic separatists–which at least in Russia’s case already includes the suspected assassination of Chechen leaders abroad. What’s the difference between sending a hit team and sending a drone?

While a decision on our part to stop drone strikes would be unlikely to alter Russian or Chinese thinking, it would have one immediate consequence: al-Qaeda would be strengthened and could regenerate the ability to attack our homeland. Drone strikes are the only effective weapon we have to combat terrorist groups in places like Pakistan or Yemen where we don’t have a lot of boots on the ground or a lot of cooperation from local authorities. We cannot afford to give them up in the vain hope it will encourage disarmament on the part of dictatorial states.

#### No causal link between U.S. drone doctrine and other’ countries choices---means can’t set a precedent

Kenneth Anderson 11, Professor of International Law at American University, 10/9/11, “What Kind of Drones Arms Race Is Coming?,” <http://www.volokh.com/2011/10/09/what-kind-of-drones-arms-race-is-coming/#more-51516>

New York Times national security correspondent Scott Shane has an opinion piece in today’s Sunday Times predicting an “arms race” in military drones. The methodology essentially looks at the US as the leader, followed by Israel – countries that have built, deployed and used drones in both surveillance and as weapons platforms. It then looks at the list of other countries that are following fast in US footsteps to both build and deploy, as well as purchase or sell the technology – noting, correctly, that the list is a long one, starting with China. The predicament is put this way:

Eventually, the United States will face a military adversary or terrorist group armed with drones, military analysts say. But what the short-run hazard experts foresee is not an attack on the United States, which faces no enemies with significant combat drone capabilities, but the political and legal challenges posed when another country follows the American example. The Bush administration, and even more aggressively the Obama administration, embraced an extraordinary principle: that the United States can send this robotic weapon over borders to kill perceived enemies, even American citizens, who are viewed as a threat.

“Is this the world we want to live in?” asks Micah Zenko, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Because we’re creating it.”

By asserting that “we’re” creating it, this is a claim that there is an arms race among states over military drones, and that it is a consequence of the US creating the technology and deploying it – and then, beyond the technology, changing the normative legal and moral rules in the international community about using it across borders. In effect, the combination of those two, technological and normative, forces other countries in strategic competition with the US to follow suit. (The other unstated premise underlying the whole opinion piece is a studiously neutral moral relativism signaled by that otherwise unexamined phrase “perceived enemies.” Does it matter if they are not merely our “perceived” but are our actual enemies? Irrespective of what one might be entitled to do to them, is it so very difficult to conclude, even in the New York Times, that Anwar al-Awlaki was, in objective terms, our enemy?)

It sounds like it must be true. But is it? There are a number of reasons to doubt that moves by other countries are an arms race in the sense that the US “created” it or could have stopped it, or that something different would have happened had the US not pursued the technology or not used it in the ways it has against non-state terrorist actors. Here are a couple of quick reasons why I don’t find this thesis very persuasive, and what I think the real “arms race” surrounding drones will be.

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## K

### \*\*Legitimacy Link/”Smart Weapons”

#### The aff's plan is a high-grade legal maneuver to create the legal cover for war - they bypass the complexities of moral choice by making the debate about who can be the best corporate warfare lawyer and find loopholes for the military to exploit

Smith 2 – prof of phil @ U of South Florida

(Thomas, *International Studies Quarterly* 46, The New Law of War: Legitimizing Hi-Tech and Infrastructural Violence)

The role of military lawyers in all this has, according to one study, “changed irrevocably” ~Keeva, 1991:59!. Although liberal theorists point to the broad normative contours that law lends to international relations, the Pentagon wields law with technical precision. During the Gulf War and the Kosovo campaign, JAGs opined on the legal status of multinational forces, the U.S. War Powers Resolution, rules of engagement and targeting, country fly-overs, maritime interceptions, treatment of prisoners, hostages and “human shields,” and methods used to gather intelligence. Long before the bombing began, lawyers had joined in the development and acquisition of weapons systems, tactical planning, and troop training. In the Gulf War, the U.S. deployed approximately 430 military lawyers, the allies far fewer, leading to some amusing but perhaps apposite observations about the legalistic culture of America ~Garratt, 1993!. Many lawyers reviewed daily Air Tasking Orders as well as land tactics. Others found themselves on the ground and at the front. According to Colonel Rup- pert, the idea was to “put the lawyer as far forward as possible” ~Myrow, 1996–97!. During the Kosovo campaign, lawyers based at the Combined Allied Operations Center in Vicenza, Italy, and at NATO headquarters in Brussels approved every single targeting decision. We do not know precisely how decisions were taken in either Iraq or Kosovo or the extent to which the lawyers reined in their masters. Some “corrections and adjustments” to the target lists were made ~Shot- well, 1993:26!, but by all accounts the lawyers—and the law—were extremely accommodating.¶ The exigencies of war invite professional hazards as military lawyers seek to “find the law” and to determine their own responsibilities as legal counselors. A 1990 article in Military Law Review admonished judge advocates not to neglect their duty to point out breaches of the law, but not to become military ombuds- men either. The article acknowledged that the JAG faces pressure to demonstrate that he can be a “force multiplier” who can “show the tactical and political soundness of his interpretation of the law” ~Winter, 1990:8–9!. Some tension between law and necessity is inevitable, but over the past decade the focus has shifted visibly from restraining violence to legitimizing it. The Vietnam-era perception that law was a drag on operations has been replaced by a zealous “client culture” among judge advocates. Commanding officers “have come to realize that, as in the relationship of corporate counsel to CEO, the JAG’s role is not to create obstacles, but to find legal ways to achieve his client’s goals—even when those goals are to blow things up and kill people” ~Keeva, 1991:59!. Lt. Col. Tony Montgomery, the JAG who approved the bombing of the Belgrade television studios, said recently that “judges don’t lay down the law. We take guidance from our government on how much of the consequences they are willing to accept” ~The Guardian, 2001!.¶ Military necessity is undeterred. In a permissive legal atmosphere, hi-tech states can meet their goals and remain within the letter of the law. As noted, humanitarian law is firmest in areas of marginal military utility. When opera- tional demands intrude, however, even fundamental rules begin to erode. The Defense Department’s final report to Congress on the Gulf War ~DOD, 1992! found nothing in the principle of noncombatant immunity to curb necessity. Heartened by the knowledge that civilian discrimination is “one of the least codified portions” of the law of war ~p. 611!, the authors argued that “to the degree possible and consistent with allowable risk to aircraft and aircrews,” muni- tions and delivery systems were chosen to reduce collateral damage ~p. 612!. “An attacker must exercise reasonable precautions to minimize incidental or collat- eral injury to the civilian population or damage to civilian objects, consistent with mission accomplishments and allowable risk to the attacking forces” ~p. 615!. The report notes that planners targeted “specific military objects in populated areas which the law of war permits” and acknowledges the “commingling” of civilian and military objects, yet the authors maintain that “at no time were civilian areas as such attacked” ~p. 613!. The report carefully constructed a precedent for future conflicts in which human shields might be deployed, noting “the presence of civilians will not render a target immune from attack” ~p. 615!. The report insisted ~pp. 606–607! that Protocol I as well as the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons “were not legally applicable” to the Gulf War because Iraq as well as some Coalition members had not ratified them. More to the point that law follows practice, the report claimed that certain provisions of Protocol I “are not a codification of the customary practice of nations,” and thus “ignore the realities of war” ~p. 616!.¶ Nor can there be any doubt that a more elaborate legal regime has kept pace with evolving strategy and technology. Michael Ignatieff details in Virtual War ~2000! how targets were “developed” in 72-hour cycles that involved collecting and reviewing aerial reconnaissance, gauging military necessity, and coding antici- pated collateral damage down to the directional spray of bomb debris. A judge advocate then vetted each target in light of the Geneva Conventions and calcu- lated whether or not the overall advantage to be gained outweighed any expected civilian spillover. Ignatieff argues ~2000:198–199! that this elaborate symbiosis of law and technology has given birth to a “veritable casuistry of war.” Legal fine print, hand-in-hand with new technology, replaced deeper deliberation about the use of violence in war. The law provided “harried decision-makers with a critical guarantee of legal coverage, turning complex issues of morality into technical issues of legality.” Astonishingly fine discrimination also meant that unintentional civilian casualties were assumed to have been unintentional, not foreseen tragedies to be justified under the rule of double effect or the fog of war. The crowning irony is that NATO went to such lengths to justify its targets and limit collateral damage, even as it assured long-term civilian harm by destroy- ing the country’s infrastructure.¶ Perhaps the most powerful justification was provided by law itself. War is often dressed up in patriotic abstractions—Periclean oratory, jingoistic newsreels, or heroic memorials. Bellum Americanum is cloaked in the stylized language of law. The DOD report is padded with references to treaty law, some of it obscure, that was “applicable” to the Gulf War, as if a surfeit of legal citation would convince skeptics of the propriety of the war. Instances of humane restraint invariably were presented as the rule of law in action. Thus the Allies did not gas Iraqi troops, torture POWs, or commit acts of perfidy. Most striking is the use of legal language to justify the erosion of noncombatant immunity. Hewing to the legal- isms of double effect, the Allies never intentionally targeted civilians as such. As noted, by codifying double effect the law artificially bifurcates intentions. Har- vard theologian Bryan Hehir ~1996:7! marveled at the Coalition’s legalistic word- play, noting that the “briefers out of Riyadh sounded like Jesuits as they sought to defend the policy from any charge of attempting to directly attack civilians.”¶ The Pentagon’s legal narrative is certainly detached from the carnage on the ground, but it also oversimplifies and even actively obscures the moral choices involved in aerial bombing. Lawyers and tacticians made very deliberate decisions about aircraft, flight altitudes, time of day, ordnance dropped, confidence in intelligence, and so forth. By expanding military necessity to encompass an extremely prudential reading of “force protection,” these choices were calculated to protect pilots and planes at the expense of civilians on the ground, departing from the just war tradition that combatants assume greater risks than civilians. While it is tempting to blame collateral damage on the fog of war, much of that uncertainty has been lifted by technology and precision law. Similarly, in Iraq and in Yugoslavia the focus was on “degrading” military capabilities, yet a loose view of dual use spelled the destruction of what were essentially social, economic, and political targets. Coalition and NATO officials were quick to apologize for accidental civilian casualties, but in hi-tech war most noncombatant suffering is by design.¶ Does the law of war reduce death and destruction? International law certainly has helped to delegitimize, and in rare cases effectively criminalize, direct attacks on civilians. But in general humanitarian law has mirrored wartime practice. On the ad bellum side, the erosion of right authority and just cause has eased the path toward war. Today, foreign offices rarely even bother with formal declara- tions of war. Under the United Nations system it is the responsibility of the Security Council to denounce illegal war, but for a number of reasons its mem- bers have been extremely reluctant to brand states as aggressors. If the law were less accommodating, greater effort might be devoted to diplomacy and war might be averted. On the in bello side the ban on direct civilian strikes remains intact, but double effect and military demands have been contrived to justify unnecessary civilian deaths. Dual use law has been stretched to sanction new forms of violence against civilians. Though not as spectacular as the obliteration bombing to which it so often is favorably compared, infrastructural war is far deadlier than the rhetoric of a “clean and legal” conflict suggests. It is true that rough estimates of the ratio of bomb tonnage to civilian deaths in air attacks show remarkable reductions in immediate collateral damage. There were some 40.83 deaths per ton in the bombing of Guernica in 1937 and 50.33 deaths per ton in the bombing of Tokyo in 1945. In the Kosovo campaign, by contrast, there were between .077 and .084 deaths per ton. In Iraq there were a mere .034 ~Thomas, 2001:169!. According to the classical definition of collateral damage, civilian protection has improved dramatically, but if one takes into account the staggering long-term effects of the war in Iraq, for example, aerial bombing looks anything but humane.¶ For aerial bombers themselves modern war does live up to its clean and legal image. While war and intervention have few steadfast constituents, the myth of immaculate warfare has eased fears that intervening soldiers may come to harm, which polls in the U.S., at least, rank as being of great public concern, and even greater military concern. A new survey of U.S. civilian and military attitudes found that soldiers were two to four times more casualty-averse than civilians thought they should be ~Feaver and Kohn, 2001!. By removing what is perhaps the greatest restraint on the use of force—the possibility of soldiers dying—law and technology have given rise to the novel moral hazards of a “postmodern, risk-free, painless war” ~Woollacott, 1999!. “We’ve come to expect the immacu- late,” notes Martin Cook, who teaches ethics at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, PA. “Precision-guided munitions make it very much easier to go to war than it ever has been historically.” Albert Pierce, director of the Center for the Study of Professional Military Ethics at the U.S. Naval Academy argues, “standoff precision weapons give you the option to lower costs and risks . . . but you might be tempted to do things that you might otherwise not do” ~Belsie, 1999!.¶ Conclusion¶ The utility of law to legitimize modern warfare should not be underestimated. Even in the midst of war, legal arguments retain an aura of legitimacy that is missing in “political” justifications. The aspirations of humanitarian law are sound. Rather, it is the instrumental use of law that has oiled the skids of hi-tech violence. Not only does the law defer to military necessity, even when very broadly defined, but more importantly it bestows on those same military demands all the moral and psychological trappings of legality. The result has been to legalize and thus to justify in the public mind “inhumane military methods and their consequences,” as violence against civilians is carried out “behind the protective veil of justice” ~af Jochnick and Normand, 1994a:50!. Hi-tech states can defend hugely destructive, essentially unopposed, aerial bombardment by citing the authority of seemingly secular and universal legal standards. The growing gap between hi- and low-tech means may exacerbate inequalities in moral capital as well, as the sheer barbarism of “premodern” violence committed by ethnic cleansers or atavistic warlords makes the methods employed by hi-tech warriors seem all the more clean and legal by contrast.¶ This fusion of law and technology is likely to propel future American interventions. Despite assurances that the campaign against terrorism would differ from past conflicts, the allied air war in Afghanistan, marked by record numbers of unmanned drones and bomber flights at up to 35,000 feet, or nearly 7 miles aloft, rarely strayed from the hi-tech and legalistic script. While the attack on the World Trade Center confirmed a thousand times over the illegality and inhu- manity of terrorism, the U.S. response has raised further issues of legality and inhumanity in conventional warfare. Civilian deaths in the campaign have been substantial because “military objects” have been targeted on the basis of extremely low-confidence intelligence. In several cases targets appear to have been chosen based on misinformation and even rank rumor. A liberal reading of dual use and the authorization of bombers to strike unvetted “targets of opportunity” also increased collateral damage. Although 10,000 of the 18,000 bombs, missiles, and other ordnance used in Afghanistan were precision-guided munitions, the war resulted in roughly 1000 to 4000 direct civilian deaths, and, according to the UNHCR, produced 900,000 new refugees and displaced persons. The Pentagon has nevertheless viewed the campaign as “a more antiseptic air war even than the one waged in Kosovo” ~Dao, 2001!. General Tommy Franks, who commanded the campaign, called it “the most accurate war ever fought in this nation’s history” ~Schmitt, 2002!.9¶ No fundamental change is in sight. Governments continue to justify collateral damage by citing the marvels of technology and the authority of international law. One does see a widening rift between governments and independent human rights and humanitarian relief groups over the interpretation of targeting and dual-use law. But these disputes have only underscored the ambiguities of human- itarian law. As long as interventionist states dominate the way that the rules of war are crafted and construed, hopes of rescuing law from politics will be dim indeed.

### \*\*Psychological Legitimacy/State Control

#### Restrictions cause net-more violence – laws of war legitimize longer-term actions and fragment dissent

Smith 2 – prof of phil @ U of South Florida

(Thomas, *International Studies Quarterly* 46, The New Law of War: Legitimizing Hi-Tech and Infrastructural Violence)

The argument advanced here is that the law of war has flourished at the cost of increased artificiality and elasticity. Law has successfully shaped norms and practices in the areas of warfare furthest from hi-tech tactics. Strides have been made, for example, in the 1980 United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, and the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines. For hi-tech states, these are relatively low-cost laws. But when modern military necessity calls, the law of war has legitimized violence, not restrained it. New military technology invariably has been matched by technical virtuosity in the law. New legal interpretations, diminished ad bellum restraints, and an expansive view of military necessity are coalescing in a regime of legal warfare that licenses hi-tech states to launch wars as long as their conduct is deemed just. The new law of war burnishes hi-tech campaigns and boosts public relations, even as it undercuts customary limits on the use of force and erodes distinctions between soldiers and civilians. Modern warfare has dramatically reduced the number of direct civilian deaths, yet the law sanctions infrastructural campaigns that harm long-term public health and human rights

### Framework 2NC Block

#### Our mental relationship to war and peace is a controlling factor in the policy research that we do and the choices we make about militarism – we have a responsibility to be conscious of the way we represent war in our scholarship – their decision to represent war as a necessary but regulate-able evil solidifies militarism

Jenkins 73 – Professor of Philosophy @ University of Alabama

[Iredell Jenkins, “The Conditions of Peace”, The Monist, Vol. 57, No. 4, Philosophy of War (OCTOBER, 1973), pp. 507-526, http://www.jstor.org/stable/27902329] Gender Edited

I shall argue in this paper that our thinking about the question of war and peace is vitiated at its source by a series of mistaken assumptions and intentions. These misconceptions pass as sound coin because they have the air of truisms: they appear to direct our inquiries along lines that are sure to be successful and are anyway the only ones available. At the same time, these errors are so basic that they distort both theory and practice from the start: they are red herrings, putting us on a false scent from which we never free ourselves because we cannot get close enough to the quarry to recognize our mistake. It is my purpose to expose these errors and point the way to their correction. Three basic mistakes have misled our thinking about war and peace. We have employed the wrong categories. We have studied the wrong data. And we have pursued the wrong goal. These errors are intimately related, with each in turn entailing the next. The categories we think in focus our attention too narrowly. The data we pore over yield distorted conclusions. The goals we are thus led to pursue are mirages that grow fainter the closer we approach them. It will be necessary to discuss these errors serially, but it must be remembered that they are in reality tightly forged links in a closed chain. 1. The controlling factor in all human undertakings is the conceptual apparatus that men [people] employ-the terms in which they think. These modes of thought largely determine the data we examine, the phenomena we are interested in, the questions we ask, and the purposes we pursue. In more homely language, this apparatus defines where we look, what we look for, and what we hope to do. And it is here, at their very first step, that our dealings with the problem of war and peace go astray. Our mistake is simple but critical: we think in terms that focus our attention on only one side of the issue, and that the more superficial and derivative side. What we do, in brief, is to treat war as an independent variable, which is to be understood in isolation from any larger context and dealt with strictly on its own terms. We appear to act on the assumption that wars are ultimate and ineradicable features of reality, so there are only two things we can do about them: delay their occurrence and make sure we win them when they occur. Seen in the light of reason, this procedure is paradoxical. The real and final object of our concern is peace. We want to establish amicable relations among people, and create a community of feeling and interests. Yet the overwhelming proportion of our thinking, talking, and acting is concerned with war. It is war, in fact and in threat, that constantly preoccupies us. So the universe of discourse in which we treat the problem of war and peace has a vocabulary that is derived entirely from only one of these elements: war. The concepts that dominate our thinking are 'nation states', 'sovereignty', 'foreign powers', 'treaties', 'alliances', 'the balance of power', 'nuclear deterrents', and other such. War so fascinates us that we are incapable of viewing it in perspective and putting it in context. So we fail to see that war is only one element in a complex set of human relationships, which can be neutralized by other and very different elements. Instead, we persist in thinking that the threat of war can be averted, and war itself 'won', only in the terms that it itself poses: namely, the appeal to force. Peace may be the object of our prayers, but war is the object of our efforts. I remarked above that there is something extremely paradoxical about this situation. But there is nothing unusual about it: this is not an isolated case, but an instance of a general type of behavior. In one context after another, we find men neglecting to pursue the good they seek and thinking only of averting the evil they fear. Many dichotomies of this sort come easily to mind: peace-war, health-illness, justice-injustice, equality-discrimination, rehabilitation-punishment. In every instance, it is the second item on which we lavish our efforts. It simply seems to be the case that in all of the contexts of life men [people] tend to take sound and satisfactory situations for granted, and to be concerned only with those that are unpleasant, threatening, or harmful. So instead of trying to preserve peace, we think only of preventing wars-or winning them. In short, we are in the odd position of not seeking the ends that we desire, but merely trying to avert or cure the outcomes we fear. Indeed, we do not even think much about these goods, and we usually define them as the absence of their opposites. So though our approach to the problem of war and peace is paradoxical, it is not anomolous. 2. Our initial mistake in dealing with the issues of war and peace is to employ the wrong categories: our thinking is done exclusively in terms of 'war' and concepts associated with it. The immediate result of this mistake is to focus our attention on a narrow and inadequate range of data. The common meaning of 'war' is a conflict between nation states, waged by armies using every weapon of force available, in which each party seeks to defeat the other (the "enemy") and reduce it to a condition of total subservience. As Clausewitz put it in his classic treatise, "War therefore is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will".1 Since we think in terms of war, and this is what war means, these are the data we turn to when we seek enlightenment on the issues of war and peace: we look only at the relations between sovereign states, and then only when these states are in a condition of actual or threatened violent conflict. We thus find ourselves in the absurd position of trying to understand peace by studying war. This is like trying to understand motion by studying rest, as the ancients did, or trying to derive the character of man from the nature of God, as the mediaevalists did. We deride these latter efforts as exercises in futility. But we employ an exactly analogous procedure in our approach to peace, and we are perpetually surprised and frustrated when it does not succeed. What we are doing, in sum, is using the pathological case as a paradigm for studying the sound case. So we become expert only in the pathology of international relations. Our fascination with the phenomena of war leads us to certain conclusions that become as unshakeable as they are deceptive. We regard the sovereign state as at once a brute fact and an impenetrable mystery. We assume that there must be irreconcilable conflicts of interest among such states. Since these conflicts can be neither resolved nor arbitrated, they must eventually lead to trial by force. Given the facts that we study, these conclusions follow naturally.

#### The lenses with which we view war and peace influence the policy options we consider – academia is a critical space to address these issues

Cady 10 (Duane L., prof of phil @ hamline university, From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum, pp. 115-117)

The very notion of restraint in war— common to all positions along ¶ the full continuum in varying degrees— puts the burden of proof on going to war and on how the fighting is done. These are the activities in ¶ need of justification. The moral presumption should be to peace, positive peace, rather than the pervasive presumption of warism and negative peace. Recognizing the grip that warism has on dominant culture ¶ may be the most formidable task of genuine peacemaking for the fore-¶ seeable future because it is warism that blocks evolution toward more ¶ pacifistic societies. Only occasionally will individuals back into the ¶ most absolute form of pacifism; the cultural predisposition to warism ¶ confines most of us to a narrow range of options toward the war- realist ¶ end of the scale. This brings us full circle and we end this consideration of a moral continuum on the morality of war and peace where we ¶ began, confronting warism.¶ The normative lenses of warism, the spectacles through which we ¶ in modern culture tend to see and interpret all that happens, turn out ¶ to be as much like blinders as lenses because they restrict our vision to ¶ a narrow range of options. Nietzsche said that if the only tool you have ¶ is a hammer, everything begins to look like a nail. Under such conditions it is pretty hard to resist hammering. Analogously, if the only ¶ vision we have is warist and the only tools we build are weapons, then ¶ every conflict invites military intervention and it is hard to resist war-¶ ring. Unless we envision a wider value perspective than the warist, we ¶ will not see the nonviolent options before us. But to see more widely ¶ we need to acknowledge and remove the blinders.¶ Peace education is a small, struggling, but growing segment of ¶ contemporary education. The dominant presumption of warism has ¶ made it difficult for those committed to peace education to develop ¶ and establish it as a legitimate discipline devoid of the image of mere ¶ anti- militarist propaganda. Some scholars call themselves peace educators while many within the traditional disciplines are reluctant to be ¶ so labeled; they may be sympathetic with genuine peace research and ¶ teaching but afraid of the stigma that goes with the label. Those scholars interested in applying their professional training and skills to peace ¶ issues face a monumental task. Education at all levels must address ¶ warism, just as they have had to address racism, sexism, ageism, classism, homophobia, and other forms of domination.4 There is increasing ¶ academic interest in what scholars call “institutional violence”— social ¶ structures like racism, sexism, and poverty that involve constraints ¶ that injure and violate; systems that have entrapping, coercive effects. Institutional forms of violence tend to be more covert than overt; ¶ nonetheless pacifists— peacemakers—of various sorts tend to work ¶ toward the recognition and abolition of these forms of oppression as ¶ the natural manifestation of their commitment to positive peace. Such ¶ work involves recovery of lost or neglected history, consideration of a ¶ full range of options beyond traditional social constraints holding the ¶ forms of domination in place, and serious, systematic, and legitimized ¶ study of conditions constituting positive peace. Preparing for war in ¶ an effort to prevent war and preserve the status quo must be distinguished from preparing for genuine positive peace in an effort to en-¶ courage cooperation and preclude a resort to war. Unless such issues ¶ are entertained routinely across all educational levels— including the ¶ recognition of how the various forms of domination are entangled in ¶ and reinforced by warism— the presumption of warism will continue ¶ to drive us toward war realism and prevent progress toward an evolving positive peace.5 Easing the grip of warism may be unlikely, but ¶ then racial integration in public schools, abolition of slavery, women ¶ voting and holding public office, the end of apartheid in South Africa ¶ and the Iron Curtain in Europe, the election of an African American ¶ as U.S. president, all were exceedingly unlikely not long before they ¶ became realities. People imagine, work for, and sacrifice for important ¶ goals even if they never are achieved. To the wonder of us all, unlikely ¶ goals are sometimes reached. Martin Luther King, Jr., believed that “the arc of history bends ¶ toward justice.” He knew that racial segregation would end . . . some-¶ day . . . so he called on Americans to “plan for the inevitable.”6 Similarly, pacifists envision a broad cultural evolution from warism toward ¶ (and eventually, to) pacifism, so pacifists ask us to prepare for the inevitable by recognizing and backing away from warism and by working to ¶ create and sustain the conditions of genuine positive peace. While education is crucial, peace educators cannot bear the burden of the ¶ wider cultural failure to see beyond warism. Scholars and teachers in ¶ traditional disciplines must address the relevant warist/pacifist issues ¶ of their fields just as feminist scholarship has been undertaken by academics in all fields, and just as racist claims have been tested and dispelled by research in all disciplines. Anti-warism work and positive ¶ peace making cannot be ghettoized in token departments and journals ¶ and dismissed for pushing an agenda; they must be undertaken across every curriculum, not marginalized but central, if we are to assist in ¶ preparing for the inevitable. It is remarkable how low peace research is ¶ among government and foundation priorities. The moral continuum ¶ here may prove useful in eroding warist obstacles to taking peace positively if only because it recognizes gradual variations among views ¶ within a single moral tradition rather than encouraging polarized ¶ views. Peace research and study need not lead to any conversion experiences; it would be surprising were they to do so, despite popular ¶ fears.

#### Framing issue – the way we discuss and represent war should come first – the language surrounding violence has direct, concrete effects

* Political acts of violence are uniquely tied to language – every government has to convince their people that it’s legitimate. The plan helps make that VERY convincing – makes it look like there’s some restraint

**Collins & Glover 2** (John, Assistant Prof. of Global Studies at St. Lawrence University, Ross, Visiting Professor of Sociology at St. Lawrence University, Collateral Language, p. 6-7)

As any university student knows, theories about the “social con­struction” and social effects of language have become a common feature of academic scholarship. Conservative critics often argue that those who use these theories of language (e.g., deconstruc­tion) are “just” talking about language, as opposed to talking about the “real world.” The essays in this book, by contrast, begin from the premise that language matters in the most concrete, im­mediate way possible: its use, by political and military leaders, leads directly to violence in the form of war, mass murder (in­cluding genocide), the physical destruction of human commu­nities, and the devastation of the natural environment. Indeed, if the world ever witnesses a nuclear holocaust, it will probably be because leaders in more than one country have succeeded in convincing their people, through the use of political language, that the use of nuclear weapons and, if necessary, the destruction of the earth itself, is justifiable. From our perspective, then, every act of political violence—from the horrors perpetrated against Native Americans to the murder of political dissidents in the So­viet Union to the destruction of the World Trade Center, and now the bombing of Afghanistan—is intimately linked with the use of language. Partly what we are talking about here, of course, are the processes of “manufacturing consent” and shaping people’s per­ception of the world around them; people are more likely to sup­port acts of violence committed in their name if the recipients of the violence have been defined as “terrorists,” or if the violence is presented as a defense of “freedom.” Media analysts such as Noam Chomsky have written eloquently about the corrosive ef­fects that this kind of process has on the political culture of sup­posedly democratic societies. At the risk of stating the obvious, however, the most fundamental effects of violence are those that are visited upon the objects of violence; the language that shapes public opinion is the same language that burns villages, besieges entire populations, kills and maims human bodies, and leaves the ground scarred with bomb craters and littered with land mines. As George Orwell so famously illustrated in his work, acts of vio­lence can easily be made more palatable through the use of eu­phemisms such as “pacification” or, to use an example discussed in this book, “targets.” It is important to point out, however, that the need for such language derives from the simple fact that the violence itself is abhorrent. Were it not for the abstract language of “vital interests” and “surgical strikes” and the flattering lan­guage of “civilization” and ‘just” wars, we would be less likely to avert our mental gaze from the physical effects of violence.

#### Subject formation is what we are trying to accomplish in debate on an everyday level, we form better subjects by attuning our ethical sensibilities to the violence of militarism

Chandler, Professor of IR at Westminster, 13

(The World of Attachment? The Post-humanist Challenge to Freedom and Necessity, Millenium: Journal of International Studies, 41(3), 516– 534)

The world of becoming thereby is an ontologically flat world without the traditional hierarchies of existence and a more shared conception of agency. For Bennett, therefore, ‘to begin to experience the relationship between persons and other materialities more horizontally, is to take a step toward a more ecological sensibility’.78 Here there is room for human agency but this agency involves a deeper understanding of and receptivity to the world of objects and object relations. Rather than the hubristic focus on transforming the external world, the ethico-political tasks are those of work on the self to erase hubristic liberal traces of subject-centric understandings, understood to merely create the dangers of existential resentment. Work on the self is the only route to changing the world. As Connolly states: ‘To embrace without deep resentment a world of becoming is to work to “become who you are”, so that the word “become” now modifies “are” more than the other way around.’ Becoming who you are involves the ‘microtactics of the self’, and work on the self can then extend into ‘micropolitics’ of more conscious and reflective choices and decisions and lifestyle choices leading to potentially higher levels of ethical self-reflectivity and responsibility. Bennett argues that against the ‘narcissism’ of anthropomorphic understandings of domination of the external world, we need ‘some tactics for cultivating the experience of our selves as vibrant matter’. Rather than hubristically imagining that we can shape the world we live in, Bennett argues that: ‘Perhaps the ethical responsibility of an individual human now resides in one’s response to the assemblages in which one finds oneself participating. Such ethical tactics include reflecting more on our relationship to what we eat and considering the agentic powers of what we consume and enter into an assemblage with. In doing so, if ‘an image of inert matter helps animate our current practice of aggressively wasteful and planet-endangering consumption, then a materiality experienced as a lively force with agentic capacity could animate a more ecologically sustainable public’. For new materialists, the object to be changed or transformed is the human – the human mindset. By changing the way we think about the world and the way we relate to it by including broader, more non-human or inorganic matter in our considerations, we will have overcome our modernist ‘attachment disorders’ and have more ethically aware approaches to our planet. In cultivating these new ethical sensibilities, the human can be remade with a new self and a ‘new self-interest’.

### Impact Overview

#### Structural violence is the proximate cause of all war- creates priming that psychologically structures escalation

\*\*Answers no root cause- because there is no root cause we must be attentative to structural inequality of all kinds because it primes people for broader violence- our impact is about the *scale* of violence and the *disproportionate* *relationship* between that scale and warfare, not that one form of social exclusion comes first

Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4

(Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn)

(Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)

This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “priming” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

#### Prefer this impact – structural violence is invisible and exponential

Nixon 11

(Rob, Rachel Carson Professor of English, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, pgs. 2-3)

Three primary concerns animate this book, chief among them my conviction that we urgently need to rethink-politically, imaginatively, and theoretically-what I call "slow violence." By slow violence I mean a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all. Violence is customarily conceived as an event or action that is immediate in time, explosive and spectacular in space, and as erupting into instant sensational visibility. We need, I believe, to engage a different kind of violence, a violence that is neither spectacular nor instantaneous, but rather incremental and accretive, its calamitous repercussions playing out across a range of temporal scales. In so doing, we also need to engage the representational, narrative, and strategic challenges posed by the relative invisibility of slow violence. Climate change, the thawing cryosphere, toxic drift, biomagnification, deforestation, the radioactive aftermaths of wars, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding environmental catastrophes present formidable representational obstacles that can hinder our efforts to mobilize and act decisively. The long dyings-the staggered and staggeringly discounted casualties, both human and ecological that result from war's toxic aftermaths or climate change-are underrepresented in strategic planning as well as in human memory. Had Summers advocated invading Africa with weapons of mass destruction, his proposal would have fallen under conventional definitions of violence and been perceived as a military or even an imperial invasion. Advocating invading countries with mass forms of slow-motion toxicity, however, requires rethinking our accepted assumptions of violence to include slow violence. Such a rethinking requires that we complicate conventional assumptions about violence as a highly visible act that is newsworthy because it is event focused, time bound, and body bound. We need to account for how the temporal dispersion of slow violence affects the way we perceive and respond to a variety of social afflictions-from domestic abuse to posttraumatic stress and, in particular, environmental calamities. A major challenge is representational: how to devise arresting stories, images, and symbols adequate to the pervasive but elusive violence of delayed effects. Crucially, slow violence is often not just attritional but also exponential, operating as a major threat multiplier; it can fuel long-term, proliferating conflicts in situations where the conditions for sustaining life become increasingly but gradually degraded.

### AT: Repoliticizes

#### **The concern with regulating war sees it as an isolatable event that can be defined and managed – this approach makes it impossible to deal with the pervasive effects of everyday militarism**

Cuomo 96 (Chris, prof of women’s studies @ UGA, War is Not Just an Event: Reflections on the Significance of Everyday Violence, *Hypatia* 11:4, Women and Violence, Autumn, pp. 30-45)

Philosophical attention to war has typically appeared in the form of justifications for entering into war, and over appropriate activities within war. The spatial metaphors used to refer to war as a separate, bounded sphere indicate assumptions that war is a realm of human activity vastly removed from normal life, or a sort of happening that is appropriately conceived apart from everyday events in peaceful times. Not surprisingly, most discussions of the political and ethical dimensions of war discuss war solely as an event-an occurrence, or collection of occurrences, having clear beginnings and endings that are typically marked by formal, institutional declarations. As happenings, wars and military activities can be seen as motivated by identifiable, if complex, intentions, and directly enacted by individual and collective decision-makers and agents of states. But many of the questions about war that are of interest to feminists-including how large-scale, state-sponsored violence affects women and members of other oppressed groups; how military violence shapes gendered, raced, and nationalistic political realities and moral imaginations; what such violence consists of and why it persists; how it is related to other oppressive and violent institutions and hegemonies-cannot be adequately pursued by focusing on events. These issues are not merely a matter of good or bad intentions and identifiable decisions. In "Gender and 'Postmodern' War," Robin Schott introduces some of the ways in which war is currently best seen not as an event but as a presence (Schott 1995). Schott argues that postmodern understandings of persons, states, and politics, as well as the high-tech nature of much contemporary warfare and the preponderance of civil and nationalist wars, render an event- based conception of war inadequate, especially insofar as gender is taken into account. In this essay, I will expand upon her argument by showing that accounts of war that only focus on events are impoverished in a number of ways, and therefore feminist consideration of the political, ethical, and onto- logical dimensions of war and the possibilities for resistance demand a much more complicated approach. I take Schott's characterization of war as presence as a point of departure, though I am not committed to the idea that the constancy of militarism, the fact of its omnipresence in human experience, and the paucity of an event-based account of war are exclusive to contemporary postmodern or postcolonial circumstances.1 Theory that does not investigate or even notice the omnipresence of militarism cannot represent or address the depth and specificity of the every- day effects of militarism on women, on people living in occupied territories, on members of military institutions, and on the environment. These effects are relevant to feminists in a number of ways because military practices and institutions help construct gendered and national identity, and because they justify the destruction of natural nonhuman entities and communities during peacetime. Lack of attention to these aspects of the business of making or preventing military violence in an extremely technologized world results in theory that cannot accommodate the connections among the constant presence of militarism, declared wars, and other closely related social phenomena, such as nationalistic glorifications of motherhood, media violence, and current ideological gravitations to military solutions for social problems. Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into the very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based politics and analyses. For any feminism that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political options, crisis-based ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed, omnipresent systems of domination and oppression that so often function as givens in most people's lives. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace, the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those whose lives are shaped by the safety of privilege, and who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism, to maintain this false belief. The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed conflict, creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the "real" violence finally occurs, or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened, and at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that make resisters drop all other political priorities. Crisis-driven attention to declarations of war might actually keep resisters complacent about and complicitous in the general presence of global militarism. Seeing war as necessarily embedded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over, all of the time, and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state. Moving away from crisis-driven politics and ontologies concerning war and military violence also enables consideration of relationships among seemingly disparate phenomena, and therefore can shape more nuanced theoretical and practical forms of resistance. For example, investigating the ways in which war is part of a presence allows consideration of the relationships among the events of war and the following: how militarism is a foundational trope in the social and political imagination; how the pervasive presence and symbolism of soldiers/warriors/patriots shape meanings of gender; the ways in which threats of state-sponsored violence are a sometimes invisible/sometimes bold agent of racism, nationalism, and corporate interests; the fact that vast numbers of communities, cities, and nations are currently in the midst of excruciatingly violent circumstances. It also provides a lens for considering the relationships among the various kinds of violence that get labeled "war." Given current American obsessions with nationalism, guns, and militias, and growing hunger for the death penalty, prisons, and a more powerful police state, one cannot underestimate the need for philosophical and political attention to connections among phenomena like the "war on drugs," the "war on crime," and other state-funded militaristic campaigns. I propose that the constancy of militarism and its effects on social reality be reintroduced as a crucial locus of contemporary feminist attentions, and that feminists emphasize how wars are eruptions and manifestations of omnipresent militarism that is a product and tool of multiply oppressive, corporate, technocratic states.2 Feminists should be particularly interested in making this shift because it better allows consideration of the effects of war and militarism on women, subjugated peoples, and environments. While giving attention to the constancy of militarism in contemporary life we need not neglect the importance of addressing the specific qualities of direct, large-scale, declared military conflicts. But the dramatic nature of declared, large-scale conflicts should not obfuscate the ways in which military violence pervades most societies in increasingly technologically sophisticated ways and the significance of military institutions and everyday practices in shaping reality. Philosophical discussions that focus only on the ethics of declaring and fighting wars miss these connections, and also miss the ways in which even declared military conflicts are often experienced as omnipresent horrors. These approaches also leave unquestioned tendencies to suspend or distort moral judgment in the face of what appears to be the inevitability of war and militarism. Just-war theory is a prominent example of a philosophical approach that rests on the assumption that wars are isolated from everyday life and ethics. Such theory, as developed by St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Hugo Grotius, and as articulated in contemporary dialogues by many philosophers, including Michael Walzer (1977), Thomas Nagel (1974), and Sheldon Cohen (1989), take the primary question concerning the ethics of warfare to be about when to enter into military conflicts against other states. They therefore take as a given the notion that war is an isolated, definable event with clear boundaries. These boundaries are significant because they distinguish the circumstances in which standard moral rules and constraints, such as rules against murder and unprovoked violence, no longer apply. Just-war theory assumes that war is a separate sphere of human activity having its own ethical constraints and criteria and in doing so it begs the question of whether or not war is a special kind of event, or part of a pervasive presence in nearly all contemporary life. Because the application of just-war principles is a matter of proper decision- making on the part of agents of the state, before wars occur, and before military strikes are made, they assume that military initiatives are distinct events. In fact, declarations of war are generally over-determined escalations of preexisting conditions. Just-war criteria cannot help evaluate military and related institutions, including their peacetime practices and how these relate to wartime activities, so they cannot address the ways in which armed conflicts between and among states emerge from omnipresent, often violent, state militarism. The remarkable resemblances in some sectors between states of peace and states of war remain completely untouched by theories that are only able to discuss the ethics of starting and ending direct military conflicts between and among states. Applications of just-war criteria actually help create the illusion that the "problem of war" is being addressed when the only considerations are the ethics of declaring wars and of military violence within the boundaries of declarations of war and peace. Though just-war considerations might theoretically help decision-makers avoid specific gross eruptions of military violence, the aspects of war which require the underlying presence of militarism and the direct effects of the omnipresence of militarism remain untouched. There may be important decisions to be made about when and how to fight war, but these must be considered in terms of the many other aspects of contemporary war and militarism that are significant to nonmilitary personnel, including women and nonhumans.

### Alt Overview

#### Militaristic war may be a central value of modern Western culture, but it can be changed through analysis – multiple empirical examples prove

Cady 10 (Duane L., prof of phil @ hamline university, From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum, pp. 23-24)

The slow but persistent rise in awareness of racial, ethnic, gender, sexual- orientation, and class oppression in our time and the beginning efforts of liberation from within oppressed groups offer hope that even the most deeply held and least explicitly challenged predispositions of culture might be examined. Such examinations can lead to changes in the lives of the oppressed. Perhaps even those oppressed by warism will one day free themselves from accepting war as an inevitable condition of nature. Two hundred years ago slavery was a common and well- established social institution in the United States. It had been an ordinary feature of many societies dating to ancient and perhaps prehistoric times. Slavery was taken for granted as a natural condition for beings thought to be inferior to members of the dominant group. And slavery was considered an essential feature of our nation’s economy. Within the past two centuries, attitudes toward slavery have changed dramatically. With these fundamental shifts in normative lenses came fundamental shifts in the practice and legality of slavery. These changes have been as difficult as they have been dramatic, for former slaves, for former slave- holders, and for culture at large. While deep racial prejudices persist to this day, slavery is no longer tolerated in modern societies. Slavery- like conditions of severe economic exploitation of labor have become embarrassments to dominant groups in part because slavery is universally condemned. The point is that the most central values of cultures— thought to be essential to the very survival of the society and allegedly grounded in the natural conditions of creation—can change in fundamental ways in relatively short periods of time with profound implications for individuals and societies. John Dewey beautifully links this point to the consideration of warism: “War is as much a social pattern [for us] as was the domestic slavery which the ancients thought to be immutable fact.”9 The civil rights movement has helped us see that human worth is not determined by a racial hierarchy. Feminism has helped us realize again that dominant attitudes about people are more likely values we choose rather than innate and determined features of human nature. It is historically true that men have been more actively violent and have received more training and encouragement in violence than have women.10 Dominant attitudes of culture have explained this by reference to what is “natural” for males and “natural” for females. By questioning the traditional role models for men and women, all of us be- come more free to choose and create the selves we are to be; we need not be defined by hidden presumptions of gender roles. Parallel to racial and gender liberation movements, pacifism questions taking warism for granted. Pacifists seek an examination of our unquestioned assumption of warism to expose it as racism and sexism have been examined and exposed. Just as opponents of racism and sex- ism consider the oppression of nonwhites and women, respectively, to be wrong, and thus to require fundamental changes in society, so opponents of warism— pacifists of various sorts— consider war to be wrong, and thus to require fundamental changes in society.

### \*\*AT: Not Practical

#### Multiple historical examples prove nonviolence is practical and state-based non-violence can be more effective than disorganized resistance

Cady 10 (Duane L., prof of phil @ hamline university, From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum, pp. 94-96)

Turning to more genuine objections to pacifism, the vast majority ¶ of standard criticisms are variations of “Be realistic.” These tend to be ¶ expressed with remarks such as, “Pacifism sounds good but it just won’t ¶ work,” or “I agree in theory but not in practice.” Since practical objections can only be resolved by reference to empirical evidence, it is at ¶ this point that the long history of nonviolent direct action needs to be ¶ known. People tend to think pacifist action will not work because they ¶ are largely ignorant of where and when it has worked. In fact, nonviolent direct action has been an effective and widespread means of social ¶ change, defense of rights, resistance against invasion, improvement of ¶ economic conditions, and overthrow of dictators. While a thorough history of nonviolent direct action cannot be included here, brief sketches ¶ of selected successful pacifist direct actions are helpful.1¶ Examples of effective use of nonviolent direct action can be documented at least as far back as fifth century B.C.E. Rome. Evidence is ¶ scattered but “nonviolent action certainly occurred between Roman ¶ times and the late eighteenth century, when the case material be-¶ comes rich.”2 While many effective nonviolent actions are familiar, ¶ many more are neglected in our school history texts, or their significance is overshadowed by detailed accounts of battles, tactics, and acts ¶ of military heroes. Some effective nonviolent actions are recounted ¶ with little recognition that they fostered major social change without ¶ resort to violence. Instances of effective use of nonviolent direct action ¶ from early American history include organized colonists challenging ¶ British rule by economic resistance, abolitionist struggles against ¶ slavery through boycott of slave- labor- produced goods and support of runaway slaves via the Underground Railroad, the struggle for women’s suffrage through protest, civil disobedience, and tax resistance, as ¶ well as numerous strikes, boycotts, slow- downs, and protests characterizing the defense of workers’ rights in the labor movement. Similar ¶ examples can be drawn from the histories of many other nations.¶ To a large extent, nonviolent means of struggle have replaced physical attacks, riots, and killings as means of social and economic reform, ¶ but we now take these nonviolent methods for granted as appropriate ¶ means for redress of economic and social grievances. Unfortunately, ¶ we rarely recognize the role of nonviolent activists in the transformation of culture from violent to nonviolent means in achieving social and ¶ economic justice. When faced with the objection “it won’t work,” the ¶ pacifist response must be, simply, that nonviolent action does work and ¶ has a history to document the claim.¶ Serious critics of pacifism press further, objecting that while a few ¶ instances of effective use of nonviolent direct action have occurred, ¶ they are exceptional cases. To respond to this, pacifists need only underscore the innumerable cooperative acts undertaken routinely every ¶ day by the vast majority of people within any functional society. When ¶ this point is granted, the objection turns to require examples not from ¶ domestic conflict over economic or social grievances but instances in ¶ which nonviolent struggle is “a major or predominant means of defense ¶ against foreign invaders or internal usurpers.”3 Here again history ¶ provides examples of successful nonviolent actions. They include:¶ German strikes and political noncooperation to the 1920 Kapp ¶ Putsch against the Weimar Republic; German government- ¶ sponsored noncooperation in the Ruhr in 1923 to the French ¶ and Belgian occupation; major aspects of the Dutch anti-Nazi ¶ resistance, including several large strikes, 1940– 45; major aspects of the Danish resistance to the German occupation, including the 1944 Copenhagen general strike, 1940– 45; major ¶ parts of the Norwegian resistance to the Quisling regime and ¶ the occupation, 1940– 45; and the Czechoslovak resistance to the Soviet invasion and occupation, 1968– 69.4¶ It must be kept in mind that in these cases nonviolent actions were ¶ undertaken with success yet with little or no preparation, training, or planning. Of course the Czechoslovak resistance ultimately ¶ failed, “but it held off full Soviet control for eight months . . . which ¶ would have been utterly impossible by military means.”5 We can ¶ only speculate how much more successful nonviolent defense might be were nations to prepare for it with commitments of resources ¶ and energy at levels comparable to current investments in military ¶ defense.

### Shift Link

#### Plan leads to indefinite detention

David Cole 13, professor at Georgetown University Law Center, 2/6/13, “Lethal Force Must Be Last Resort,” <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/02/05/what-standards-must-be-met-for-the-us-to-kill-an-american-citizen/lethal-force-must-be-last-resort>

Killing is also sometimes justified in self defense, or when necessary for law enforcement purposes, as when a woman kills her husband who is threatening her with a gun, or when the police recently shot the kidnapper in Alabama to save his hostage’s life. But killing in self defense requires a truly imminent threat of attack, and a finding that capture is not feasible, so that lethal force is a last resort.

Carried away by the technology of drones, which permit remote-control killing anywhere in the world from the safety of home, the Obama administration has stretched these rules beyond recognition. It asserts the power to kill Americans far from any battlefield, even if they are not a member of Al Qaeda, and even when they pose no threat of an immediate attack on the United States. It essentially defines any operational leader of Al Qaeda or its undefined “associated forces” as presumptively and continually posing an imminent threat, permitting their killing at any time.

But even if capture is not feasible at the moment, if the suspect is not about to attack us, it is possible that capture will become feasible later. Self defense requires that lethal force be used only as a last resort; the Obama administration’s redefinition of “imminence” permits it to be used as a first resort. Is it any wonder that the administration has killed hundreds of suspected terrorists outside Afghanistan, but captured almost none?

#### Turns the aff

Glazier 8 [Spring, 2008, David Glazier is an Associate Professor, Loyola Law School Los Angeles. J.D., University of Virginia School of Law, “A SELF-INFLICTED WOUND: A HALF-DOZEN YEARS OF TURMOIL OVER THE GUANTANAMO MILITARY COMMISSIONS”, 12 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 131]

The notion of equal treatment under the law is a long-standing fundamental principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence now internationally codified by the ICCPR which declares that "all persons [\*192] shall be equal before the courts and tribunals." n492 This is hardly true of the military commissions, however, which exempt Americans from trial by statute, Brits from trial by demand of their government, and granted an Australian special head-of-the-line privileges and concessions such as a security clearance for a foreign counsel officially proscribed by the governing directives. n493 Khadr was also allowed to have two Canadian counsel participate pro hac vice in his brief to the CMCR, with one even sharing oral argument with his military attorney. n494 Assuming trials eventually resume, it will be particularly revealing to see both whether citizens of Muslim countries are given any right to assistance from co-national counsel and how sentences they are awarded compare with Hicks' ultimate slap-on-the-wrist punishment. Back in early 2002, the original Appointing Authority, Paul Wolfowitz, promised that "we're going to operate in a way that common law courts, which is our court system, operate[], which is you [mete out] justice in an equal way. If you start with one set of punishments for one kind of individual, that will probably set a standard for others." n495 The disparate treatment accorded defendants to date can only set the United States up for a lose-lose dilemma should trials resume. If citizens of other countries, particularly Muslim nations, receive less favorable treatment than those sharing the Anglo-American heritage, there will be loud international cries of discrimination. On the other hand, if more convicted individuals receive only minor punishment, the U.S. public will likely conclude either that the government is failing to adequately protect the country, or that it has seriously misrepresented the dangers of international terrorism and the threat posed by the detainees. In either case the government will be subject to withering criticism likely to further erode support for its conduct of the "war on terror."

## 1NR

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#### Growth solves the case

**Eiras 4** (Ana Isabel , Senior Policy Analyst for International Economics in the Center for International Trade and Economics at The Heritage Foundation, Why America Needs to Support Free Trade)

REASON #5: Peace Free trade fosters an enormous chain of economic activity, the benefits of which culminate in a social desire to be at peace with neighboring and even faraway nations with which trade is conducted or might be conducted in the future. When individuals see how beneficial it is to live in an economically free society; when they see how freedom allows them to improve their lives and those of their families; when they can create new businesses, engage in commerce, or work for a decent salary or wage, adding dignity to their lives, they want peace to preserve all these good things. By contrast, when people live under economic oppression and are at the mercy of a small ruling authority that dictates every aspect of their lives and limits their ability to realize their potential, they resent the life they have and learn to hate better lives elsewhere. If they cannot enjoy the fruits of their efforts and cannot realize their potential; if they cannot feel free to do business, work freely, and trade freely; if they do not have anything to gain or to lose, they begin to feel that any change--even war--might be better. They have no incentive to desire peace with their neighbors. For this reason, the areas of greatest conflict in the world also happen to be those that are economically repressed. (See Map.) The Economic Freedom Map, drawn annually from the Index, shows, for example, that countries that are the most economically repressed have also suffered civil wars and unrest. The areas of the Middle East in which civil wars and terrorist havens abound are both economically repressed and mostly unfree. North Korea, a country plagued by starvation and poverty, is repressed. Brazil, Argentina, parts of Africa, and some former Soviet republics--all mostly unfree--have high levels of poverty and periodically suffer political and economic crises. Free trade and economic freedom set the process of growth, innovation, and prosperity in motion. In that process, individuals support the creation of institutions that are conducive to growth and that preserve peace and prosperity**. The greater the level of prosperity, the greater the likelihood of peace.**

#### Turns the Middle East --- economically induced retrenchment destabilizes the regional balance of power

#### Turns Pakistan and the Middle East --- decline causes terrorism

**Harris and Burrows 9** (Mathew, PhD European History at Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” <http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf>, AM)

In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groupsinheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacksand newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, **particularly in the absence of economic outlets** that would become narrower in an economic downturn.

#### Means no norms are credible if Obama gives in

Krugman, 9/29 --- Professor of Economics and International Affairs at Princeton

(Paul, 9/29/2013, “Rebels Without a Clue,” <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/30/opinion/krugman-rebels-without-a-clue.html>)

Meanwhile, on the politics, reasonable people know that Mr. Obama can’t and won’t let himself be blackmailed in this way, and not just because health reform is his key policy legacy. After all, once he starts making concessions to people who threaten to blow up the world economy unless they get what they want, he might as well tear up the Constitution. But Republican radicals — and even some leaders — still insist that Mr. Obama will cave in to their demands.

**The negative signal *overwhelms the aff***

**Delamaide, 9/27** --- political columnist for MarketWatch in Washington (9/27/2013, Darrell, MarketWatch, “Congress starting to resemble the United Nations; Commentary: If we have a broken government, can we really be exceptional?” Factiva))

What a sorry farce government has become, as egos and ambitions run unbridled in our nation’s capital, equaled only by the myopia of not being able to see further than the next procedural victory. **The brinksmanship over shutting down the government and risking default on U.S. debt is the ultimate test of American “exceptionalism.” Can we parade our political dysfunction before the world and still retain the respect of other nations? Ask smirking** Russian President Vladimir **Putin about that**. Can we as the issuer of the world’s reserve currency manage a debt default without any long-term consequences? Heck, yes, seems to be the attitude of some cowboys in Washington. We’re the greatest nation on earth and we don’t have to follow the rules other nations follow, they imply. President Barack **Obama went to the** **U**nited **N**ations **this week to tell assembled world leaders that “America is exceptional — in part because we have shown a willingness, through the sacrifice of blood and treasure, to stand up not only for our own narrow self-interest, but for the interests of all.” How credible are these words when our politicians can’t overcome their own narrow self-interest to take care of the commonweal in this country? Does anyone believe that America wants to guarantee the security of Syrian children when our lawmakers won’t even provide food for hungry children at home?** Most Americans yawn when the news turns to the United Nations. We have come to dismiss the organization founded with such idealism after World War II as an ineffectual talking shop. The General Assembly is useless, most people believe, because it is filled with crazy radicals who push for powerless motions that a sullen majority approves. The problem is that our House of Representatives is coming to fit that description, too. The Security Council has limited usefulness because individual members can indefinitely block action with a veto. Sometimes our Senate seems to be similarly ineffective. The difference is that we need the U.S. government to send out the Social Security checks we have invested in through our payroll tax, and to make the Medicare payments that have been guaranteed by that same tax. We need the government to step in and sustain a certain minimum standard of living that we feel is appropriate for the wealthiest nation on the planet. If markets seem calm, it’s because investors have come to regard the shenanigans in Washington as a sideshow. The Republicans have been crying wolf for so long and so repeatedly that no one believes the threat. Lew, for his part, has little choice but to play it straight and discharge his duty as a government official. So he reaffirmed earlier warnings in a letter this week to House Speaker John Boehner, telling him that Treasury’s ability to juggle payments will finally come to an end Oct. 17, when the government will have only $30 billion in the kitty, compared to daily expenditures that can run to $60 billion. “If we have insufficient cash on hand, it would be impossible for the United States of America to meet all of its obligations for the first time in our history,” Lew wrote. The Treasury secretary rejected Republican proposals to prioritize payments in order to pay creditors, calling it “default by another name.” “The United States should never have to choose, for example, whether to pay Social Security to seniors, pay benefits to our veterans, or make payments to state and local jurisdictions and health care providers under Medicare and Medicaid,” he said in his letter. “There is no way of knowing the damage any prioritization plan would have on our economy and financial markets.” **The next few weeks will tell us and the rest of the world what kind of country we are. We can’t afford a broken government. We aren’t that exceptional.**

### AT: No Link

**All other issues have to be set aside to resolve fiscal crises --- the plan disrupts critical focus**

**Bowman, 9/26** (Michael, 9/26/2013, Voice of America Press Releases and Documents, “Fiscal Fights Snarl US Congress, Imperil Other Legislation,” Factiva))

CAPITOL HILL - With no clear path to avoid a U.S. government shutdown October 1, U.S. congressional leaders already are bracing for the next fight: to raise the federal borrowing limit before the United States hits its debt ceiling in mid-October. **While partisan fiscal battles risk economic damage, they also monopolize lawmakers' time and push other congressional business to the side.**

Democratic Congressman Jared Polis said the Republican-controlled House of Representatives should be working to reform America's immigration system rather than engaging in damaging fights centered on President Barack Obama's health care law.

"This body has not spent one minute on the floor in consideration of an immigration reform bill. Not one minute. A lot of time on nothing, nothing, nothing. We need to act on so many pressing national issues," said Polis.

Frustration is not limited to Democrats. Republican Senator Chuck **Grassley said there are many issues that deserve Congress' attention**. "Tax reform. A constitutional amendment requiring a balanced budget. A farm bill."

But with Congress already mired in a partisan fight to keep the government running, another battle is brewing. Thursday, House Speaker John Boehner said Republicans have conditions for raising the U.S. borrowing cap.

"We are going to introduce a plan that ties important spending cuts and pro-growth reforms to a debt-limit increase," said Boehner.

Failure to hike the borrowing limit could trigger a default and another downgrade of U.S. creditworthiness. Boehner's announcement was immediately blasted by Democratic Senator Richard Durbin. "If they [House Republicans] stand by their position and do not give us a clean extension of the debt ceiling, the victims will include all employees across America."

At the White House, spokesman Jay Carney repeated President Obama's refusal to negotiate on the debt ceiling.

**The bottom line? Congress and the White House are focused on two fiscal battles that will extend well into next month**. Even if a shutdown is averted, spending authority is only expected to be extended for two to three months, setting the stage for another spending showdown near the end of the year.

**"It pushes everything off the table," said political analyst** Stuart **Rothenberg**. **"The Congress has had a difficult time over the past few years raising the debt ceiling, dealing with budgets and spending, and keeping the government open. We are really going to have a legislative logjam here."**

One possible casualty is immigration reform. Conventional wisdom holds that Congress must act this year if reform is to succeed, since lawmakers will shy from casting politically-charged votes ahead of the 2014 mid-term elections.

**Plan is a perceived loss for Obama that saps his capital**

**Loomis, 7** --- Department of Government at Georgetown

(3/2/2007, Dr. Andrew J. Loomis is a Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “Leveraging legitimacy in the crafting of U.S. foreign policy,” pg 35-36, <http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/7/9/4/8/pages179487/p179487-36.php>)

Declining political authority encourages defection. American political analyst Norman **Ornstein writes** of the domestic context,

**In a system where a President has limited formal power, perception matters. The reputation for success**—the belief by other political actors that even when he looks down, a president will find a way to pull out a victory—**is the most valuable resource a chief executive can have**. **Conversely, the widespread belief that the Oval Office occupant is on the defensive, on the wane or without the ability to win under adversity can lead to disaster, as individual lawmakers calculate who will be on the winning side and negotiate accordingly.** In simple terms, winners win and **losers lose more often than not.**

**Failure begets failure. In short, a president experiencing declining amounts of political capital has diminished capacity to advance his goals.** As a result, political allies perceive a decreasing benefit in publicly tying themselves to the president, and an increasing benefit in allying with rising centers of authority. A president’s incapacity and his record of success are interlocked and reinforce each other. **Incapacity leads to political failure, which reinforces perceptions of incapacity. This feedback loop accelerates decay both in leadership capacity and defection by key allies.**

The central point of this review of the presidential literature is that **the sources of presidential influence—and thus their prospects for enjoying success in pursuing preferred foreign policies—go beyond the structural factors imbued by the Constitution**. Presidential authority is affected by ideational resources in the form of public perceptions of legitimacy. The public offers and rescinds its support in accordance with normative trends and historical patterns, non-material sources of power that affects the character of U.S. policy, foreign and domestic.

This brief review of the literature suggests how **legitimacy norms enhance presidential influence in ways that structural powers cannot explain**. Correspondingly, **increased executive power improves the prospects for policy success**. As a variety of cases indicate—from Woodrow Wilson’s failure to generate domestic support for the League of Nations to public pressure that is changing the current course of U.S. involvement in Iraq—the effective execution of foreign policy depends on public support. Public support turns on perceptions of policy legitimacy. As a result, policymakers—starting with the president—pay close attention to the receptivity that U.S. policy has with the domestic public. In this way, normative influences infiltrate policy-making processes and affect the character of policy decisions.

**1nc Link --- Fight to Defend Link**

**Fighting to defend his war power will sap Obama’s capital, trading off with rest of agenda**

**Kriner, 10** --- assistant professor of political science at Boston University

(Douglas L. Kriner, “After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War”, University of Chicago Press, Dec 1, 2010, page 68-69)

**While congressional support leaves the president’s reserve of political capital intact, congressional criticism saps energy from other initiatives on the home front by forcing the president to expend energy and effort defending his international agenda. Political capital spent shoring up support for a president’s foreign policies is capital that is unavailable for his future policy initiatives**. Moreover, any weakening in the president’s political clout may have immediate ramifications for his reelection prospects, as well as indirect consequences for congressional races.59 Indeed, Democratic efforts to tie congressional Republican incumbents to President George W. Bush and his war policies paid immediate political dividends in the 2006 midterms, particularly in states, districts, and counties that had suffered the highest casualty rates in the Iraq War. 60

**In addition to boding ill for the president’s perceived political capital and reputation, such partisan losses in Congress only further imperil his programmatic agenda, both international and domestic.** Scholars have long noted that President Lyndon **Johnson’s dream of a Great Society also perished in the rice paddies of Vietnam.**

**Lacking** the requisite funds in a war-depleted treasury and **the political capital needed to sustain his legislative vision, Johnson gradually let his domestic goals slip away** as he hunkered down in an effort first to win and then to end the Vietnam War. In the same way, **many of** President **Bush’s highest second-term domestic proprieties, such as Social Security and immigration reform, failed perhaps in large part because the administration had to expend so much energy and effort waging a rear-guard action against congressional critics of the war in Iraq.**61

**When making their cost-benefit calculations, presidents surely consider these wider political costs of congressional opposition to their military policies.** If congressional opposition in the military arena stands to derail other elements of his agenda, all else being equal, the president will be more likely to judge the benefits of military action insufficient to its costs than if Congress stood behind him in the international arena.

**--- XT: Fight to Defend Link**

**President has to spend political capital defending war powers**

**Samples, 11** --- director of the Center for Representative Government at CATO

(10/27/2011, John, “Congress Surrenders the War Powers: Libya, the United Nations, and the Constitution,” <http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa687.pdf>))

But political representation has other fac-ets. It has given voice to public dissatisfaction about wars proper and limited wars. Con-gress “has historically been actively engaged in debates over the proper conduct of major military initiatives. It has proposed, publicly debated, and voted on various legislative initiatives to authorize or curtail the use of force.” **Congress has also held hearings about the conduct of limited and proper wars.** 215 **Many believe that such legislative actions have little effect on the president. Yet such ac-tions can affect the cost-benefit calculations of the president** in pursuing or failing to pur-sue a limited war. **Congress can raise the costs of a policy by shaping and mobilizing public opinion against a war, thereby increasing the cost in political capital a president must pay to sustain a policy.** Congressional actions also signal disunity (or unity) to foreign actors, who in turn act on their expectations, thereby raising the costs of a limited war. Congres-sional actions also affect presidential expec-tations about how the conduct of a war will be received in the legislature; Congress can thus influence presidential policies without directly overturning them. 216 Systematic evi-dence indicates that since 1945 Congress has been able to influence presidential policies through these means. 217 Although short of constitutional propriety, congressional voice can matter in war-making.

**Defending presidential powers costs capital**

**Pushaw, 04** --- Prof at Pepperdine Law (Fall 2004, Robert J., Missouri Law Review, “SYMPOSIUM: Defending Deference: A Response to Professors Epstein and Wells,” 69 Mo. L. Rev. 959))

More recently, **the Court** denied President Truman's claim of implied Article II power to unilaterally seize and operate domestic steel mills to ensure production of arms for the Korean War n51 and **invalidated** President **Bush's indefinite detention of suspected terrorists**. n52 The Court apparently concluded that the wars against Korea and terrorism posed less immediate and serious threats, and that in any event both **Presidents had gone constitutionally overboard in their responses without specific congressional authorization**. Left unsaid was that Truman in 1952 and **Bush in 2004 lacked the popularity and political capital to disregard the Court's orders**. n53

### Impact Debate

**Defense doesn’t assume an ABRUBT DEFAULT that SHREDS THE SOCIAL SAFETY NET and sends MASSIVE INTERNATIONAL REIPPLE EFFECTS**

**Studies prove!**

**Royal 10** Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense (Jedediah, 2010, Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may **increase the likelihood of external conflict**. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent stales. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level. Pollins (20081 advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody **transition** from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 19SJ) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of **miscalculation** (Fcaron. 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain **redistribution** of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately. Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level. Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states arc likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Mom berg and Hess (2002) find a **strong correlation** between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write. The linkage, between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict lends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other (Hlomhen? & Hess. 2(102. p. X9> Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blombcrg. Hess. & Wee ra pan a, 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DcRoucn (1995), and Blombcrg. Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force arc at least indirecti) correlated. Gelpi (1997). Miller (1999). and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that Ihe tendency towards diversionary tactics arc greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked lo an increase in the use of force.

**Double dip recessions are uniquely escalatory**

**Fordham 10** [Tina Fordham, “Investors can’t ignore the rise of geopolitical risk”, Financial Times, 7-17-2010, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/dc71f272-7a14-11df-9871-00144feabdc0.html>]

Geopolitical risk is on the rise after years of relative quiet – potentially creating further headwinds to the global recovery just as fears of a double-dip recession are growing, says Tina Fordham, senior political analyst at Citi Private Bank. “Recently, markets have been focused on problems within the eurozone and not much moved by developments in North Korea, new Iran sanctions, tensions between Turkey and Israel or the unrest in strategically significant Kyrgyzstan,” she says. “But taken together, we don’t think investors can afford to ignore the return of geopolitical concerns to the fragile post-financial crisis environment.” Ms Fordham argues the end of post-Cold War US pre-eminence is one of the most important by-products of the financial crisis. “The post-crisis world order is shifting. More players than ever are at the table, and their interests often diverge. Emerging market countries have greater weight in the system, yet many lack experience on the global stage. Addressing the world’s challenges in this more crowded environment will be slower and more complex. This increases the potential for proliferating risks: most notably the prospect of politically and/or economically weakened regimes obtaining nuclear weapons; and military action to keep them from doing so. “Left unresolved, these challenges could disrupt global stability and trade. This would be a very unwelcome time to see the return of geopolitical risk.”

### AT: Econ Down

#### Scenario’s not U.S. recovery but global decline --- Davidson says debt ceiling would cause depression level collapse --- decoupling does not assume the massive ripple effect --- this is also in the context of global

### AT: Passel

#### Passel does NOT assume our internal link --- it’s example of the recession is categorically different from the u.s. NOT PAYING BILLS to FOREIGN CREDITORS ---

#### Davidson says defaulting causes a T-Bond crisis – that exacerbates food scarcity

**Min 10 –** (David, Associate Director for Financial Markets Policy – Center for American Progress, “The Big Freeze”, 10-28, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/10/big\_freeze.html)

A freeze on the debt ceiling could erode confidence in U.S. Treasury bonds in a number of ways, creating further and wider panic in financial markets. First, [by causing a disruption in the issuance of Treasury debt, as happened in 1995-96](http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/ai96130.pdf), a freeze would cause investors to seek alternative financial investments, even perhaps causing a run on Treasurys. Such a run would cause the cost of U.S. debt to soar, putting even more stress on our budget, and the resulting enormous capital flows would likely be highly destabilizing to global financial markets, potentially creating more asset bubbles and busts throughout the world. Second, the massive withdrawal of public spending that would occur would cause significant concern among institutional investors worldwide that the U.S. would swiftly enter a second, very deep, recession, raising concerns about the ability of the United States to repay its debt. Finally, the sheer recklessness of a debt freeze during these tenuous times would **signal** to already nervous investors that there was a significant amount of political risk, which could cause them to shy away from investing in the **U**nited **S**tates generally. Taken together, these factors would almost certainly result in a significant increase in the interest rates we currently pay on our national debt, currently just above 2.5 percent for a 10-year Treasury note. If in the near term these rates moved even to 5.9 percent, the long-term rate predicted by the Congressional Budget Office, then our interest payments would increase by more than double, to nearly $600 billion a year. These rates could climb even higher, if investors began to price in a “default risk” into Treasurys—something that reckless actions by Congress could potentially spark—thus greatly exacerbating our budget problems. The U.S. dollar, of course, is the world’s reserve currency in large part because of the depth and liquidity of the U.S. Treasury bond market. If this market is severely disrupted, and investors lost confidence in U.S. Treasurys, then it is unclear where nervous investors might go next. A sharp and swift move by investors out of U.S. Treasury bonds could be highly destabilizing, straining the already delicate global economy. Imagine, for example, if investors moved from sovereign debt into commodities, most of which are priced and traded in dollars. This could have the catastrophic impact of weakening the world’s largest economies while also **raising the prices of** the basic inputs (such as metals or **food**) that are necessary for economic growth. In short, a freeze on the debt ceiling would cause our interest payments to spike, making our budget situation even more problematic, while potentially triggering greater **global instability**—perhaps even a global economic depression.

**Prices spikes kill billions and cause global war**

**Brown 07 –** (Lester R., Director – Earth Policy Institute, 3-21, http://www.earth-policy.org/Updates/2007/Update65.htm)

Urban food protests in response to rising food prices in low and middle income countries, such as Mexico, could lead to **political instability** that would add to the growing list of failed and failing states. At some point, spreading political instability could disrupt **global economic progress**. Against this backdrop, Washington is consumed with “ethanol euphoria.” President Bush in his State of the Union address set a production goal for 2017 of 35 billion gallons of alternative fuels, including grain-based and cellulosic ethanol, and liquefied coal. Given the current difficulties in producing cellulosic ethanol at a competitive cost and given the mounting public opposition to liquefied coal, which is far more carbon-intensive than gasoline, most of the fuel to meet this goal might well have to come from grain. This could take most of the U.S. grain harvest, leaving little grain to meet U.S. needs, much less those of the hundred or so countries that import grain. The stage is now set for direct competition for grain between the 800 million people who own automobiles, and the world’s **2 billion** poorest people. The risk is that millions of those on the lower rungs of the global economic ladder will start falling off as higher food prices drop their consumption below the survival level.

**Not intrinsic---a logical policymaker could both do the plan and raise the debt ceiling---logical decision-making is a key portable skill**

**Plan key to the economy**

Nathaniel **Sheppard 11**, correspondent for the Chicago Tribune and NYT, June 7 2011, “Why pint-sized Yemen has become a world player,” http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/06/07/152204.html

That Yemen could fall into the abyss is of great geopolitical significance that has put the bean-size nation at center stage. About 11 percent of the world’s seaborne petroleum passes through the Gulf of Aden en route to the Suez Canal, regional refineries and points west. ¶ It is not the largest shipment by far but enough that disruptions in transit could **spook world markets** and set off a **new spiral of inflation** as the world tries to recover from four years of economic distress.¶ Yemen occupies the southwestern and southern end of the Arabian Peninsula. It is bordered by Saudi Arabia to the north, the Red Sea to the west and Oman to the east. ¶ West bound oil must transit the Gulf of Aden and Bab el Mandab, a narrow strait that passes between Yemen and Djibouti then past the pirates’ paradise, Somalia before reaching open water. It is one of seven strategic world **oil** shipping **chokepoints**. ¶ Moreover, the area may contain significant untapped oil reserves, more reason for US concern since Saudi reserves may be diminishing and America is doing little to wean itself from fossil fuel.¶ Should Yemen polity fall apart, the country would be up for grabs. One of the grabbing hands would be that of **A**l **Q**aeda in the **A**rabian **P**eninsula, one of the most notorious of Al Qaeda offshoots. Even before Osama Bin Laden was killed and his body dumped into the sea at the beginning of May, the Al Qaeda leader and best known symbol of world terror had lost control of Yemen’s Al Qaeda warriors. They marched to their own drum.¶ Able to operate freely in this poorest of poor, barely managed country with rugged, unforgiving terrain, Yemen’s Al Qaeda has been able to mount several attacks on the US from here. First there was the suicide bombing of the naval destroyer USS Cole while it refueled at the Yemeni port of Aden. Seventeen seamen were killed¶ Subsequent attacks launched from here included the failed Christmas Day bomb plot in 2009 and the parcel bomb plot of 2010, which also failed. ¶ In 2009, Nasir Al Wuhayshi, an Al Qaeda commander who trained under Bin Laden in Afghanistan and served as his secretary, announced the consolidation of Al Qaeda forces in the region as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, under his command.¶ The US went after Al Qaeda elements in the region that same year but in lawless Somalia with disastrous consequences.¶ Commander Wuhayshi pledged to take jihad from the Arabian Peninsula to Israel, striking at Muslim leaders he decreed “criminal tyrants,” along the way, such as the Saudi royal, family, Yemen’s President Ali Abdullah Saleh and recently deposed Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. ¶ Once in Israel he would “liberate” Gaza and Muslim holy sites such as Haram Ash-Sharif, known by Jews as Temple Mount, the holiest of sites in the Old City of Jerusalem. It was here that God chose the Divine Presence to rest; from which the world we know expanded; and that God gathered the dust to make man.¶ US Navy SEALs would love to meet Mr. Wuhayshi to discuss diabolical ambitions for any serious attempt to carry out his apocalyptic quest most certainly would plunge the world into war of world proportions. His agenda and the passion and persistence with which he and his followers pursue it are a reason for stepped up US engagement in Yemen.¶ Before the current uptick in violence as disparate forces seek to send President Saleh packing for good, the long reigning strongman had begun to cooperate with the US counter terrorism efforts in the region, obliging with a series of air strikes and ground assaults on suspected Al Qaeda targets in Yemen. That cooperation may now be in tatters and Mr. Wuhayshi stands to gain ground.¶ The US’ waltz with the strongman was not by choice. While Mr. Saleh’s cooperation was probably more to save his utterly corrupt regime, he was viewed by the US as the lesser of evils in Yemen. The attitude toward President Saleh was the same as toward Panamanian strongman Gen. Manuel Noriega, another US criminal client: “He may be an SOB but he’s our SOB.’’ ¶ With a bigger footprint and wider control in Yemen in the absence of a strong central authority, outright land grabs and possible alliances with Somalia warlords, it would be as if Al Qaeda had found its **Holy Grail**, a potential for **disrupting the flow of oil to the west**, and what it views as the devil incarnate, the US. ¶ Ships transiting the area already find the waters treacherous. Now it stands to get worse. They are frequently targeted by pirates from Somalia who kill or demand large ransoms if they are able to successfully board cargo-carrying vessels. Oil tankers are like crown jewels.¶ International forces, including the US, have treated the Somali pirates like flies at a picnic, swatting them away unscathed most of the time and sometimes killing them, but not enough times to make their confederates think about new careers. ¶ Hijacking or blowing up oil tankers and messing with the oil that powers the world is a different matter altogether. There is too much at stake to leave it to Yemen to handle its own affairs but overt meddling from the West would be unwelcome in the region.¶ No Western or Asian oil dependent nation would relish the idea of invading a Muslim nation at a time of such tensions with Muslims. The US is particularly reluctant, having already done so twice in Iraq and Afghanistan.¶ Oil is oil however. While it might not matter to Muslim fundamentalists who want to turn the hands of time back to the 17th century, oil dependent nations **would not sit by idly** while an already **fractured** world **economy** worsened. The situation would get ugly.¶ Thus the tail wags the dog, the pint-sized nation that offers so little has forced the powerful behemoths to consider so much, like their limited options for doing anything about frightening events unfolding before their eyes.

**Issues are compartmentalized---votes on the debt ceiling are determined by ideology not unrelated agenda items---otherwise health care should have ended Obama’s agenda**

**Obama losses pound the link**

**NPR 9/21**, “Have Obama's Troubles Weakened Him For Fall's Fiscal Fights?” http://www.ideastream.org/news/npr/224494760

President Obama has had a tough year. He **failed** to pass gun legislation. Plans for an immigration overhaul have **stalled** in the House. He barely escaped what would have been a humiliating rejection by Congress on his plan to strike Syria.¶ Just this week, his own Democrats forced Larry Summers, the president's first choice to head the Federal Reserve, to withdraw.¶ Former Clinton White House aide Bill Galston says all these issues have **weakened the unity of the president's coalition.**¶"It's not a breach, but there has been some real tension there," he says, "and that's something that neither the president nor congressional Democrats can afford as the budget battle intensifies."¶ Obama is now facing showdowns with the Republicans over a potential government shutdown and a default on the nation's debt. On Friday, the House voted to fund government operations through mid-December, while also defunding the president's signature health care law — a position that's bound to fail in the Senate.¶ As these fiscal battles proceed, **Republicans have been emboldened by the president's recent troubles**, says former GOP leadership aide Ron Bonjean.

**PC not key---Obama will refuse to negotiate**

David **Jackson 9/18**, USA Today, “Obama: Debt ceiling is not a 'bargaining chip,’” http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/09/18/obama-business-roundtable-boehner-shutdown-debt-ceiling/2830789/

President Obama said Wednesday that he will not allow the debt ceiling to become "a bargaining chip to set policy," calling the tactic "irresponsible" politics.¶ "It would fundamentally change how American government functions," Obama told the Business Roundtable, a group of CEOs.¶ As the White House and Congress gear up for new budget battles, Obama said congressional Republicans are trying to use the debt ceiling to "**extort**" harmful budgets from his administration.¶ Obama asked the business people to "flip the script," and imagine the political reaction if a Democratic House speaker told a Republican president: We won't raise the debt ceiling unless you raise corporate taxes by 20%.¶ "That can't be a recipe for government," Obama said.

**Won’t pass**

**Bloomberg 10-3** – Bloomberg News, 12:43PM ET, 10/3/13, “Republicans Said to Plan Debt-Limit Measure Amid Shutdown,” http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-03/republicans-said-to-plan-debt-limit-measure-amid-shutdown.html

House Majority Leader Eric Cantor of Virginia indicated that Republicans and Democrats should negotiate their differences on government spending and increasing the nation’s borrowing authority at one time.

Republicans want to “sit down and talk to resolve our differences” on both issues, Cantor told reporters today at the U.S. Capitol.

House Republican leaders are weighing their next move in a standoff that has shut down the government and risks a U.S. default in two weeks.

They plan to bring up a measure to raise the U.S. debt-limit as soon as next week as part of a new attempt to force President Barack Obama to negotiate on the budget, according to three people with knowledge of the strategy.

The approach would merge the disputes over ending the partial government shutdown and raising the debt ceiling into one fiscal fight.

“I’d like to get one agreement and be done,” House Majority Whip Kevin McCarthy told reporters yesterday without offering details.

Cantor didn’t provide details on when Republicans will introduce a measure to raise the debt ceiling. Leaders will meet with rank-and-file members behind closed doors tomorrow morning to discuss the next move.

No Incentive

Republican leaders are attempting to pair their party’s priorities with a debt-limit increase, a plan they shelved last month to focus on a stopgap measure to fund the government in the new fiscal year. The goal is to have a bill ready in the coming days, even without resolving the partial government shutdown, according to a Republican lawmaker and two leadership aides who asked not to be identified to discuss the strategy.

There’s no incentive for the Republican-controlled House to take up a Senate-passed short-term measure without add-ons because many lawmakers don’t yet feel the effects of the government shutdown now in its third day, the people said.

**XO solves the impact**

Joe **Weisenthal 9/30**, Executive Editor for Business Insider, “It Increasingly Looks Like Obama Will Have To Raise The Debt Ceiling All By Himself,” <http://www.businessinsider.com/it-increasingly-looks-like-obama-will-have-to-raise-the-debt-ceiling-all-by-himself-2013->9

With no movement on either side and the debt ceiling fast approaching, there's increasing talk that the solution will be for Obama to issue an e**x**ecutive **o**rder and require the Treasury to continue paying U.S. debt holders even if the debt ceiling isn't raised.¶ Here's Greg Valliere at Potomac Research:¶ HOW DOES THIS END? What worries many clients we talk with is the absence of a clear end-game. We think three key elements will have to be part of the final outcome: First, a nasty signal from the stock market. Second, a daring move from Barack Obama to raise the debt ceiling by executive order if default appears to be imminent. Third, a capitulation by Boehner, ending the shut-down and debt crisis in an arrangement between a third of the House GOP and virtually all of the Democrats. ¶ Valliere isn't the only one seeing this outcome.¶ Here's David Kotok at Cumberland Advisors:¶ We expect this craziness to last into October and run up against the debt limit fight. In the final gasping throes of squabbling, **we expect** President Obama to use the President Clinton designed e**x**ecutive **o**rder strategy so that the US doesn’t default. There will then ensue a protracted court fight leading to a Supreme Court decision. The impasse may go that far. This is our American way. “Man Plans and God Laughs” says the Yiddish Proverb.¶ Indeed, back in 2011, Bill Clinton said he'd raise the debt ceiling by invoking the 14th Amendment rather than negotiate with the House GOP.¶ This time around, again, Clinton is advising Obama to **call the GOP's bluff.**

**Plan has bipartisan support**

**AP 13**, "Congress looks to limit drone strikes", February 5, www.cbsnews.com/8301-250\_162-57567793/congress-looks-to-limit-drone-strikes/

Uncomfortable with the Obama administration's use of deadly drones**, a growing number in Congress is looking to limit America's authority to kill** suspected **terrorists**, even U.S. citizens. The Democratic-led outcry was emboldened by the revelation in a newly surfaced Justice Department memo that shows drones can strike against a wider range of threats, with less evidence, than previously believed.¶ The drone program, which has been used from Pakistan across the Middle East and into North Africa to find and kill an unknown number of suspected terrorists, is expected to be a top topic of debate when the Senate Intelligence Committee grills John Brennan, the White House's pick for CIA chief, at a hearing Thursday.¶ The White House on Tuesday defended its lethal drone program by citing the very laws that some in Congress once believed were appropriate in the years immediately after the Sept. 11 attacks but now think may be too broad.¶ It has to be in the agenda of this Congress to reconsider the scope of action of drones and use of deadly force by the United States around the world because the original authorization of use of force, I think, is being strained to its limits," Sen. Chris Coons, D-Del., said in a recent interview.¶ Rep. Steny Hoyer of Maryland, the No. 2 Democrat in the House, said Tuesday that "it deserves a serious look at how we make the decisions in government to take out, kill, eliminate, whatever word you want to use, not just American citizens but other citizens as well."¶ Hoyer added: "We ought to carefully review our policies as a country."¶ The Senate Foreign Relations Committee likely will hold hearings on U.S. drone policy, an aide said Tuesday, and Chairman Robert Menendez, D-N.J., **and the panel's top Republican**, Sen. Bob **Corker** of Tennessee, both have quietly **expressed concerns about the** deadly **operations**. And earlier this week, a group of 11 Democratic and Republican senators urged President Barack Obama to release a classified Justice Department legal opinion justifying when U.S. counterterror missions, including drone strikes, can be used to kill American citizens abroad.

**Obama drone speech pounds the link**

Neela **Banerjee 13**, LA Times DC Energy and Environment Correspondent, 5/26/2013, “Republicans criticize Obama’s shift on drone use,” http://www.thestate.com/2013/05/26/2788605/republicans-criticize-obamas-shift.html

WASHINGTON, DC — Republicans criticized President Barack Obama on Sunday for **what they described as a retreat** in the war against terrorism when they said the world’s crises demand a more aggressive, vigilant United States.¶ In a speech Thursday at the National Defense University in Washington, Obama said he would narrow the use of drone attacks against suspected terrorists and seek to close the prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.¶ Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-SC, who serves on the Senate Armed Services Committee, said on “Fox News Sunday” that he had “never been more worried about national security” and called the president “tone deaf” on the issue.¶ “I see a big difference between the president saying the war’s at an end and whether or not you’ve won the war,” said Sen. Tom Coburn, R-Okla. “We have still tremendous threats out there, that are building – not declining, building – and to not recognize that, I think, is dangerous in the long run and dangerous for the world.”

**PC fails**

**Drum 13** [Kevin Drum, political writer for Mother Jones, “Maureen Dowd and Presidential Leverage,” Apr 22 2013, http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/04/maureen-dowd-and-presidential-leverage]

Still and all, maybe this is a good oppportunity to talk—yet again—about presidential power in domestic affairs. Presidents obviously aren't powerless: they have agenda setting power, they have agency rulemaking power, and they're always at the table since nothing becomes law without their signature. This provides them with a certain amount of leverage**. But not much**. The truth is that presidents have never had all that much personal power in domestic affairs. Modern presidents have largely succeeded when they had big majorities in Congress (FDR, LBJ, Reagan, Obama's first two years) and failed when they didn't. That's by far the biggest factor in presidential success, not some mystical ability to sweet talk legislators.¶ But there's more to this. Dowd's real problem is that she hasn't kept up with either academic research or simple common sense over the past half century. She's still stuck **in the** gauzy **past** when presidents really did have at least a bit of arm-twisting power. LBJ's real source of success may have been an overwhelming Democratic majority in Congress, but it's also true that he really did have at least a few resources at hand to persuade and threaten recalcitrant lawmakers. The problem is that even those few resources **are now** largely **gone**. The world is simply a different place.¶ Party discipline, for example, is wildly different than it used to be. The party apparatus itself, which the president heads, has far less power than it used to have to compel support for a president's agenda. At the same time, parties are **far more** ideologically **unified** than in the past, which means that picking off a few members of the opposition party is much more difficult than it used to be.¶ And that's not all. Earmarks and pork barrel budgeting in general are largely gone. You can partly blame Obama for this state of affairs, since he was in favor of getting rid of earmarks, but this is something that affects all lawmaking, not just guns. The budget barons of the Senate simply don't have the power any longer to make life miserable for backbenchers who don't toe the president's line.¶ In fact, party leaders don't have very much power at all over backbenchers anymore. The days are long gone when newly elected members spent years quietly working their way up the seniority ladder and providing reliable votes for the party along the way. These days, they vote the way they need to vote, and there's very little anyone can do about it. Even threats to withhold fundraising are mostly empty. Party leaders need them more than they need party leaders, and everyone knows it.¶ Finally, there's the most obvious change of all: the decision by Republicans to stonewall every single Obama initiative from day one. By now, I assume that even conservative apologists have given up pretending that this isn't true. The evidence is overwhelming, and it's applied to practically every single thing Obama has done in the domestic sphere. The only question, ever, is whether Obama will get two or three Republican votes vs. three or four. If the latter, he has a chance to win. But those two or three extra votes **don't depend on leverage**. In fact, Obama's leverage is negative. The last thing any Republican can afford these days is to be viewed as caving in to Obama. That's a **kiss of death** with the party's base.¶ Obama may very well be a lousy negotiator. But honestly, that's just not a big factor here. He **simply doesn't have much leverage** of any concrete kind, and when it comes to soft leverage, his power is quite probably negative. That's life in modern Washington. Dowd needs to grow up and figure that out.

### AT: Strait

**It’s impossible to disrupt commerce at sea – recent improvements in the strength of the global fleet**

**Lieberthal, Professor - Political Science – Michigan, 07**

**(Smooth Sailing, Foreign Affairs, May/June, Vol. 86, Issue 3)**

Twentieth-century history underscores the difficulty of significantly disrupting commerce at sea. Attacking commercial ships has been an effective means of achieving political objectives only when employed by major powers in wars of national survival. U.S. operations in the Pacific in World War II imposed serious hardships on Japan; the British blockade of Germany during World War I and German operations against Allied shipping in the Atlantic during both world wars were also quite successful. Blockades have been used selectively for more limited purposes but only under unique geopolitical circumstances. In 1962, for example, a U.S. blockade helped defuse the Cuban missile crisis, and Iraqi oil was successfully embargoed by a maritime coalition in support of UN sanctions after 1991. Lesser naval powers have lacked the capability to blockade major shipping routes, even when fighting all-out wars. The most notable example comes from the Iran-Iraq War, during which the opposing sides attacked shipping in the Persian Gulf to weaken each other in their stalemated conflict. Iran, in particular, had an advantageous geographic position to selectively interdict tanker traffic passing through the Persian Gulf. But neither it nor Iraq achieved much success, despite 544 attacks that killed over 400 civilian sailors and injured another 400. Although commercial shipping in the Gulf initially dropped by about 25 percent and the price of crude oil spiked, the so-called tanker war did not in the end significantly disrupt oil shipments. In fact, the price of crude soon started to fall steadily, partly because Iran lowered its prices to offset higher insurance premiums on shipments. In 1987, the United States offered to protect Kuwaiti ships by outfitting them with U.S. flags and escorting them, which deterred further attacks. Even at its most intense, the tanker war failed to ensnare more than two percent of the ships traveling through the Persian Gulf. Recent trends concerning oil tankers make it even more difficult to disrupt maritime oil shipments. The size and the strength of the global tanker fleet have increased markedly over the last two decades. From 1980 to 2006, the number of tankers grew from 2,516 to more than 10,400, and the average capacity of each tanker increased by 400 percent, with a disproportionate amount of the new tonnage having been added in recent years. Single-hulled tankers are being phased out in favor of more resilient double-hulled ones. The greater number of tankers traveling at higher speeds and in more congested shipping lanes makes it increasingly difficult to identify and intercept them. This is especially true for submarines, which have a limited ability to identify surface ships and have only a small onboard supply of torpedoes and antiship missiles. If a submarine attacks a ship using just two torpedoes, it will have exhausted more than a tenth of its standard arsenal. Meanwhile, other potential targets nearby will disperse, forcing the submarine to relocate. A single conventional-power submarine (Iran has only three) facing no opposition could realistically expect to damage about half a dozen oil tankers in a busy sea-lane several hundred miles wide over the course of a month, disrupting at most a tiny fraction of the oil deliveries made during that period. Conventional-power submarines, moreover, are relatively slow and cannot catch modern tankers, which travel at 15-20 knots. Mines and conventional-warhead missiles are even less effective now against large modern tankers than they were in the past. **During the Iran-Iraq War, several oil tankers ran over mines** in the Strait of Hormuz, **but they sustained little damage** due to their size and the protective effect of the liquid petroleum they carried (petroleum is not explosive in the airless tanks, and its weight holds the hulls in place). Even the most modern antiship missiles have relatively small warheads that are designed to damage the sensors and weapons systems of surface warships but are not capable of sinking or disabling a large tanker. Most missiles shot at a tanker would explode on its large deck, causing minimal damage. Even if they penetrated the deck, they would explode inside tanks where the liquid oil or the water in ballast would absorb the blast without igniting. In order to disable a modern-day tanker, an attack would have to include a salvo of eight to ten missiles with conventional warheads; a sustained campaign would quickly exhaust the missile stockpile of a medium-sized military power.

**International response solves**

**Lieberthal, Professor - Political Science – Michigan, 07**

**(Smooth Sailing, Foreign Affairs, May/June, Vol. 86, Issue 3)**

When a country cannot deploy the full range of naval forces necessary for a targeted blockade, it can try to interfere with any and all shipping by deploying mines, submarines, or aircraft. In conducting such an indiscriminate campaign against an adversary, however, the aggressor must consider the reaction of third parties whose shipping interests will inevitably be affected. Historically, neutral countries and countries concerned with free maritime traffic have tended to band together and reflag ships, provide escorts, and place great pressure on the disruptive countries. The navies of China, India, Japan, and Russia already have the capability to conduct serious campaigns of harassment against shipping generally or to impose targeted blockades on vulnerable nations with smaller navies. But the farther away these operations were from their home ports, the less effective the actions would be and the more likely that they would be stopped by concerted international action. For example, although India has significant capabilities to patrol the coast of Pakistan and selectively stop oil shipping there, it would find conducting a similar operation in oil shipping lanes farther afield more difficult. Such actions against international shipping would also provoke immediate opposition from the international community--especially the United States. **A multinational maritime force would have little difficulty suppressing the threat and keeping sea-lanes open.** Consider a Chinese blockade of Taiwan. Chinese aircraft flying from coastal bases could track and identify ships approaching Taiwan, and Chinese warships could easily stop, inspect, and divert specific vessels. Taiwan's naval and air forces would put up a good fight in contesting the blockade, but they would be worn down in a matter of weeks by the larger Chinese force. The blockade would cause severe economic hardship in Taiwan. But if the United States and the international community considered the blockade unjustified, international pressure for a settlement would be intense, and the blockade could be lifted by an opposing maritime coalition led by the United States. Even mines, which can be dropped covertly from fishing vessels and other merchant ships, would have a limited effect on traffic. The combined surveillance, intelligence, and antimine capabilities of the major maritime nations would be able to identify the country laying the mines; find, isolate, and clear the minefields; **and restore shipping in a matter of weeks.** DREAD NOT The resilience of today's tanker fleet and the realities of naval power mean that effecting a serious and sustained disruption of international oil shipping is a much more difficult task than is generally imagined. **Even the critical chokepoints of maritime commerce could be kept open in the face of attempts by countries or terrorists to wreak havoc in them.**

### AT: Compart

**Political capital is key to switching votes**

**Kuttner 11 (Robert, Senior Fellow – Demos and Co-editor – American Prospect, “Barack Obama's Theory of Power,” The American Prospect, 5-16, http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=barack\_obamas\_theory\_of\_power)**

As the political scientist Richard Neustadt observed in his classic work, Presidential Power, a book that had great influence on President John F. Kennedy, **the essence of a president's power is "the power to persuade."** Because our divided constitutional system does not allow the president to lead by commanding, presidents amass power by making strategic choices about when to use the latent authority of the presidency to move public and elite opinion and then use that added prestige as clout to move Congress. In one of Neustadt's classic case studies, Harry Truman, a president widely considered a lame duck, nonetheless persuaded the broad public and a Republican Congress in 1947-1948 that the Marshall Plan was a worthy idea. As Neustadt and Burns both observed, though an American chief executive is weak by constitutional design, **a president possesses several points of leverage**. He can play an effective outside game, motivating and shaping public sentiment, making clear the differences between his values and those of his opposition, and **using popular support to box in his opponents and move them in his direction**. He can complement the outside bully pulpit with a nimble inside game, uniting his legislative party, bestowing or withholding benefits on opposition legislators, forcing them to take awkward votes, and using the veto. He can also enlist the support of interest groups to pressure Congress, and use media to validate his framing of choices. Done well, all of this signals leadership that often moves the public agenda.

### AT: Past Losses

**Timeframe differential --- Obama’s sticking to his guns on debt --- he will win now but NEW LOSSES deck it**

**Millbank, 9/27** (Dana, 9/27/2013, “Obama should pivot to Dubya’s playbook,” <http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-09-27/opinions/42446718_1_president-obama-house-republicans-debt-limit>))

**If** President **Obama can stick to his guns, he will win his October standoff with Republicans.**

That’s an awfully big “if.”

This president has been consistently inconsistent, predictably unpredictable and reliably erratic. Consider the events of Thursday morning:

Obama gave a rousing speech in suburban Washington, in defense of Obamacare, on the eve of its implementation. “We’re now only five days away from finishing the job,” he told the crowd.

But before he had even left the room, his administration let slip that it was delaying by a month the sign-up for the health-care exchanges for small businesses. It wasn’t a huge deal, but it was enough to trample on the message the president had just delivered.

**Throughout his presidency, Obama has had great difficulty delivering a consistent message. Supporters plead for him to take a position — any position — and stick with it.** His shifting policy on confronting Syria was the most prominent of his vacillations, but his allies have seen a similar approach to the Guantanamo Bay prison, counterterrorism and climate change. Even on issues such as gun control and immigration where his views have been consistent, Obama has been inconsistent in promoting his message. Allies are reluctant to take risky stands, because they fear that Obama will change his mind and leave them standing alone.

Now come the budget showdowns, which could define the rest of his presidency. **Republican leaders are trying to shift the party’s emphasis from the fight over a government shutdown to the fight over the debt-limit increase**, where they have more support. A new Bloomberg poll found that Americans, by a 2-to-1 margin, disagree with Obama’s view that Congress should raise the debt limit without any conditions.

But **Obama has a path to victory**. That poll also found that Americans think lawmakers should stop trying to repeal Obamacare. And that was before House Republicans dramatically overplayed their hand by suggesting that they’ll allow the nation to default if Obama doesn’t agree to their laundry list of demands, including suspending Obamacare, repealing banking reforms, building a new oil pipeline, easing environmental regulations, limiting malpractice lawsuits and restricting access to Medicare.

**To beat the Republicans, Obama might follow the example of** a Republican, George W. **Bush**. Whatever you think of what he did, **he knew how to get it done: by simplifying his message and repeating it, ad nauseam, until he got the result he was after**.

**Obama instead tends to give a speech and move along to the next topic. This is why he is forever making “pivots” back to the economy**, or to health care. But **the way to pressure Congress is to be President One Note**.

**In the debt-limit fight, Obama already has his note: He will not negotiate over the full faith and credit of the** **U**nited **S**tates. That’s as good a theme as any; **it matters less what the message is than that he delivers it consistently**.

The idea, White House officials explained to me, is to avoid getting into a back-and-forth over taxes, spending and entitlement programs. “We’re right on the merits, but I don’t think we want to argue on the merits,” one said. “Our argument is not that our argument is better than theirs; it’s that theirs is stupid.”

This is a clean message: Republicans are threatening to tank the economy — through a shutdown or, more likely, through a default on the debt — and Obama isn’t going to negotiate with these hostage-takers.

Happily for Obama, Republicans are helping him to make the case by being publicly belligerent. After this week’s 21-hour speech on the Senate floor by Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Tex.), the publicity-seeking Texan and Sen. Mike Lee (R-Utah) objected to a bipartisan request to move a vote from Friday to Thursday to give House Republicans more time to craft legislation avoiding a shutdown. On the Senate floor, Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) accused them of objecting because they had sent out e-mails encouraging their supporters to tune in to the vote on Friday. The Post’s Ed O’Keefe caught Cruz “appearing to snicker” as his colleague spoke — more smug teenager than legislator.

**Even if his opponents are making things easier for him, Obama still needs to stick to his message.** As in Syria, the president has drawn a “red line” by saying he won’t negotiate with those who would put the United States into default. **If he retreats, he will embolden his opponents and demoralize his supporters**.

### AT: N/U

#### We post date --- cross-apply from the link debate that the

**Political pressure from Obama is yielding progress --- GOP starting to crack**

**Lowrey & Parker, 10/4** (Annie Lowrey and Ashley Parker, 10/4/2013, International Herald Tribune, “Republican said to soften stance on debt limit; Speaker signals openness to deal as Obama steps up push for resolution,” Factiva))

As the **Obama** administration on Thursday **sharply stepped up the volume in its tense fiscal battle with Republicans**, with warnings from the president and the Treasury that a debt default could have a catastrophic global impact, a key Republican sent a message that he would not let that happen.

The twin warnings came from a Treasury Department report and a muscularly worded speech from President Obama, who said that unless Congress acted soon, ‘‘the whole world will have problems.’’

But **in a potentially critical development**, the speaker of the House, Representative John A. **Boehner** of Ohio, **told colleagues in a closed-door meeting that he was determined to prevent a federal default and was willing to pass a measure through a combination of Republican and Democratic votes**, according to a lawmaker who was there. Other Republicans said they had the same sense of his intentions.

The Treasury Department, in a report issued on Thursday, said the impasse over raising the debt limit, when the government runs out of money to service its debts at mid-month, could cause credit markets to freeze, the dollar to plummet and interest rates to rise sharply.

A default, the report said, could potentially result ‘‘in a financial crisis and recession that could echo the events of 2008 or worse,’’ with results — including higher interest rates, reduced investment, higher debt payments and slower growth — that ‘‘could reverberate around the world.’’ The impact, it says, ‘‘could last for more than a generation.’’

The report comes as **the White House has been steadily building up pressure on Congress to leave the statutory debt limit out of the broader negotiations over the budget and the health care law** that led early Tuesday to a government shutdown.

**As the stakes grew higher and the public began feeling the impact of the shutdown, there were signs, both public and private, of growing division within the Republican Party both over the shutdown and the debt limit.**

The lawmaker who reported on Mr. Boehner’s comment, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said the speaker had said he would be willing to violate the so-called Hastert rule if necessary to pass a debt limit increase. The informal rule refers to a policy of not bringing to the floor any measure that does not have a majority of Republican votes.

A spokesman for Mr. Boehner pushed back on the idea that the speaker would try to pass a debt-limit increase mainly with Democratic votes, but acknowledged that the speaker understood the need to head off a default.

‘‘The speaker always, always prefers to pass legislation with a strong Republican majority,’’ said the spokesman, Michael Steel.

**Other Republicans also said Thursday that they got the sense that** Mr. **Boehner would do whatever was necessary to ensure that the country did not default on its debt**.

Representative Michael G. Fitzpatrick, Republican of Pennsylvania, who was one of just 22 House Republicans this year who helped Mr. Boehner pass three crucial bills with a majority of Democratic support — to avert a fiscal showdown, to provide relief for the victims of Hurricane Sandy and to pass the Violence Against Women Act — said he expected that he might be asked to do so again.

‘‘Hurricane Sandy, the fiscal cliff, all of the big votes require reasonable Republicans and Democrats to come together in order to pass it and get it to the president’s desk,’’ Mr. Fitzpatrick said. ‘‘This will be no different.’’

**GOP will cave**

**Cohen, et. al, 10/4** (Tom Cohen. Deirdre Walsh and Ed Payne, 10/4/2013, CNN Wire, “Hope for debt limit deal rises while shutdown standoff remains mired,” Factiva))

WASHINGTON (CNN) -- House Speaker John Boehner and fellow GOP lawmakers meet to discuss the government shutdown Friday, a day after the Republican leader reportedly told fellow legislators that he won't allow the United States to default on its debt.

Congressional Republicans remain divided over how to structure legislation to raise the nation's borrowing level, and with only two weeks before the debt ceiling deadline, there is still no plan to avoid a default.

But **at a meeting** Wednesday **with House GOP members, Boehner said he would not allow a default to happen, even if it means getting help from Democrats**, according to a Republican House member who requested anonymity to talk about the private meeting.

A Boehner aide said Thursday that the speaker "has always said the United States will not default on its debt, so that's not news."

Democratic Sen. Charles **Schumer** of New York **cheered the prospect of the GOP leader refusing to block at least this measure**, which President Barack Obama and his fellow Democrats strongly support.

**"This could be the beginnings of a significant breakthrough,"** Schumer said in a statement. "Even coming close to the edge of default is very dangerous, and **putting this issue to rest significantly ahead of the default date would allow everyone in the country to breathe a huge sigh of relief."**

The potential breakthrough -- at least on the debt limit -- came two weeks before the government is set to run out of money to cover its roughly $16.7 trillion debt. If the debt ceiling isn't bumped up, the country goes into default.

Conservative Republicans want budget cuts in exchange for upping the credit limit.

Boehner wrote this week in USA Today that "there is no way Congress can or should pass (a debt ceiling increase) without spending cuts and reforms to deal with the debt and deficit and help get our economy moving again."

He accused the president of refusing to negotiate; Obama and Democratic leaders have since said they are open to talks on any and all budgetary matters, but only after the government is reopened.

**Key indicators prove Boehner’s flexible**

**Sargent, 10/4** (Greg, 10/4/2013, Washington Post.com, “John Boehner gives away the game (a bit),” Factiva))

Multiple reports today inform us that John Boehner is privately telling colleagues that in the end, he won't allow default and will even let a debt ceiling hike pass with mostly Dem votes if it comes down to it. Plenty of folks are rightly skeptical about this development. But it's not entirely without significance.

The Post's account points out that this may be a trial balloon designed to gauge how this will play with conservatives. Meanwhile, **a spokesman for Boehner has been reiterating that Boehner does not intend to allow default, even as that spokesman is simultaneously reiterating that he will expect concessions in exchange for raising the debt limit, anyway.** Why? Because a "clean" debt limit cannot pass the House.

This is a variation on the glaring absurdity that's been at the heart of Boehner's position for some time, i.e, the simultaneous insistence that he knows the debt limit hike must happen -- and that the contrary is not an option -- even as he asks us to grant the presumption that the prospect of default gives him leverage. The twist added here is that this leverage is derived from the fact that only way to avert default is for Dems to give up enough in concessions so a high enough number of Republicans will vote to raise the debt limit to get it through. The game is that Boehner knows it must be raised -- wink, wink -- but all those crazies in his caucus will need some goodies to get them to go along.

Note these details from the Post's write up:

In a series of small-group meetings in his office suite, Boehner has told fellow Republicans that he will not permit a vote on a "clean" short-term spending bill that does not end or delay parts of the new federal health-care law. But the aides indicated that Boehner is willing to risk infuriating some of the most conservative House GOP lawmakers by relying on a majority of Democratic votes — and less than a majority of Republicans — to pass a debt-ceiling increase.

What still needs to be nailed down is whether Boehner is prepared to allow a vote on a "clean" debt ceiling increase. Quotes from his spokespeople suggest not, but on the other hand, if a debt ceiling increase is going to pass with mostly Dems, it would have to be clean. More clarification here would be useful.

**More broadly, what seems to be going on here is that this is Boehner's "big give,"** as one Dem aide put it to me sarcastically. **Boehner is signaling flexibility in the sense that he just may be willing to give Dems the "clean" debt ceiling increase they want, but only in a larger context where Dems will be expected to make concessions in exchange for keeping the government open.** In other words, whether or not Boehner ends up being open to a "clean" debt ceiling vote, the larger picture will remain that Democrats will still have to hand over a series of concessions in exchange for GOP cooperation in returning us to something resembling governing normalcy.

So in one sense, this isn't much of a concession. On the other hand, **the mere fact that Boehner sees a need to telegraph nominal flexibility to begin with could be a key tell. With Obama warning that Wall Street should take the possibility of default seriously, Boehner seems to see a need to underscore, again, that he will not allow default** under any circumstances, and that keeping alive any doubts about this is politically untenable. Dems will look at this and probably only be even more encouraged to hold to a hard line on both the government shutdown and the debt limit. Boehner's trial balloon is also useful in the sense that it makes the glaring absurdity that's always been at the heart of his position even more glaringly absurd.

**Boehner is willing to compromise**

**Lowrey & Parker, 10/4** (Annie Lowrey and Ashley Parker, 10/4/2013, International Herald Tribune, “Republican said to soften stance on debt limit; Speaker signals openness to deal as Obama steps up push for resolution,” Factiva))

As the Obama administration on Thursday sharply stepped up the volume in its tense fiscal battle with Republicans, with warnings from the president and the Treasury that a debt default could have a catastrophic global impact, a key Republican sent a message that he would not let that happen.

The twin warnings came from a Treasury Department report and a muscularly worded speech from President Obama, who said that unless Congress acted soon, ‘‘the whole world will have problems.’’

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### AT: XO Solves

#### Presidential action CRUSHES THE ECONOMY

Liptak, 10/4 (Adam, 10/4/2013, NYTimes.com Feed, “Experts See Potential Ways Out for Obama in Debt Ceiling Maze,” Factiva))

However one interprets the Constitution, there remains the practical question of whether the nation’s creditors would continue to lend to the United States if the president did take unilateral action.

“I don’t think anyone in their right minds would buy those bonds,” Michael W. McConnell, a law professor at Stanford, said of debt issued without Congressional authorization.

Were Mr. Obama to act, court challenges would inevitably follow. But most legal experts said they expected judges to stay out of the fray, either by ruling that the particular challengers had not suffered the sort of direct injury that gave them standing to sue or by ducking the issue by calling it a “political question” not fit for judicial resolution.

In any event, Professor Dorf said, courts could not move quickly enough. “Even when courts move very fast, they don’t move as fast as markets,” he said.

There is at least one reason, Professor Posner said, to hope for a court challenge that would reach and be decided by the Supreme Court: “It would be the most interesting case in decades.”

#### Obama won’t unilaterally continuing borrowing --- rejects that legal reasoning

Liptak, 10/4 (Adam, 10/4/2013, NYTimes.com Feed, “Experts See Potential Ways Out for Obama in Debt Ceiling Maze,” Factiva))

On Thursday, Mr. Carney dismissed the argument, popular in some legal circles, that the amendment authorized the president to raise the debt ceiling.

“We do not believe that the 14th amendment provides that authority to the president,” he said. He added that the meaning of the provision had divided constitutional scholars. That alone, Mr. Carney said, “means that it would not be a credible alternative.”

**Entertaining GOP negotiating demands will drag the process out and trigger economic collapse**

**Lobello, 8/27** --- business editor at TheWeek.com (Carmel, 8/27/2013, “How the looming debt ceiling fight could screw up the U.S. economy; Yup, this is happening — again,” <http://theweek.com/article/index/248775/how-the-looming-debt-ceiling-fight-could-screw-up-the-us-economy)>)

Ready for more debt-ceiling drama?

The Treasury Department said Monday it would hit its borrowing limit in mid-October, which means that Congress will need to raise its $16.7 trillion debt ceiling to pay the nation's bills.

The sooner-than-expected deadline comes at an inconvenient moment, because Congress is already facing a budget deadline for the stopgap "continuing resolution" that finances the federal government, which is set to run out September 30. Failure to come to an agreement would trigger a government shutdown.

Having two big deadlines fall two weeks apart could be a recipe for disaster. Republicans, led by Speaker John **Boehner** (R-Ohio), **have been musing about the possibility of using the debt ceiling, instead of a government shutdown, as leverage to delay the implementation of ObamaCare**.

But as Ezra Klein put it in The Washington Post, "Trading a government shutdown for a debt-ceiling breach is like trading the flu for septic shock":

**Anything Republicans might fear about a government shutdown is far more terrifying amidst a debt-ceiling breach. The former is an inconvenience. The latter is a global financial crisis.** It’s the difference between what happened in 1995, when the government did shutdown, and what happened in 2008, when global markets realized a bedrock investment they thought was safe (housing in that case, U.S. treasuries in this one) was full of risk. [The Washington Post]

Indeed, **a debt ceiling debate in 2011 that went on to the last possible minute had real economic consequences, leading Standard & Poor's to downgrade the United States' credit rating. The move "left a clear and deep dent in US economic and market data," said** Matt **Phillips at Quartz**.

Investors pulled huge amounts of cash from the stock market, and consumer confidence was hurt as well. When the same problem cropped up again in May 2012, because Congress failed to reach a long-term deal, Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers in Bloomberg explained how confidence plummeted the first time around:

[Confidence] went into freefall as the political stalemate worsened through July. Over the entire episode, confidence declined more than it did following the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. in 2008. After July 31, when the deal to break the impasse was announced, consumer confidence stabilized and began a long, slow climb that brought it back to its starting point almost a year later. [Bloomberg]

This morning, Wolfers had this to say:

Treasury Secretary Jack Lew visited CNBC Tuesday morning to reiterate President Obama's promise not to go down he same road. **"The president has made it clear: We're not going to negotiate over the debt limit,"** Lew said.

He also explained why in a letter to Boehner Monday morning. "Protecting the full faith and credit of the United States is the responsibility of Congress, because only Congress can extend the nation's borrowing authority," he wrote. "Failure to meet that responsibility would cause irreparable harm to the American economy."